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1.  PREFACE 
1 
Scope of  Study 
In response to the specific terms of reference provided by the Commission the final 
report presented is  the compilation  of a  6  month  study  U{ldertaken  by  Arthur 
Andersen, with the assistance of Antelope Consulting and Ovum Limited between 
March  and October 1994  for  the Commission of the European Communities DG 
XIII. A.  The study covers only the twelve existing Member Statesl. 
The scope of the study comprised the following aspects: 
Identification of specific issues relevant to questions of cost allocation and the 
choice of cost accounting methods in Telecommunications Operators (TOs) 
Details  of  existing  cost  allocation  and  cost  accounting  methods  of  the 
Community operators 
An  assessment  of  the  way  in  which  interconnect  charges  should  be 
formulated and established 
An assessment of the way in which universal service costs and any other 
social  costs  should be  taken  into  account when  establishing  interconnect 
charges 
An assessment of the way in which efficiency should be  promoted in the 
determination of interconnect charges 
Elaboration of cost allocation and cost accounting methods, compatible with 
existing national practices, which would be necessary for implementing an 
efficient scheme for establishing interconnect charges.  This was limited to the 
overriding  principles  and  did  not  require  identification  of  detailed  cost 
allocation rules or cost accounting principles. 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, UK. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
The study was carried out through interviews with interested parties and original 
research  of interconnect  regimes in place  worldwide,  and  takes  accoWlt  of the 
considerable advances made by the Commission in earlier studies. 
The data in this report is correct as at the time of the questionnaire responses and 
interviews.  We appreciate that changes in opinions and aspects of the data may 
have arisen during the time since conducting the questionnaires and interviews.  In 
particular we would like to note that SIP, our respondent from Italy, has recently 
undergone merger with I  takable, lritel, Telespazio and Sirm to form a new operator-
Telecom I  talia. 
Acknowledgements 
The study team developed detailed questionnaires to gather information and these 
were  circulated  to  the  incumbent  Telecommunications  Operator  (TO)  (former 
monopolist PTO) and the National Regulatory Authority (NRA)  in each Member 
State together with a number of actual and potential competitors and interconnecting 
operators.  We would like to thank all the personnel at these organisations who gave 
of their time to complete the questionnaires and attend the follow up interviews.  A 
list of the organisations surveyed by questionnaire and/  or interviewed in connection 
with this study is set out below. 
COUNTRY  OPERATO~EGULATORNAMffi 
Belgium  Belgacom 
Belgian Institute for Post and 
Telecommunications 
Denmark  Tele Danmark A/5 
Telestyrelsen 
France  France Telecom 
Direction Generale des Postes et 
Telecommunications 
Germany  Deutsche Bundespost Telekom 
Federal Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications 
Mannesmann Mobilfunk 
Greece  Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
Hellenic Telecommunication 
Organisation (OTE) 
2 
INTERVIEWED  QUESTIONNAIRE 
COMPLETED 
"  "  "  " 
N/A  "  N/A  "  "  "  ~  " 
" 
CD 
"  "  N/A  " 
X  X 
X  X ' 
Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
Ireland  Telecom Eireann  ...J  ...J 
Department of Transport, Energy and  ...J  ...J 
Communications 
Italy  SIP (now part of Telecom ltalia)  ...J  ...J 
Ministry of Post and  X  X 
Telecommunications 
Luxembourg  Enterprise des Postes et  ...J.  ...J 
Telecommunications 
Ministry of Communications  ...J  ...J 
Netherlands  PTI Telecom BV  ...J  ...J 
HDTP  ...J  ...J 
Portugal  Portugal Telecom  N/A  ...J 
Ministry of Transport and  X  X 
Communication 
Spain  Telef6nica de Espana, SA  ...J  ...J 
Directorate Generale de  ...J  ...J 
Telecomunicadones (DGTel) 
United  British Telecom  ...J  ...J 
Kingdom  Mercury Communications Limited  ...J  ...J 
Vodafone  ...J  ...J 
Cellnet  ...J  ...J 
Mercury one-2-one  ...J  N/A 
Colt  ...J  N/A 
Energis  ...J  N/A 
Cable Television Assodation  ...J  N/A 
United States  AT&T  ...J  N/A 
of America 
x  These organisations were invited to. participate in the study but unfortunately 
had to decline due to other constraints on their time 
<D  The Questionnaire was completed by Arthur Andersen from information 
gained in the interview. 
Further Information 
The study was conducted by a  European wide team of professionals  under the 
direction of John Ormerod.  Any queries on the contents of this report should be 
directed in the first instance to John Ormerod, Nick Owen or Morten Singleton on 44-
71-438-3622,44-71-438-3058 or 44-71-438-3000 respectively. 
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2  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
2.1  Introduction 
The provision  of telecommunications services has historically  been  considered  a 
natural monopoly.  As a result of technological advances most telecommunications 
experts now are of the opinion that monopoly conditions are theoretically only likely 
to  arise in specific  segments  of the local  loop, if at all.  In parallel' with  these 
technological advances, regulatory developments and changing political factors have 
motivated the consideration of introducing competition into telecommunications in 
many countries.  Following the Review of the Telecommunication Services Sector the 
European Community has set the liberalisation of all voice telephony services as a 
major long-term goal. 
Competition  in  network  industries  can  either  take  the·. form  of  service  based 
competition over a monopolist's network or there can be infrastructure and service 
based  competition  where  competing  networks  add  a  further  dimension  to  the 
competitive  environment  In  either  case  liberahsation  will  require  the 
interconnection of competing networks and service providers to ensure "any-to-any" 
service  is  provided  in  an economically  efficient  manner.  Such  interconnection 
necessitates the establishment of principles for determining, on an ongoing basis, the 
charges that must be levied by one network operator to another network operator or 
service provider for the interconnect services demanded, i.e. the interconnect charge. 
In  newly  liberalised  environments,  there  are  no  market  prices  for  interconnect 
services.  Furthermore,  where  netw-orks  are  owned  by  organisations  that  are 
competing against firms needing to interconnect with the same network, there is a 
risk  that  anti-competitive  behaviour will  result.  It  is  essential  to  establish  the 
framework  for  interconnect  charges  otherwise  there  is  a  risk  that many  of the 
potential benefits to the Community of competition will be delayed or lost. 
The  Commission's  response  to  this  has  been  that  the  basis  for  establishing 
interconnect charges should be an assessment of the costs incurred by the operator 
providing interconnection  facilities,  i.e.  that interconnect charges should be "cost 
orientated".  This requires the establishment of principles for determining the costs of 
efficiently providing interconnect services, including the costs of providing universal 
service where such an obligation exists. 
The  purpose of this  study is  to  recommend  cost  accounting  practices  and  cost 
allocation methods compatible with existing national practices to support such an 
efficient scheme of interconnect charges.  This  study therefore looks  at the cost 
accounting  issues  of relevance  to  Telecommunications  Operators  (TOs)  and  the 
existing cost accounting practices  of Member State  operators.  It  then  provides 
recommendations  on  how  interconnect  charges  should  be  established  and 
formulated,  how universal service obligations and efficiency  should be promoted 
through the interconnect regime and finally considers the cost accounting practices 
and cost allocation methodologies that should be adopted to support such charges. 
5 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
2.2  Cost Accounting in Telecommunications Operators 
The Need for Cost Accounting Systems 
Organisations adopt cost  accounting systems that provide cost information  that 
users require.  The relative values placed upon different types of information by 
different users will be  reflected in the cost accounting systems that organisations 
adopt.  These influences are not static but are dynamic, changing to meet the new 
requirements  of information  users  as  the  organisation,. its  competitors  and  the 
commercial and regulatory environments evolve. 
There are a number of different interest groups, or stakeholders, in any organisation. 
Broadly they can be divided into two groups - external and internal.  The demand 
for cost information from management, the principal internal stakeholder, arises for 
a  number  of  reasons  including  the  desire  to  make  the  total  business  more 
manageable by breaking it down, to introduce incentives for efficient  production, 
and to provide relevant cost information for pricing decisions etc.  Each purpose may 
require different cost information and each may be slightly different to  the cost 
information required for external financial reporting. 
Where competitive commercial pressures do not necessitate management to seek this 
internal cost information, costing systems often develop to support external financial 
reporting  requirements.  US-UK  comparative  research,  undertaken  by  Arthur 
Andersen, of the changes that take place when network utility industries are opened 
to  competition  concluded  that  the  challenges  created  by  emerging  competition 
necessitate significant cultural and  management changes,  not least of which  are 
those concerned with service cost and profitability measurement and management. 
Cost Accounting as a Regulatory Concern 
The role that cost information plays in the regulatory environment may influence the 
cost accounting systems of TOs as a result of the demands placed upon such systems 
by regulatory reporting requirements.  Costs have traditionally, and will continue to 
be, an important feature in "utility" regulation. 
The approach taken to consumer protection by the NRA, be it "rate of return" or 
"price-cap"  regulation,  will  influence  the  demands  placed  upon  the  TO's  cost 
accounting systems.  Whilst the latter has better incentive effects on the total cost 
base of a monopolist provider it does not ensure the production of robust service 
cost information, a feature more commonly associated with rate of return regulation 
prescriptions. 
The requirements of a TO's cost accounting system will therefore be influenced by 
the  changing  regulatory  environment  One should  not presume that  with  the 
introduction of competition the responsibility and workload of the regulator will 
automatically reduce.  Indeed, during the transition from monopoly to competitive 
markets the regulator's requirement for cost information may become more onerous, 
until the competition becomes established and market forces provide the necessary 
checks.  · 
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The  more  active  roll  envisaged  for  the  NRAs,  particularly  in  refereeing  the 
unbundling  of  tariffs,  developing  the  cost  methodology,  and  overseeing  its 
implementation will require additional resources and funding if it is to achieve these 
.policy aims. 
Cost Standards and Costing Terminology 
Different  cost standards have  different  uses.  Any  analysis  of cost information 
should be carefully reviewed to ensure it meets the user's requirements.  No single 
cost standard can provide all the information an organisation needs. 
It can be argued that efficient resource allocation and consequent economic efficiency 
results if prices are set equal to marginal cost (MC).  However, MC is impractical to 
measure due to the difficulty of analysing unitary changes in output  This problem 
can be overcome if  long run incremental costs (LRICs) are used.  LRICs take a longer 
term view of the changes in cost that arise and therefore allow both volume sensitive 
and non volume sensitive fixed costs to be incorporated into a  cost standard that 
remains  marginal  in  concept,  and  therefore  also  promotes  efficient  resource 
allocation and economic efficiency. 
However, both the MC and LRIC standards have a serious shortcoming.  Neither 
takes account of residual joint and common costs nor of the historical financial 
position  of the  organisation.  Therefore if prices  are set equal to  the  LRIC  an 
organisation is unlikely to be financially viable in the long term.  Instead prices must 
be set at a  premium, or margin, above the LRIC, such that across all services the 
margin allows a  recovery of the residual joint and common costs, and provides a 
return that covers the legitimate past expenditure of the organisation, and allows it 
to remain financially viable. 
Whilst there are some theoretical economic principles for  developing prices based 
upon concepts of incremental cost, such as the Ramsey Pricing Rule and the Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule,  both have practical shortcomings that render them less 
useful. 
Fully Distributed Cost (FDC) is an historical cost concept that distributes all of an 
organisation's costs to products and services.  If used in pricing decisions this will 
ensure that the firm remains financially viable, but many economists have argued 
that the use of arbitrary cost allocations  within the FDC system results  in  sub-
optimal decisions and therefore inefficient outcomes.  The degree of arbitrariness in 
cost attribution and allocation can be significantly reduced with the use of cost causal 
attribution  and  allocation  methodologies,  such  as  Activity-Based  Costing,  and 
therefore the criticisms of FDC for use in pricing decisions can to some extent be 
mitigated.  · 
Embedded  Direct  Cost  (EDC)  is  an  historical  cost  contribution  approach  that 
attributes the actual direct historical network expenditure to individual services.  In 
this way prices can be set such that the margin above EDC is sufficient to recover all 
historical  residual joint and  common  costs  and  to  ensure  that  the  organisation 
remains  financially  viable  in  the  longer  term.  EDC  contribution  analyses  are 
appealing to regulators and TO management because they "tie into the books" and 
explain recent, albeit past performance.  They allow management to obtain a detailed 
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understanding of the  relative  contributions  of individual services  and highlight 
revenue and cost imbalances.  They also provide a rigorous basis for setting prices 
which  ensures  that revenues  will  fully  recover  legitimate  expenditure  made  in 
previous years. 
A final drawback of both FDC and EDC, even when enhanced by the use of Activity-
Based Costing, is that they are based upon the existing physical network engineering 
capacity and existing business processes and work practices.  They take no account 
of  technology  changes,  potential  efficiencies  in  business  processes  and  work 
practices, and include large elements of cost which are "sunk" or unavoidable in cost 
determination. 
Some words about Cost Allocation 
In considering any cost standards for use in pricing decisions it is important that 
operators  and  regulators  alike  ensure  that  they  both  understand  and  satisfy 
themselves that appropriate decisions have been taken in the cost attribution and 
allocation process. 
There  is  considerable  flexibility  in  developing  cost  attribution  and  allocation 
principles.  Having  decided  upon  the  principles  there  is  considerable  further 
flexibility in the detailed basis of application.  The telecommunications industry is 
characterised by a very high proportion of the cost base having no direct relationship 
to the service offerings.  Consequently, complex decisions are required on extensive 
and subjective cost attribution and allocations. 
Ideally a rigorous and detailed cost methodology should be published in sufficient 
detail for an independent observer to understand all the judgements that have been 
made. 
2.3  Existing Cost Accounting Practices and Cost Allocation Methods of Community 
Operators 
Background 
The  national  geographical  and  demographic  factors  as  well  as  the  ownership 
structure,  competitiveness  of  the  marketplace,  and  the  external  and  regulatory 
reporting framework of the individual Member States have all influenced the level of 
costs and the development of costing practices in each Member State's incumbent 
TO. 
Given  the genesis  of most of Europe's  TOs  in state-owned monopolies  and the 
relatively  recent formulation  of independent companies in many Member States, 
their existing cost accounting systems reflect the historical demands that were placed 
upon them.  These are unlike the demands made upon the cost accounting systems 
of competitive commercial organisations.  Accordingly, their cost accounting systems 
are often not as well developed. 
Financial Reporting Requirements 
Historically, many of Europe's TOs were managed to a state imposed budget and 
they  were  required  to  account  on  a  cash  basis  for  transactions.  The  costs  of 
a 
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individual products and services was not a significant issue for either managers or 
policy makers.  As long as total revenues were in excess of total costs by an amount 
sufficient to fund investment, and to provide a contribution to state treasuries no-one 
focused on the relative profitability of different services. 
More  recently,  many  of  Europe's  TOs  have  been  established  as  independent 
companies,  but  more  often  than  not,  majority  ownership  has  at  least  initially 
remained  with  the  state.  Whilst this  has necessitated  the  adoption  of  accruals 
accounting, the rigour and detail with which it is applied is greatly influenced by the 
ownership  structure,  regulatory  demands  and  the  degree  of liberalisation  and 
consumer pressure. 
In  most  Member States  the cost accounting  systems  of the  incumbent TOs  are 
significantly less well developed than one would find in competitive commercial 
organisations.  Most incumbent TO's accounting systems have developed to a large 
extent  to  support  external  financial  reporting  requirements.  While  most  TOs 
perform  some  form  of  internal  management  cost  reporting  this  is  often 
predominantly sourced from the external financial reporting system and is unlikely 
to be of sufficient rigour and detail to provide 'accurate' service cost information. 
The  rigour  and  detail  employed  by TOs  across  Europe  to  meet  their  external 
reporting requirements is  also  variable.  Most of Europe's TOs have to  produce 
annual financial statements that adhere to the requirements of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and other relevant legislation.  This has been broadly 
harmonised by the implementation of the EC 4th and 7th Directives which have been 
adopted  throughout the  community.  ·However,  the  costing  and  other  systems 
developed to support these requirements vary considerably.  For example, there are 
a number of incumbent TOs that have not, until comparatively recently, or do not 
currently, maintain a full detailed fixed asset register. 
The role of the NRA varies across the community.  Some NRAs have only recently 
been established, but all are now separated from the operator.  Generally, outside the 
UK the regulatory environment is in the early stages of development  The level of 
understanding amongst Member State NRAs of the cost accounting issues associated 
with interconnection is varied, with many NRAs requiring significant improvement 
to be effective  in their  roles.  It is  apparent that many  NRAs  are  approaching 
interconnect without an adequate understanding of the costing issues.  This may 
temper effective  regulatory  oversight in  developing  cost  orientated  interconnect 
charges. 
Regulatory reporting requirements vary considerably across  the community with 
consequent variation in the demands placed upon TO's cost accounting systems. 
Where binding requirements exist in the law or the. licence the TO's cost accounting 
system has to be capable of compliance.  However, some NRAs use ad-hoc reporting 
requests for information which restricts, rather than facilitates  the development of 
the TO's cost accounting capabilities. 
In some Member States the regulatory role appears to be blurred with that of an 
investment monitoring role.  There is clearly significant potential for conflicts where 
such a situation exists.  Such inherent conflicts of interest need to be resolved if the 
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industry  is  to  gain  confidence  in  the  ability  of the  NRA  to  provide  impartial 
regulation. 
Internal management information has not yet reached the levels of complexity, detail 
'and  flexibility  more common in competitive commercial organisations.  Internal 
reporting increasingly focuses  on the customer and efficiency which will in  tum 
encourage the development of more sophisticated cost accounting systems. 
Few  incumbent TOs  produce highly  segmented reporting.  Generally,  the  TO's 
segmental reporting capability is  not as  detailed  as  will be  required  for  setting 
accurate cost orientated interconnect charges. 
In  competitive  operators  more  rigorous  and  detailed  segmental  information  is 
maintained.  Incumbents  generally,  however,  have  indicated  a  keen  interest  in 
obtaining additional and more rigorous  information where this  is not currently 
available. 
Both  operators and NRAs anticipate dramatic changes in reporting requirements 
which  will  in tum require significant  development of the  TO's  cost  accounting 
systems.  The competitive forces which would encourage such developments may be 
enhanced by NRA involvement to increase the pace of change. 
Cost Standards 
The cost accounting systems of the incumbent operators all currently utilise the FDC 
cost standard.  Some incumbents professed themselves unaware of incremental costs 
and their suitability for pricing decisions but those who are familiar with this cost 
standard appreciated how useful it might be.  In contrast, operators in competitive 
markets demonstrated a greater awareness of the alternative cost standards to FDC 
and utilised those standards more extensively.  FDC is also not held in such high 
regard by them as it is by incumbent operators in less competitive markets. 
NRAs generally indicated less awareness of the issues in the choice of cost standards 
than the TOs.  However, to some extent this may be explained by a reluctance to 
comment  where  cost  standards  are  currently  under  consideration.  Generally, 
however, NRAs are proponents of the FDC or equivalent standards due to the ability 
to verify the costs by independent audit 
Existing Member State interconnect agreements reflect the fact that all incumbent 
operators utilise FDC based cost accounting systems.  Only in competitive markets 
are alternatives advocated, such as Mercury Communication Limited's preference for 
incremental cost based interconnect charges in the l!K. 
Few TOs indicated any willingness to revise the cost standard used in their cost 
accounting system.  NRAs were silent on this issue. 
Cost Accounting Systems 
Most TOs agree that direct costs make up a minimal proportion of total costs.  Much 
of the  service  cost calculation  is  therefore  dependent upon  the  attribution  and 
allocation of shared costs.  There are large differences in the level of detail and nature 
of cost data captured, collected and analysed into cost pools between TOs.  (For 
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example fixed  assets are categorised differently and depreciated at different rates). 
Generally it was evident that more detailed and rigorous processes were conducted 
by operators in competitive markets. 
Similarly there were large differences between approaches to the capitalisation or 
expensing of cost items in each Member State.  This might seem surprising given the 
expected  harmonisation  intended by the implementation of the EC  4th  and 7th 
Directives in  all  Member States but it reflects the range of alternatives permitted 
under Member States' accounting standards. 
The cost attribution and allocation methods used by Community TOs also varied in 
the levels  of allocation  and the methods used.  The principles  of Activity-Based 
Costing are becoming increasingly well known although its practical application is 
currently fairly limited and restricted to a relatively high level. 
Most TOs view their cost accounting systems as continually evolving to  meet the 
needs of internal and external information users. 
Cost and Tariff Imbalances 
Large imbalances exist between service costs and tariffs in all Member States (except 
Denmark), both geographically and by service.  TOs and NRAs do not generally 
expect geographical  de-averaging to  take place in the future.  Geographical de-
averaging of tariffs is a  politically sensitive issue and should therefore be tackled 
appropriately. 
Service cost and tariff rebalancing would eliminate the local access loss.  Many TOs 
and NRAs are considering service rebalancing (at least partially) which will reduce 
the magnitude of the local access loss. 
Interconnect 
Outside  the  UK,  existing  network  operator  interconnection  is  generally  only 
extended to a  related party mobile operator, or a  second mobile operator.  Most 
interconnect charging is  currently tariff orientated as opposed to cost orientated. 
However, there are encouraging signs of TO's intentions to collect and measure the 
costs associated with interconnect in the future.  This  does not yet extend to  an 
understanding of, or intention to cost, unbundled services.  TOs outside of the UK 
have not addressed  in  detail  the  issue  of  what unbundled  services  should  be 
available in interconnect. 
Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
Most TOs and NRAs are unable to provide a sufficiently detailed definition of the 
USO to allow it to be costed, and do not, as a general rule, calculate the cost in any 
detailed way. 
Deliberately or otherwise, most incumbents confuse the definition of the USO with 
that of the Access Deficit and as such are overestimating the magnitude of the cost of 
the USO. 
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24  Formulation and Establishment of Interconnect Charges 
Factors Influencing Interconnect Charge Formulation 
The diversity of interconnect regimes around the world demonstrate that a number 
of factors can influence the formulation and establishment of interconnect charges. 
For example: 
•  The structural separations introduced into the telecommunications sector at 
the time of liberalisation; 
•  The government's objectives for future industry structures; 
•  The timetable over which the goals of liberalisation need to be achieved; 
•  The degree of tariff imbalances in existing retail tariffs; 
•  A consideration of the political repercussions of certain courses of action. 
The formulation and determination of interconnect charges will be one of the most 
significant  determinants of how efficiently  the industry  uses  its  scarce  network 
resources.  It will also influence how closely retail prices reflect the true underlying 
economic  costs  of service provision,  and thus how rapidly incumbent operators 
improve  their  efficiency  and the market responds  to  changing consumer needs 
through service innovation.  The need fo'r the NRA in each Member State to become 
involved in the establishment and regulation of interconnection and particularly the 
agreement  of cost  orientated  interconnect  charges  required  to  allow  the  use  of 
monopoly assets is therefore inevitable. 
Costs and Tariffs 
Most European incumbent TOs are at present still operating as at least dominant 
players in most of their businesses, and most have a monopoly over the provision of 
voice telephony services.  As a result, their tariff structure has arisen to a great extent 
as  a  result of their genesis in the public sector and this has led to  a  number of 
inherent cross subsidies. 
These  cross  subsidies  arise  as  a  result  of  obligations  and/  or  tariff  constraints 
imposed by the regulatory authorities.  These have an economic consequence on the 
incumbent and many argue that these obligations and/  or their funding should be 
shared  amongst competing operators,  perhaps through  the interconnect  regime. 
There are two significant cross  subsidies that need to be considered particularly, 
Universal Service Obligations (USOs) and the Local Access Loss. 
The usa arises  where  operators  are  required  to  provide socially  desirable  but 
uneconomic services (e.g. pay phones) or to serve groups of uneconomic customers 
(e.g. the deaf, the socially disadvantaged, remote rural subscribers).  There is clearly 
a cost in the provision of these services and as markets are liberalised  regulators 
need to decide whether the obligations and/  or their funding should be shared. 
Also as a result of their genesis in the public sector in most Member States TOs have 
tariff imbalances for particular services.  The most important, and that articulated by 
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most TOs is that they make a loss on the provision of local access due to  pricing 
below cost, and that this is funded through above cost call tariffs.  Whilst the origin 
of  this  local  access  loss  may have been  as  a  result  of early  USO  policy,  most 
customers giving rise to a local access loss are not USO customers.  When viewed 
together with the revenues generated from incoming and outgoing calls many of 
these subscribers are economically profitable.  Therefore such tariff imbalance costs 
as the local access loss should be considered separately from the USO. 
Unless tariffs are rebalanced to closely reflect underlying cost, such imbalances could 
give  rise  to  real  costs  to  certain  operators.  For  example, if the incumbent TO 
provides residential access but a new entrant carries that subscriber's long distance 
call  traffic  the incumbent will  lose  the opportunity to  fund  its  local  access  loss 
through higher long distance call charges.  This is the logic behind requiring new 
entrants to make a contribution to the local access loss, such as the Access  Deficit 
Contribution (ADC) regime in the UK. 
Our empirical research demonstrates that there is a great deal of misunderstanding 
throughout  Europe  with  many  people  using  the  terminology  "Access  Deficit" 
synonymously with the cost of USOs.  What should be appreciated is the two are 
fundamentally different in their cause and underlying economics and significantly 
different in quantum, and therefore need to be considered separately. 
Formulation of  Interconnect Charges 
In formulating cost orientated interconnect charges a  number of elements to  the 
interconnect charge can be identified.  There are two principal elements that relate to 
costs that arise as a result of one party buying interconnect services from another. 
These are the Connection Charge and the Conveyance Charge. 
If a policy decision is taken to share the provision of and/  or the funding of costs 
arising in relation to obligations imposed by the regulator (as identified above) via 
the interconnect regime, a further two charge elements can be identified.  The first of 
these will reflect tariff imbalances - i.e. the Local Access Loss Charge, and the second 
will reflect the cost of USOs - the Universal Service Obligation Charge.  The need for 
the local access loss charge will obviously be removed if  NRAs remove the constraint 
on incumbent TOs rebalancing their tariffs. 
Unbundling 
In setting cost orientated interconnect charges it is  also necessary to  address the 
question of what it is that interconnecting operators should charge for, and what it is 
they demand.  To date interconnect regimes have been set up for the provision of 
bundled interconnect services.  More recently in the UK and the US, there has been a 
drive to  unbundle interconnect services.  This  necessitates  the separation  of the 
service into  the use of different network elements to  ensure that interconnecting 
operators only pay for those network elements they use.  Indeed, due to the different 
underlying economics of individual network elements it is not possible to achieve 
cost orientated charges unless charges are levied for unbundled elements. 
Recent  experience  in  the  UK  has  shown  that  identification  of  the  unbundled 
elements is not a simple task  However~ one thing is clear, the identification of the 
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unbundled elements should not be left to the incumbent TO or the NRA  alone. 
Participation by existing and potential competitors is necessary to understand what 
it is they wish to buy.  In the UK  Oftel's original consultation on interconnection 
started in June 1993.  By  March 1994, following a number of industry workshops, 
Oftel  were  only  able  to  publish  a  preliminary  list  of services  unbundled  into 
individual network components.  Finalisation of this list is yet to be achieved. 
Establishment of  Interconnect Charges 
There is widespread consensus that operators should be allowed freely to negotiate 
the  detail  of  interconnect  terms  and  conditions.  However,  there  is  clearly 
asymmetrical power in such negotiations in favour of the incumbent TO.  Therefore 
regulatory intervention in setting the framework for interconnection would appear 
to  be  essential.  The  NRA has  a  vital  role  to  play  to  ensure that interconnect 
agreements promote fair competition.  This can only be achieved if  new entrants can 
rely for their bargaining power on a regulatory regime which sets the framework 
and  objectives  that  interconnect  agreements  are  considered  in,  and  provides  a 
process for dealing with disagreements.  It is also the responsibility of the NRA to 
ensure that interconnect agreements promote economic efficiency and are therefore 
in the national interest 
To  achieve these goals,  the NRA must establish an interconnect framework that 
allows  transparent interconnect charges which are both efficient and sustainable. 
The interconnect regime must ensure that there is no undue discrimination and that 
sufficient  information  is  available  to  ensure competitive new  entry  and  market 
efficiency  result.  Accounting  separation  is  widely  accepted  as  a  method  of 
supporting this  objective,  although the practicalities of its implementation would 
require industry consultation. 
Whilst we acknowledge the principle of subsidiarity it will be an opportunity lost if 
these  principles  are not agreed  in  sufficient  detail at a  community  level.  The 
Community as a whole may suffer if  their establishment is left to individual Member 
State NRAs and the inevitable delays that would result. 
2.5  The Universal Service Obligation and Interconnect Charges 
We understand the Commission's underlying aim is to ensure that the economic 
benefits of competition within the European telecommunications sector are achieved 
without foregoing the social benefits which have historically, been available through 
state run monopolies, and their implicit cross subsidisation of such social policies. 
The empirical research in this study shed very little new light on this subject and 
accordingly this report sets out preliminary ideas, mainly derived from the existing 
expertise of the study team members,  reviewed jointly in the light of the  other 
findings of this study. 
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Compatibility of  Competition and Universal  ~eroice 
There are many who have argued that the introduction of competition endangers 
universal service policy  goals  because it will  lead  to  the end of cross  subsidies 
inherent  within  existing  tariff  structures,  to  the  detriment  of  many  ordinary 
customers.  Whilst there is some strength in this argument, the contrary position is 
that as long as regulatory oversight is exercised to ensure price rebalancing takes 
place at a reasonable rate, and that vulnerable subscriber groups who could suffer 
from rebalancing are safeguarded, subscribers will benefit from liberalisation.  In fact 
there  are  some  strong  and  compelling  arguments  why,  properly  regulated, 
competition can in fact  benefit universal service,  and indeed may form part of a 
future definition of universal service. 
VVhat is the Universal Service Obligation 
Whilst the concept of universal service is  clearly understood throughout Europe 
there are number of definitions available, none of which are sufficiently articulated to 
allow accurate costing.  In a report to DG IV,  Cave, Milne and Scanlan define the 
USO as "services that are supplied to customers or groups of customers at a loss, 
even when the firm supplying them is operating efficiently and its past investment 
has been based on sound business decisions".  Obviously this should not include 
those customers that in hindsight are loss making but only because the TO has failed 
to  exploit  their  potential.  Further,  they  have  identified  four  different  policy 
perspectives that may relate to universal service. 
It is apparent that, depending upon the stage of telecommunications development in 
a  particular  Member State,  different  policy  perspectives  may  predominate,  thus 
affecting the definition, interpretation and cost of the USO in each circumstance.  For 
example in stages of early development, universal service goals will primarily be 
related  to  the  achievement  of universal  geographic  coverage.  In  high  income 
countries, where household penetration is  likely to exceed 90%,  universal service 
goals are largely likely to be accomplished for basic service and the principal policy 
objective then becomes providing targeted subsidies to prevent subscribers leaving 
the  network  as  a  result  of  tariff  rebalancing,  and  to  encourage  marginal  non 
subscriber groups to subscribe. 
In most Member States it is  possible to  generalise  that the primary goal  of the 
universal service policy is  now social,  and we should therefore regard universal 
service  as  a  social  requirement  of  the  telecommunications  industry.  Similarly 
allowing freedom to rebalance the different revenue components to better reflect the 
underlying costs is overall in the national interest of each Member State and should 
therefore be encouraged, subject to suitable consumer safeguards. 
It should be noted that incumbent TOs in certain Member States have onerous public 
service obligations e.g. France, Belgium.  These are not the same as universal service 
obligations but are similar, in that they impose upon the incumbent a cost e.g.  the 
cost of provision of a telephone service free  of charge to  the government.  In the 
short term these costs can be dealt with in the same way as USO costs, but the long 
term objective should be to remove from the industry the burden of funding such 
obligations. 
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Responsibility for Universal Service 
Whilst universal service policy objectives are clearly the domain of the NRA in each 
Member State it has traditionally been the "responsibility" of the incumbent to meet 
and fund such costs.  As markets liberahse it is likely that this could lead to some 
sub-optimal incentive effects whereby the incumbent operator incurs, or claims to 
have incurred, more than economically efficient costs in meeting its obligations.  This 
is likely to present problems as operatorS and regulators try to agree if and how the 
cost of such obligations should be funded in a liberalised environment. 
In this report we have assumed that by the time European Member States liberalise 
their  voice  telephony  services,  networks  will  have  achieved  wide  geographic 
coverage and that universal service policy  objectives  will largely be  restricted  to 
targeting  subsidies  to  disadvantaged  groups and to  prevent people  leaving  the 
network following rebalancing.  If liberahsation occurs before a  Member State has 
reached this stage, the cost of the USO is likely to be greater to ensure widespread 
geographical network coverage.  Given the current liberahsation timetable we do not 
anticipate that this will happen, but if it does the obligation for wide geographical 
coverage can be accommodated in the same way as other targeted subsidies, by a 
franchise approach.  Indeed liberalisation in this way may speed up universal service 
provision.  We also assume that by the time voice telephony is h"beralised service cost 
and tariff imbalances in Member State tariffs will have been  eradicated  through 
progressive tariff rebalancing.  If they have not,  local  access  losses  will  still be 
recorded by incumbent operators and the associated cost will need to be funded. 
The point to note is that this is not included within the cost of USO. 
Establishing and maintaining the social requirements of universal service policy will 
become an iterative process involving the following steps.  Firstly the NRA through 
wide  consultation  and  debate  should  deterntine  what  "non  commercial"  (USO) 
services society requires of the telecommunication industry.  Each TO should then be 
invited  to  offer  such  services  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Remaining  unfulfilled 
requirements should where appropriate be made the subject of competitive bids, 
such that TOs could bid to fulfil all, or part of, a requirement and contracts would be 
awarded on the basis of a  fuller  evaluation of these bids.  The services  thought 
unsuitable for competitive bidding, or for which no bids are received, would then be 
imposed as an obligation on whichever TO, or TOs, appears to be best placed to fulfil 
them efficiently.  This means it will not always be the incumbent TO, although in the 
early  stages  of  h"berahsation  this  is  more  than  likely.  Where  such  unilateral 
imposition imposes an inequitable cost burden upon TOs they could then appeal to 
the NRA to share the funding of the obligation.  Our empirical research shed very 
little new light on the actual cost of meeting USOs in each Member State.  In part this 
was because the "cost" may be variously interpreted as either total cost or net cost 
taking into account call revenues, or lifetime cost as opposed to specific period cost, 
and  in  all  cases,  can  be  calculated  either  on  an  avoidable,  fully  distributed  or 
incremental cost basis. 
Cost of  Universal Service 
Logically the most satisfactory definition of the cost is one that takes account of the 
net current annual cost for all lines which prior to connection, the TO would choose, 
or have chosen, not to connect.  There is a normal commercial decision to cultivate 
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currently unprofitable or marginally profitable customers for their future prospects 
(e.g. student bank accounts) and whilst future prospects are of course never certain it 
is usual to accept some risk.  Therefore not all unprofitable customers would fall to 
be defined as USO  customers.  Since only a  minority of customers are likely to 
impose a net USO  cost (after taking account of call revenues), it is  reasonable to 
estimate  the  cost  of service  provision  to  these  "uneconomic"  customers  on  an 
avoidable cost basis, i.e.  to calculate what cost would be saved if these customers 
were taken off the network or not connected. 
The net cost of USO as defined above is likely to vary significantly depending upon 
the level of network development.  In high income European countries with well 
developed networks the avoidable cost of removing a subscriber from the network is 
likely  to  be  very  small,  whereas  at the very early stages  of development when 
network roll out is a high priority the avoidable cost of adding subscribers to new 
areas are much more significant.  A recent report by Analysys for the Bangemann 
Group has estimated the cost of USO before and after proposed tariff rebalancing 
and concluded that excluding Greece and Portugal, where networks are less well 
developed, the USO costs range form 0.5%  to 5%  of revenue prior to rebalancing and 
0.25%  - 3.7%  after rebalancing.  Having examined the available data on the cost of 
USO in advanced economies we observe that any method based upon TOs cost and 
revenue records can produce a number of different answers.  If, however, avoidable 
costs are used and incoming call revenues are taken into account, such costs shrink 
dramatically. 
Funding of  Universal Service 
Where an operator believes the unilateral imposition of universal service obligations 
upon it is  unfair because  the avoidable cost is  incongruous with  its  status  and 
competition policy objectives it could appeal to the NRA for shared funding.  After 
the NRA has vetted the avoidable cost calculated by the TO, they may agree to some 
form of shared funding of the cost. 
Whilst it may be convenient to use interconnect agreements as the vehicle for such 
income transfers to help fund social obligations the relevant cost will not generally 
vary in proportion to any dimension of interconnect, be it either capacity or call 
minutes, so it is not clear that they should be  added to  the existing elements of 
interconnect charges.  Generally they may be better relegated to a separate item in 
the interconnect agreement in their own right, and recovered as a USO levy on the 
industry in  a  competitively neutral manner,  perhaps based  on revenue.  These 
proposals are consistent with current work being done in the USA  on a  so called 
"Net Trans systems for Universal Service Support". 
2.6  Promotion of Efficiency Through Interconnect Charges 
There is  widespread belief that the provision of voice services by the incumbent 
operators  of  Europe  is  currently  inefficient.  The  primary  driving  force  for 
liberalisation is the desire to increase the static technical and allocative efficiency of 
the industry together with its dynamic efficiency.  This will improve the efficiency of 
use of network resources, the use of resources by the economy as a whole and the 
efficiency with which the industry responds to market needs respectively. 
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Efficiency of  Incumbent TO 
Interconnect charges themselves are probably not best used as a  direct n1eans  for 
influencing the operational efficiency of incumbent TOs, due to the immaterial effect 
that interconnection is likely  to have on the incumbent TOs cost structure in the 
short-term following  liberalisation.  The  only  way  to  achieve  lasting  efficiency 
improvements is to open the telecommunications sector to the forces of competition, 
and in this way interconnect charges can be used indirectly to promote efficiency if 
they are set at a  level that enables competitive entry,  and reduces the perceived 
barriers to entry. 
Competition can establish new levels of operational best practice, putting pressure 
on costs, driving modernisation programmes and thereby increasing both the static, 
technical and dynamic efficiency of the market  The price rebalancing resulting from 
competition will improve allocative efficiency and the pressure on profitability will 
increase dynamic efficiency further. 
Efficient Market Entry 
NRAs must, however, balance the desire to facilitate competitive entry by setting 
low interconnect charges with the risk of inefficient market entry based upon short-
term arbitrage opportunities that do not offer economically sustainable businesses. 
If  this occurs, there will be a loss of static technical efficiency which, if prolonged and 
taken to an extreme, could outweigh the benefits achieved from liberalisation.  This 
is certainly a danger when the interconnect charges are set equal to any marginal or 
incremental concept of cost.  As previously discussed, to encourage only efficient 
market entry interconnect charges should accourtt for more than the incremental cost 
of interconnect calls.  They should also contribute a proportion to all residual joint 
and common costs, even where these cost are sunk, and they should be calculated 
over a reasonably large increment and long time frame. 
NRAs could well argue that the dangers of inefficient market entry are small when 
compared with the benefits of enhancing the efficiency of the incumbent TO through 
competition.  The optimal output is likely to be achieved only if NRAs balance the 
desire to promote competition and the risk of potentially inefficient market entry. 
Inefficient  market  entry  could  also  result  from  cross  subsidies  within  existing 
telephone tariffs.  In virtually every Member State there is a cross subsidy where call 
revenues fund local access losses.  The. most efficient means of dealing with this 
situation is for  tariffs to be rebalanced to remove the local access  loss.  This will 
enable prices  to  reflect  the real cost of provision and thus encourage use of the 
telephone network only where it is  cost effective  to  do  so.  The  only economic 
argument  against  this  cost  orientated  tariff,  is  that  high  access  prices  might 
discourage new network subscriptions and thus reduce the number of people any 
individual  telephone  user  is  able  to  contact.  The  balance  between  these  two 
arguments depends upon the level of penetration of the national telephone network, 
but in most Member States penetration is already high and it would seem likely that 
the local access loss is not serving any economically useful social purpose.  It would 
be much more preferable to allow tariff rebalancing, with safeguards to ensure that 
there is no market "shock" and that vulnerable subscriber groups are protected.  If, 
however, tariff rebalancing to eliminate the local access loss is not possible it will be 
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necessary to build a contribution to the local access loss into the interconnect regime 
or find an alternative method for shared funding. 
Charging Method 
If  interconnect charges are based upon retail tariffs of the incumbent, the new entrant 
is severely restricted in its ability to offer any innovative tariffing schemes, and "me 
too" pricing and service offerings will result  This will create dynamic inefficiencies 
in the market. 
If prices are to be based on cost the "pure" charging method would be to relate the 
interconnect price  to  the network capacity  used for  the  majority  of conveyance 
charge elements,  since this reflects  the real cost causation.  However,  the use of 
capacity charging tends to work against the new entrants and many may prefer an 
interconnect price based on calling levels.  This is not the case where the new entrant 
becomes more established and can better forecast its capacity requirements. 
Perhaps the best arrangement is  to give the new entrant the choice of either the 
capacity or per call minute cost related interconnect charge. 
Further, interconnect charges should be based upon unbundled network elements, 
as the differing underlying economics of different network elements will not allow 
cost orientation in a bundled environment.  Whilst the cost associated with defining 
and identifying the appropriate unbundled network elements may be high in the 
long term it is likely that the cost will be  ·more than justified by the benefits accruing 
to the industry. 
Ensuring Efficiency Over Time 
Whatever the cost basis for interconnect charges they should be formulated in such a 
way that allows the balance between encouraging competitive market entry and the 
requirement only to encourage sustainable market entry to change through time. 
This will allow the charges to mirror the changing competitive positions within the 
liberalised market place.  The use of marginal or incremental cost based interconnect 
charges tends to  foster  efficiency  in the incumbent, but may result in inefficient 
market entry.  It may provide a good starting point for interconnect prices but if  this 
approach is to be adopted it is important that an increasing premium is added to the 
incremental cost each year to ensure that the new entrants are adding to the overall 
efficiency of the market  Whilst the use of fully causally distributed cost will help to 
guard against inefficient market entry, it may well prevent competitive market entry 
and will tend to reduce the competitive pressure on the incumbent and thus may not 
encourage improvements in its efficiency.  In this case it is important that there is 
downward  pressure  on  FDC  based  interconneCt  price  and  thereby  on  the 
incumbent's cost base.  It seems likely that some form of price-cap should be used, 
particularly where it is also being applied to retail tariffs. 
Structural Asymmetries 
Undoubtedly  there  will  also  be  a  whole range  of other  structural  asymmetries 
existing in the market at the time of liberalisation (e.g.  unequal access).  Whilst the 
interconnect charge may be used  to  compensate new entrants  for  the structural 
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disadvantages any such method can only produce sub-optimal economic outcomes. 
The only way to remove this problem is to remove the structural asymmetries.  In 
the intervening period prior to  their removal a  number of countries have found 
abatements  to  interconnect  charges  a  useful  method  to  encourage  incumbent 
operators  to  remove structural asymmetries  or to  help new entrants  offset  their 
consequent costs. 
2.7  Cost Accounting Practices to Support an Efficient Scheme of Interconnect Charges 
There  is  clearly  no  right  way  to  fol'll}ulate  and  establish  interconnect  charges. 
Different interconnect regimes reflect different industry structures and the political 
and social objectives of these jurisdictions.  Similarly they develop as the market 
develops  and will  never achieve  the economically  optimal  solution  but instead 
should be  constructed to facilitate competitive market entry and thus obtain the 
benefits of liberalisation in a way that meets national political and social objectives, 
whilst striking a balance between the interest of incumbents and new entrants, for 
the benefit of consumers.  Therefore whilst it is possible to evaluate the alternative 
approaches theoretically, the one adopted in practice is likely to be  a theoretically 
sub-optimal  but workable  compromise.  At  a  European  level  we  can  suggest 
principles  that  should  be  followed  in  establishing  cost  orientated  interconnect 
charges that benefit from the experiences of other countries, and that these principles 
should be broad enough to have application across Member States. 
Appropriate Costs for Setting Interconnect Charges 
The only definition of cost that is relevant for pricing decisions is  one that is  based 
upon long run cost.  This will allow the organisation to  remain financially viable. 
However, there is an asymmetric distribution of information behveen the incumbent 
TO and competing operators and the NRA alike.  Therefore to have confidence in the 
cost of providing interconnect the NRA ~ust  either calculate the cost himself using 
an historical cost or engineering cost study approach or alternatively set down the 
principles that should be followed by the incumbent TO in calculating these costs. 
The latter appears attractive but it should be recognised that too much discretion can 
be left with the incumbent if only broad principles  are promoted by  the  NRA. 
Further, the NRA  cannot avoid a  detailed understanding of the incumbent's cost 
base if it is  to  ensure that regulatory  investigations  and questions  of price-cost 
relationships are clearly understood. 
Historical Vs Forward Looking Cost 
Economic theory would suggest that the relevant long run costs are forward looking, 
and that prices should then be set to provide a premium or margin over the forward 
looking long run costs such that across all services this margin allows the company 
to and remain financially viable.  In competitive commercial organisations prices are 
not set based on cost alone but are based on market forces.  However, in practice 
approximations of varying accuracy to  the forward looking costs  are often made 
employing historical cost information.  Whilst not always the case, this is because the 
cost  of  obtaining reliable  forward  looking cost  information  often  outweighs  the 
resulting benefits.  Furthermore management are often keen to ensure that reported 
profits cover all historical costs.  Our empirical research suggests that in the more 
competitive  Member  States  TOs  are·  beginning  to  develop  a  much  better 
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understanding of their cost bases for management decisions.  This is an expensive 
process which requires competition to provide the driving force. 
Competitive  markets  stimulate  the  development  of new  management  tools  for 
success in the competitive arena.  As competition becomes more intense the cost of 
not understanding forward  looking costs  will  outweigh the cost saved by using 
"rough historical approximations".  It is only the forces of competition that will drive 
TO management to develop the myriad of management tools they need to survive, 
such as a more sophisticated understanding of their customers and the segment and 
service  line  contributions  achieved.  It  is  the  commercial  need  to  have  this 
information that will drive organisations to understand and manage their costs in a 
way that gets closer to economically efficient ideals.  It is our belief that regulatory 
demands will never be able to deliver these responses in the way that a competitive 
market place can. 
Furthermore, there are a number of practical problems with the implementation of 
forward looking costs.  Most of the European TOs do not have a cost system that will 
produce the information in a robust manner.  Whilst we predict that competition will 
force  them to ascertain this information in the long run, information obtained by 
regulatory demand is unlikely to be satisfactory.  The only remaining solution would 
be for the NRA to commission independent cost studies of the forward looking costs 
using engineering cost studies.  However due to  the asymmetry of information 
between the incumbent and others this would likely result in a sub-optimal outcome, 
and  even  if these  costs  were  developed  they  would  undoubtedly  meet  with 
criticisms from unconvinced competitors.  Due to the lack of transparency between 
underlying cost and charges the regime would be difficult to defend.  Finally, they 
are subjective in nature and therefore incapable of independent verification or audit. 
Thus, whilst we believe that the correct cost basis for pricing decisions is one based 
upon  forward  looking  costs  it is  unlikely  that most of  Europe's  TOs  could  be 
required to produce this information given the characteristics of their existing costing 
systems.  In the interest of expediency interconnect charges in a practical setting will 
need to be based on historical rather than forward looking cost, at least in the short 
run.  Whilst not theoretically pure this will for the time being allow interconnect 
terms to be set in advance in a transparent manner which will be an "enabler" for 
market entry and therefore competition  ..  Following hberalisation, as the interconnect 
market  becomes  competitive  interconnect  charges  will  be  driven  to  reflect  the 
forward looking cost by the competitive process. 
Incremental Vs Fully Distributed Costs 
The next question is to decide whether Incremental ~ost (IC) or FDC should be used. 
Whilst not an  economically  pure substitute  for  forward  looking  LRIC,  an  EDC 
approach can be used as a rough approximation of incremental costs.  This does not 
overcome criticisms relating to changing technologies and inefficient operations, but 
the application of rigorous cost causal principles, including the use of Activity-Based 
Costing techniques  for  cost  attribution  and  allocation,  can  be adopted  to  get  a 
workable substitute for  the LRIC.  Prices  set equal to  the EDC  will not make a 
contribution to residual joint and common cost or allow the organisation to remain 
financially viable in the long term, therefore a margin should be added so as to allow 
recovery  of  these  costs.  This  margin  should not be  so  high  as  to  ensure  the 
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incumbent TO recovers all of its cost and therefore has no incentive to become more 
efficient. 
The margin should be established through negotiation between the interconnecting 
parties.  Where this does not give rise to agreement the NRA should determine the 
appropriate margin. 
In  the  early  stages  of  liberalisation  the  contribution  to  total  revenue  from 
interconnect services is likely to be small for the incumbent TO, but the cost to the 
new entrants is likely to be the single most important determinant of their viability. 
A  workable compromise that encourages competitive market entry and also puts 
incentives on the incumbent to reduce cost through increased efficiency may be to set 
interconnect charges based at a margin above the EDC but below FDC.  Thus there is 
a  theoretical  basis  for  setting interconnect  charges  based  on  this  surrogate  for 
incremental cost when first introducing competition and then migrating towards 
charges based on fully  allocated costs as competition develops.  Ultimately,  in a 
competitive market the difference between the FDC and the LRIC plus "premium" 
will be small. If  one accepts the EDC as a rough approximation to the IC it will allow 
interconnect charges to be based upon costs from the audited accounting system and 
will provide transparency in the relationship between cost and charges.  Whilst not 
the most theoretically sound basis in the short term this will facilitate efficiency in 
the long term by permitting market entty and therefore put pressure on costs such 
that in the long term charges reflect the true underlying cost of service provision. 
Formulation of  Interconnect Charges 
Having considered the cost standard to  be  utilised  it is  worthwhile  refocussing 
attention on the formulation of interconnect charges. 
A.  Charges for Interconnection Services 
Al.  The Connection Charge.  Of the interconnect charge elements this is likely to be 
the most easily identified and agreed by interconnecting parties, and consists  of 
primarily  capital  costs  that  can  be  easily  identified  in  a  causal  manner  as  a 
consequence of interconnection.  Charges for connection should reflect the directly 
attributable  costs  of  connecting  the  two  systems.  Charges  should  be  one-off 
reflecting  the non  traffic  sensitive nature  of these  costs,  although  a  mixture  of 
upfront payments and periodic fixed rentals may be agreed. 
A2.  Convevance  Charges.  These  charges  should  be  for  unbundled  network 
elements.  Conveyance costs cover: 
the use of the physical connection betWeen the two networks to permit the 
transfer of calls from one network to another; 
the  usage  cost  incurred  when  one  operator  utilises  another  operator's 
network to handle a call e.g. the provision of sufficient capacity for switching, 
transmission, and other network components; 
the variable supplementary and ancillary costs, such as call setup, monitoring 
and recording network activity, billing etc; and 
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the overhead cost associated with the provision of interconnect services. 
The costs and therefore the charges will have a number of sub components reflecting 
a  combination  of  fixed  Non  Traffic  Sensitive  (NTS)  costs,  and  variable  Traffic 
·Sensitive (TS)  costs and also  distance and non distance sensitive costs.  The cost 
should be separately calculated for each unbundled network element and divided 
into those that are NTS and those that are TS, and those that are distance related and 
those that are not. 
B.  Charges for shared funding of obligations and tariff restrictions imposed by 
the Regulator 
B1.  Local Access  Loss Charge.  For an economically efficient outcome and a less 
problematic  regime  the  local  access  loss  is  best  dealt  with  by  removing  any 
restrictions upon operators from rebalancing their tariffs, provided universal service 
obligations are met by targeted subsidies. 
It is understandable that with the potential threat that infrastructure competition in 
the local loop may have, many incumbent TOs do not find it attractive to lobby to lift 
the restrictions on rebalancing.  If  the restrictions were lifted they may well not raise 
prices as a result of this threat of competition, and this would result in their local 
access business still being loss making.  One conclusion is to suggest that the book 
cost of the incumbent TO's investments in their local loops must be stated above 
their economic value, and that therefore they should be written down to  allow a 
reasonable return to be made on providing access. 
If neither rebalancing nor asset writedowns has been effected prior to liberalisation 
and losses are still incurred as a result of regulatory restrictions on price rebalancing 
then some form of shared funding of the ·local access loss will be required. 
The problem then becomes one of ensuring correct quantification of the size of the 
local access loss.  For new entrants to have confidence in the regime this will require 
an  exposure  of  the  incumbent's  cost  base  and  an  accurate  calculation  and 
quantification of the local access loss. 
The local access loss will not vary in proportion with any dimension of interconnect 
other than the use of the local access network.  The cost should not be recovered 
within the interconnect charge but relegated to a separate item in the interconnect 
agreement to be recovered over the use of the local access network in a competitively 
neutral manner.  · 
B2.  Universal Service Obligation Charge.  The most satisfactory result may well be 
achieved if USOs  are allocated to those organisations best placed to achieve them 
once voluntary or competitive application for provision of such services has been 
taken into account.  Only if a TO can then demonstrate that the avoidable cost is 
inequitable given its size should the NRA consider shared funding of this avoidable 
cost by way of a levy on other operators. 
However, the cost associated with USOs will not generally vary in proportion to any 
dimension of interconnect, be it either capacity or call minutes.  As with the local 
access loss charge they may be better allocated to a separate item in the interconnect 
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agreement in their own right and therefore become more akin to a USO levy on the 
industry and recovered in a competitively neutral manner rather than incorporated 
within the interconnect charge. 
The Isolation of  Inefficiency 
Even where the arbitrariness of cost attributions and allocations  is  reduced with 
rigorous employment of cost causal attribution and allocation methodologies such as 
Activity-Based Costing, there is  still an unresolved problem with the use of any 
historical cost approach.  That is, they attribute cost based upon the actual historical 
network  engineering  capacity  together  with  actual  business  processes  of  the 
organisation, and therefore the resulting costs reflect historical traffic patterns and 
performance of the organisations.  If the TO is,  or has been, inefficient there is  a 
danger that this will be encouraged to continue.  Therefore it is imperative that the 
NRA together with TOs ensure that a strict application of Activity-Based Costing is 
used  in  cost  attribution  and  allocation,  this  will  assist  in  the  identification  of 
inefficiencies.  Benchmarking between European TOs will assist in identifying areas 
of cost worthy of more rigorous investigation.  This will generally lead to a reduction 
in the cost of individual network elements. 
Each NRA should agree with incumbent operators a process for elimination of the 
inefficiencies.  Only  where  it is  felt  appropriate  should  these  costs  be  shared. 
Sensible network planning which has resulted in efficient surplus capacity to ensure 
the resilience of the network should not be confused with inefficiency. 
Consistency and Comparability 
Due  to  differences  in  accounting  policies  and  their  detailed  application  by 
Community operators different operators could derive different costs given the same 
underlying cost base.  It is important that during the period of managed competition 
there is an effort by the Community to ensure consistency and comparability of cost 
methodologies to ensure that different accounting treatments  do  not allow  sub-
optimal economic  outcomes  to  arise.  This  should not be  restricted  to  the  cost 
accounting policies adopted but also to the cost attribution and allocation principles 
used in operator's costing systems. 
There is considerable flexibility in developing these cost attribution and allocation 
principles  and having decided upon the principles  there is  considerable  further 
flexibility in their detailed application.  It should be the responsibility of the NRA 
together with the industry to agree the cost accounting methodologies and identify 
the underlying cost drivers within the network operations and also the techniques to 
be used in the Activity-Based Costing system.  This is  a  fairly  detailed area  and 
requires considerable work, however, if this investment is not made up front the 
even larger potential benefits of competition will be lost. 
28  Conclusions and Recommendations 
In view of the challenging and complex issues involved in liberalisation across a 
diverse Community, the purpose of this study was to highlight the key issues and 
provide  some  broad  guidelines  and ·principles  to  form  the  basis  for  future 
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development and progress.  The views expressed in this report are clearly our own, 
and are based upon the interviews  that we have performed with operators  and 
regulators  throughout  Europe  and  the  secondary  research  of  the  considerable 
literature which has been published on this subject 
There is  currently a unique opportunity for the European Commission to ensure a 
harmonised approach to the cost accounting methods used in the establishment of 
costs on which to base interconnect charges.  This will ensure that consistent and 
efficient  charges  are  developed  across  the  Community.  . With  the  onset  of 
competition in voice telephony in most European countries ti.metabled for 1998, this 
process will be increasingly difficult to implement if  delayed. 
Any  guidance  that  the  Commission  develops  on  this  subject  should  take  into 
consideration the business requirements of the Telecommunications Operators (TOs) 
themselves, and as such should be practical, implementable and congruent with the 
business practices of these operators.  The Commissions' goal should be to develop a 
general framework  for  interconnect;  establishing the broad principles  which will 
form the basis for future development and progress, and hence enable a harmonised 
approach to interconnect. 
Existing Cost Accounting Practices and Cost Allocation Methods of Community Operators 
The cost accounting practices and cost allocation methods of Community operators 
generally meet the information needs of current users.  However, the competitive 
market place will  require  the development of more rigorous  approaches  to  cost 
accounting in many Member State TOs.  Early development should be encouraged. 
In  addition, the importance of a  comprehensive and harmonised cost accounting 
approach to interconnect in the EU has been recognised. 
To date, with few exceptions National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) have generally 
not been  required to have a  detailed understanding of the cost accounting issues 
associated with interconnect  However, with the onset of a liberalised market NRAs 
will need to develop a more detailed understanding of costing issues to be able to 
provide effective  regulatory  oversight in  developing cost orientated interconnect 
charges, and cost orientated tariffs. 
Formulation of  Interconnect Charges 
The diversity of interconnect regimes around the world indicates that a number of 
factors influence the formulation and establishment of interconneCt regimes.  As such 
the Commission should suggest broad principles for interconnect to be agreed at an 
EU level.  The responsibility for implementation should rest with the Member States. 
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The principles which we recommend the Commission endorse are as follows:-
•  Interconnect  Charges  should  be  based  on  the  underlying  costs  of  an 
efficient operation, and in all cases contain two elements attributable to the 
interconnect services provided.  These are: 
The Connection Charge. 
The Conveyance Charge. 
•  Separate charges within each element should be developed to reflect the 
traffic  sensitive and non traffic sensitive costs and the distance and non 
distance related costs. 
•  Further  Charge  elements  resulting  from  obligations  and/  or  tariff 
constraints  imposed  by regulatory  authorities  do not relate  directly  to 
interconnect  As such they should be recovered separately from the costs 
of interconnect  services,  or,  at  a  minimum  as  a  separate  part  of  the 
interconnect agreement This incorporates the following elements: 
The Tariff Imbalance or Local Access Loss Charge. 
The Universal Service Obligation Charge. 
Consideration of these elements are given in separate sections below. 
•  Interconnect Charges should be set to facilitate competition.  In order to 
achieve this objective, NRAs in each Member State should ensure that the 
interconnect  process  is  transparent  giving  rise  to  charges  which  are 
efficient and sustainable.  Accounting separation under the review of the 
NRA is one way transparency may be achieved.  In addition, NRAs should 
ensure that agreements are not unduly discriminatory and that confidence 
in  the  agreements  is  promoted  through  the  availability  of  sufficient 
information. 
•  Interconnect charges should be based upon the cost of unbundled network 
elements.  NRAs should liaise with TOs and potential operators to develop 
a list of the unbundled network elements which interconnecting operators 
wish  to  purchase.  A  co-ordinated  European  approach  would  be  an 
efficient means by which this process could be achieved and would ensure 
cross-border consistency. 
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The Local Access Loss 
The local access loss arises out of service cost and tariff imbalances.  We believe that 
the local access loss should be eradicated, where justifiable, by ensuring that any 
constraints on the rebalancing of tariffs are removed. 
We recommend that the Conunission should: 
•  Encourage Member States to remove all barriers to tatiff rebalancing.  The 
speed  of  rebalancing  and  safeguards  for  vulnerable  consumer  groups 
should be determined by the NRA to take account of the national situation. 
•  Until such time as the service tariffs are rebalanced, consideration may be 
given by the NRA to sharing these "losses" amongst competing TOs.  Such 
costs of the local access loss should be recovered ··over the use of the local 
access network in a competitively neutral manner. 
•  Recovery  of the local  access  loss  should only be partial,  to  encourage 
efficiency in the incumbent operator.  Local access loss charge waivers may 
be considered by NRAs to encourage competitive market entry until full 
rebalancing  has  occurred,  but such  initial  waivers,  if of  only  limited 
duration, make transition arrangements more difficult and will stifle the 
development of competition in the local access market. 
The Universal Service Obligation 
The definition of the universal service obligation evolves with the development of a 
country's telecommunications infrastructure.  Such evolution will continue in the 
competitive market  We believe that competition will not endanger the provision of 
universal service, but that, with regulatory oversight to ensure price rebalancing is 
carried out at a reasonable rate and vulnerable subscriber groups receive targeted 
support, competition will improve the provision of universal service by:-
improving efficiency and reducing prices 
fostering innovation 
generating market growth 
creating increased  revenue with which to  fund  genuine universal service 
obligation costs 
encouraging operators to compete for the provision of social services. 
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We recommend that: 
•  The NRAs in each Member State should be responsible for defining and 
identifying universal service obligation services and costing the universal 
service obligation. 
•  The  following  principles  for  sharing the  proVlSton  and/  or  funding  of 
universal service obligations should be used by the Member States: 
the cost of universal service obligations should be calculated on an 
avoidable cost basis and incorporate the net current annual cost for 
all lines which, prior to connection, the TO would choose, or have 
chosen, not to connect 
the provision of universal service and/  or the funding of the cost of 
universal service obligations should be encouraged to conform to 
the following framework: 
i.  TOs should be encouraged to provide "USO" services on a 
voluntary basis. 
ii.  Unfulfilled  obligations  should be  offered  for  competitive 
tender by TOs. 
iii.  Residual obligations should be imposed by the NRA.s upon 
those TOs best placed to meet them. 
iv.  Where  an  operator  believes  the  unilateral  imposition  of 
universal service obligations upon it is unfair because the 
avoidable  cost  is  incompatible  with  its  status  and 
competition policy objectives it could appeal to the NRA for 
shared funding. 
v.  After the NRA has vetted the avoidable cost calculated by 
the TOs they may agree to shared funding of the cost. 
vi.  Shared funding of universal service obligation costs should 
be  by way  of a  levy  on the industry  in·  a  competitively 
neutral manner and not included as part of the interconnect 
charge. 
Promoting Efficiency 
The most effective  mechanism for  improving efficiency  is  through  liberalisation 
which will: 
encourage use of best practices and apply downward pressure to costs 
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bring about rebalancing and hence improve allocative efficiency 
For  interconnect  no  one  charging  method  will  provide  the  ideal  solution  for 
promoting efficiency.  Low charges may encourage efficiency of the incumbent but 
may also lead to inefficient market entry. 
The promotion of efficiency,  incorporating the principles agreed at a  Community 
level, should be conducted by the NRAs who are best able to tailor the interconnect 
charge regime to the national situation. 
In this respect we recommend the following principles: 
•  interconnect charges should be set so as to facilitate competition which will 
then encourage efficiency. 
•  Where Incremental Cost concepts are used in interconnect pricing, charges 
should be set above the incremental cost to ensure a contribution to  the 
residual joint and common costs of the interconnected operator. 
•  Where  Fully  Distributed  Costing  is  used  to  set  interconnect  charges, 
downward  pressure  should  be  exerted  on  the  interconnect  charge  to 
encourage TO efficiency.  For example, through the application of a price-
cap. 
•  Interconnect charges should be based upon the cost of unbundled network 
elements. 
•  The structural advantages enjoyed by the incumbent should be offset by 
abatement of interconnect charges.  Abatements  may then be  reduced 
through time to reflect the increasing symmetry between the new entrant 
and the incumbent 
•  The industry needs to investigate the practicahty of implementing charges 
based on capacity. 
•  New entrants should then be offered the choice of either a capacity or a 
per-call minute cost related interconnect charge. 
Cost Accounting Practices 
There is currently a  diversity of cost accounting practices across  the Community 
which need to be harmonised for equity in interconnect. 
Investment  in  more  detailed  and  more  rigorous  cost  allocation  and  attribution 
methodologies will arise through compe~tion  in time. 
The Commission should take this opportunity to harmonise accounting policies and 
practices  as  far  as  is  practicable.  A  framework  for  such  harmonisation  should 
incorporate  the  factors  listed  below.  This  is  not intended  to  be a  complete  or 
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definitive list,  and indeed excludes elements previously directed for Community 
action elsewhere in our conclusions. 
We recommend that 
•  European TOs should be encouraged to adopt a uniform approach to cost 
attribution and allocation methods, and accounting principles to ensure 
cross-border consistency in cost measurement. 
•  Cost allocation and attribution methods employed by TOs should be based 
on cost causal principles.  Such principles may require joint and common 
costs  to  be attributed and allocated in a  more cost causal manner than 
currently  employed.  Such  increases  in  the  levels  of  attribution  and 
allocation should be encouraged so long as  the benefits  of greater cost 
causality are not outweighed by excessive expense. 
•  Activity-Based Costing principles should be encouraged for use by TOs as 
a method for understanding the underlying costs and cost drivers where 
Fully Distributed Cost or Embedded Direct Cost standards are used.  The 
industry should agree the cost drivers and cost allocation and attribution 
methodologies to be applied. 
•  TOs  should  be  encouraged  to  develop  long  run  incremental  cost 
information for pricing decisions. 
•  Until such time as long run incremental costs are practicable, interconnect 
charges  should  be  based  on  Embedded  Direct  Cost  plus  a  margin  to 
contribute to the joint and common costs of the interconnected operator. 
•  The  size  of  the  margin  above · the  Embedded  Direct  Cost  should  be 
determined by negotiation between the parties to interconnect.  Only when 
there is a dispute should the Member State NRA become involved. 
•  A  process  for  eliminating  inefficiencies  should be agreed  between  the 
NRAs and incumbent operators.  The costs of inefficiencies in incumbent 
operators  should  be  calculated  where  a  Fully  Distributed  Cost  or 
Embedded Direct Cost approach is used for interconnect charges.  Such 
calculations should either be scrutinised by the NRAs or carried out by 
them.  The  cost  of  such  inefficiencies  should  not  be  passed  on  to 
interconnecting operators in the interconnect charge and should only be 
shared where this is felt appropriate by the NRA. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
3.  INTRODUCTION 
.This section describes the background to this study in order to set it in context with 
other EC studies and relevant Directives.  It discusses the case for interconnection 
and specifically the need for regulatory involvement and cost orientated interconnect 
charges.  It then identifies the key issues to be addressed in achieving this objective, 
relating them to  the scope of the study and describes how the remainder of the 
report is structured to address that scope and draw conclusions. 
3.1  Context of Study 
2 
The conclusions and recommendations of the Review  of the Telecommunications 
Services Sector2, were endorsed in a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers 
on 16 July 1993. 
This set as a major long term goal in the Community the liberalisation of all voice 
telephony services "whilst maintaining universal service".  The resolution has set 
1 January  1998  as  the  overall  date  for  the  full  liberalisation  of  voice  telephony 
services, with additional transition periods of up to 5 years for Member States with 
less developed networks (i.e.  Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal) and a  possible 
period of up to two years for very small networks (i.e. Luxembourg).  It supports the 
Commission's  intention  to  prepare,  before  1  January  1996,  the  necessary 
amendments to the Community regulatory framework. 
In the follow up to that review the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 
commissioned this study on "cost allocation and the general accounting principles to 
be used in the establishment of interconnect charges in the context of telephone 
liberalisation in the European Community". 
Commission of the European Communities.  Communication to the Cound.l and European 
Parliament on the consultation of the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications 
Services sector.  28 April1993, COM (93) 159 final.  ISBN 92-77-55601-3. 
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3.2  Interrelationship of this study with other Concurrent Studies 
During  the  study  timetable  there  was  a  concurrent  study  undertaken  by 
Wissenschaftliches  Institut  fiir  Kommunikationsdienste  GmbH  ("WIK")  and  the 
European-American Centre for Policy Analysis (EAQ on Network Interconnection 
in the Domain of ONP - "The WIK Study". 
The WIK Study on interconnection is a "comprehensive study of the issues involved 
in the interconnection of different telecommunications networks aiming to develop a 
general regulatory framework for  a  competitive market".  The Arthur Andersen 
study  "examines  the  practical  questions  associated  with  the  establishment  of 
appropriate cost allocation and accounting systems and assesses the way in which 
interconnect  charges  should  be  established  in  preparation  for  full  service 
liberalisation".  Our study also assesses the way in which universal service costs 
should be taken into account when estab~hing  interconnect charges and the ways in 
which efficiency should be promoted. 
Our study therefore concentrates on existing cost allocation systems and on the 
practical steps which should be taken to ensure TOs are able to adopt cost allocation 
and accounting methods which will support the requirements of a liberalised service 
domain. 
3.3  Existing EC Directives 
There are a number of existing EC Directives that specifically discuss cost accounting 
systems and the characteristics they should take.  Given the significant cost and lead 
times required to implement different or "upgraded" cost accounting systems it is 
worthwhile summarising the main characteristics recommended in those Directives. 
EC Directives that are of relevance are as follows: 
•  90/387  /EEC- ONP framework Directive 
•  90/388/EEC-The services Directive 
•  92/  44/EEC - leased lines Directive 
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•  Draft Directive on voice telephony 
Each  of  the  above  Directives  call  for  objective,  transparent,  published,  non 
discriminatory, cost orientated tariffs for unbundled services. 
The ONP framework Directive also suggests that unbundled cost orientated tariffs 
should provide for a fair sharing of the global cost of resources and enable operators 
to make a reasonable level of return. 
Article 10 of the leased line Directive sets out the legal requirements to be applied to 
tariffing principles and the cost accounting systems to support them.  Article 10.1 
states that tariffs  should be  cost orientated and independent of their application. 
Article 10.2 states that the suitable cost accounting system should include elements 
that highlight both direct and common costs and also provides general allocation 
principles.  Recital19 to the leased line Directive also states that "[TOs]  shall use an 
appropriate transparent cost accounting system, which can be verified by accounting 
experts ensuring the production of recorded figures; whereas such requirements can 
be  fulfilled  for  example by implementation of the principle  of fully  distributed 
costing." 
3.4  The Case for Interconnection 
3 
Historically  the provision  of telecommunications services  has been  considered  a 
natural monopoly.  There are many different definitions of a natural monopoly but 
the most common are based upon the sub-additivity of the cost function resulting 
from economies of scale and scope.  In theory this means that a  single provider 
should  deliver  conditions  of economic  efficiency  provided  there  is  no  abuse  of 
monopoly power.  As a result of technological advances most telecommunications 
experts recognise that monopoly conditions are theoretically only likely to arise now 
in specific segments of the local loop (WIK)3.  In parallel with these technological 
advances, regulatory developments and changing political factors  have motivated 
Wissenschaftliches lnstitut fur Kommunikationsd.ienste GmbH (WIK).  (Neu, Werner and Karl-
Heinz Newmann).  Interconnection Agreements in Telecommunications.  Study prepared for 
The Commission of the European Communities DG Xlll.  Bad Honnef, January 1993. 
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consideration of the introduction of competition into network industries4, such as 
telecommunications, previously thought of as natural monopolies. 
Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector is widely believed to be the most 
appropriate way to obtain "the best possible deal for the end user in terms of quality,  • 
choice and value for  money"5•  Experience elsewhere in the world indicates that 
competition increases levels  of efficiency,  the amount of service  innovation  and  .. 
customer choice, and has also resulted in reduced prices.  In the US consumers have 
benefited from substantial reductions in ~ong distance tariffs and innovative services 
without  the  deterioration  of  universal  service · achievement  in  states  that  have 
adopted  positive policies  to  that end.  6  Competition will  bring large  consumer 
benefits, not only directly but also indirectly as a result of the fact that an efficient 
telecommunications sector is now recognised as an enabler of industrial growth and 
therefore the economy as a whole". 
Broadly, competition in network industries can either take the form of service based 
competition over a monopolist's network or there can be infrastructure and service 
based  competition  where competing networks  add  a  further  dimension  to  the 
competitive environment.  In either case efficient competition will only be achieved if 
firms  are allowed to interconnect with networks operated by rival firms,  either to 
allow the provision of competitive services or to enable one firm to gain access to the 
other firm's customers, (e.g. to allow a mobile operator's customers to call the PSTN's 
customers). The terms and conditions on which operators can interconnect with each 
other  are  therefore  of  vital  importanc;:e  to  the  development  of  a  competitive 
telecommunications  market  In particular  such  interconnection  necessitates  the 
establishment of principles for determining, on an ongoing basis, the charges that 
Network industries are characterised by the use of a common infrastructure to provide a range 
of products and services e.g. gas, electricity, rail, water and telecommunications. 
Oftel.  Consultative Document issued by the Director General ofT  elecommunication. 
Interconnection and Accounting Separation.  The Office of Telecommunication, June 1993. 
FCC.  ''Trends in Telephone Service" FCC Industry Analysis Division, March 1993. 
Explanations presenting causal arguments which link an expansion in GOP to 
telecommunications development are many, and can be found in the literature on economic 
growth and the diffusion of technology. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG .xm 
must be  levied by one network operator to  another network operator or service 
provider for the interconnect services demanded, i.e. the interconnect charge. 
3.5  The Case for Regulatory Involvement 
8 
9 
In a telecommunications market where all levels of the market are competitive, the 
interconnect services would be competitively priced, and there would be no need to 
establish  the  principles  for  determining such charges.  It is  not necessarily  the 
presence of competition that will provide market prices but the threat of competition, 
existing or possibles.  However, few sectors of the European telecommunications 
market are currently freely competitive for voice telephony services. 
Whenever a network is owned by an organisation that is competing against firms 
needing to interconnect with the same network there is a risk that anti-competitive 
behaviour will result  The dominant network owner is motivated to overcharge for 
interconnection as the competitor's only alternative is to build its own network.  This 
benefits  the dominant operator in two ways,  higher revenues from interconnect 
services  and  greater  barriers  to  potentially  competitive  market  entrants.  The 
sihtation is aggravated by the vertical historical struchtre of the telecommunications 
industry,  where  activities  that  can  be  thought  of  as  nahtral  monopolies,  and 
potentially competitive activities  for which access  to  the network is essential,  are 
combined9.  In the telecommunications industry provision of certain segments of the 
local wireline network can be thought of as a monopolistic service whereas many 
long distance services are now regarded as competitive. 
The Federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommuriications.  Basic Considerations on a Cost 
Benchmark for the Eligibility for Approval of Monopoly Tariffs.  Information series on 
regulation issues 10.  Bonn, May 1993. 
AT & T in their response to the Oftel Consultative Document on Interconnection and 
Accounting Separation stated that "a central barrier to vigorous, multicarrier competition in 
the UK is BT's ability and incentive to frustrate the competitive process through its dominant 
control over essential interconnection facilities needed by others to reach end users, and its 
simultaneous parti.dpation in all levels of the retail market.  Through this structural advantage, 
BT is able essentially to control the viability of its rivals.  In addition, BT may utilise its control 
over interconnection to gain other advantages stemming from the lack of equal access (from 
both customer and technical perspectives), superior information relating to customers and 
network charges and the like". 
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Where there is  vertical separation the provider of "upstream" monopoly services 
provides them as an input to providers of retail services on an arms length basis and 
does not participate in the "retail" or "downstream" market  However, for a number 
of reasons many governments liberalising their telecommunications industries do 
not find it attractive to introduce vertical separation of the former monopolist when 
liberalising.  In this situation, where there is vertical integration and liberalisation, 
the former monopolist is often dominant in the downstream market as well as the 
upstream market and the success of competition is dependent upon the regulation of 
interconnect terms. 
Consequently, whichever industry structure is  adopted regulation of interconnect 
terms  will  be necessary.  WIK  identify  two  opposing views  regarding  the way 
interconnection should come about  The first relies upon regulatory intervention to 
make interconnection mandatory to ensure the success of competition and resulting 
economic  efficiency.  Others  oppose  this  view  on  the  basis  that  mandatory 
interconnection  may  prevent  the  entrepreneurial  new  entrants  from  seeking 
improved methods of providing end to end service.  This view is sustainable only if 
certain conditions pertain to the interconnect terms.  The compromise is  to ensure 
interconnection is  always available, but to allow new entrants to  freely  negotiate 
with  incumbents  over  interconnection  terms  and  allow  them  to  exercise  their 
entrepreneurial  abilities  to  find  alternative  ways  of  delivering  services  to  their 
customers if  this is attractive.  The regulatory problem then becomes one of ensuring 
that  interconnect  terms  achieved  through  negotiation  encourage  economically 
efficient outcomes and that the dominant operator does not take advantage of his 
greater power. Accordingly, charges cannot be left to market forces and regulatory 
intervention is required until market participants can be assured contested market 
prices. 
3.6  Cost Orientated Interconnect Charges 
The  Commission's  response  to  this  has  been  that  the  basis  for  establishing 
interconnect charges should be an assessment of the costs incurred by the operator 
providing  interconnect  facilities,  i.e.  that  interconnect  charges  should  be  "cost Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG .xm 
orientated"10•  This  in  tum  implies  the  need  to  establish  the  principles  for 
determining  the  costs  of interconnect services,  including  the costs  of  providing 
uneconomic  universal  service  where  such  an  obligation  exists.  This  principle 
therefore raises the question of how such costs are measured, and more particularly 
how they are broken down and allocated to different services, or customers. 
The Commission therefore set as the objective of this study fhe examination of the 
practical questions associated with the establishment of appropriate cost allocation 
and accounting systems, and the establishment of the principles for  determining 
interconnect charges. 
3.7  Achieving  Cost  Orientated  Interconnect  Charges  and Relevance  to  Scope  and 
Structure of Report 
10 
The achievement of cost orientated charges gives rise to a  number of key issues 
which must be addressed before a  framework for  achieving the objective can be 
implemented. 
There is the question of how cost is measured in telecommunications organisations. 
There  are  a  number  of  different  cost  standards  available  to  any  organisation 
attempting to understand its costs and ~ey  each have different uses.  Furthermore, 
the characteristics of provision of telecommunications services are that a  range of 
services  are  provided  over  a  common network and  this  gives  rise  to  complex 
questions of cost allocation when calculating the cost of service. 
This issue is recognised in the scope of this study which requires "the identification 
of specific  issues  relevant to  questions  of cost allocation  and the choice  of cost 
accounting methods in TOs".  We address this in Section 4 of this report describing 
the various cost standards and their strengths and weaknesses.  We also discuss the 
historical forces that have influenced the choice of cost accounting methods in TOs. 
Coundl of the European Communities.  Coundl Directive of 28 June 1990 on the establishment 
of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open 
network provision. 90/387  /EEC.  Official Journal of the European Communities No. L192 p1-9. 
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Section  4  therefore identifies  the issues relevant to cost accounting in TOs  and 
develops  some  theoretical  understanding  of  the  relative  merits  of  particular 
standards.  The Commission require that the recommendations of this study are 
consistent with existing national practices,  and therefore before developing any 
detailed recommendations on the most appropriate cost accounting  practices  for 
determining interconnect charges, an appreciation of the current practices of TOs is 
gained.  Accordingly, the scope of this study also requires "Details of existing cost 
allocation  and cost accounting methods of the Community operators."  Section  5 
details the results of our empirical research in this area and provides a  reference 
point for  developing cost orientated interconnect charges which are practical and 
capable of implementation by TOs without excessive cost and disruption, and that 
are therefore compatible with existing national practices. 
The next issue to address is the process of using cost information to establish cost 
orientated interconnect charges.  This is consistent with the scope requirement for 
"an assessment of the way in which interconnect charges should be formulated and 
established".  Section 6 addresses this by revisiting the objectives of interconnect and 
identifying  the  role  of  interconnect  charges  in  shaping  competition  in 
telecommunications.  Section  6  then  discusses  the  formulation  of  interconnect 
charges and identifies the role of the regulator in the process of setting interconnect 
charges. 
The final components of the study's scope are "an assessment of the way in which 
universal service costs and other social costs should be taken  into account when 
establishing interconnect charges" and "an assessment of the way in which efficiency 
should  be  promoted  in  the  determination  of interconnect charges"  respectively. 
Sections 7 and 8 discuss these two issues in tum identifying the inter-relationship 
between interconnect and the policy objectives of universal service and efficiency. 
Section 9 of the study builds on the findings of the previous sections by pulling the 
various  issues  and  findings  together  to  set  out  a  practical  framework  for  the 
establishment  of  cost  orientated  interconnect  charges.  It  also  provides  some 
suggestions on what the next steps should be in terms of research and development 
of more detailed recommendations. 
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4.  COST ACCOUNTING IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS 
4.1  Introduction 
Across the Community there are diverse levels of regulatory understanding of the 
cost accounting issues of relevance to interconnection betweeit TOs.  This section 
reviews  a  number of the basic  issues  pertaining to  cost accounting in  TOs.  It 
examines  the  need  for  cost  accounting  information  and  systems  by  business 
organisations and the influences on the design and sophistication of such systems.  It 
then examines the changing requirements for cost accounting systems in TOs and 
the impact of regulation  and liberalisation  on the requirements  of such  costing 
systems.  The section then reviews the nature of costs arising in TOs and provides an 
analysis of the different cost standards used to analyse costs, and an overview of 
their  appropriateness  for  different  uses.  Finally  consideration  is  given  to  the 
particular problem of cost allocation for TOs. 
4.2  The Need for Cost Accounting Systems 
Before  making any observations  on cost accounting practices  and cost allocation 
methods employed by organisations, or recommending appropriate practices to be 
adopted, it is worthwhile to first review the reasons why all business organisations 
need cost accounting systems. 
The need for such systems is driven by a desire for cost information.  There are a 
number of different interest groups, or stakeholders, in an organisation, all of which 
have a  desire for  cost information.  Many will require  different information for 
different purposes.  As the environment changes the constituent stakeholders in an 
organisation  may  change,  as  will  the  importance  placed  upon  the  different 
information requirements of each. 
Cost accounting systems therefore need to produce cost information that meets the 
requirements of those demanding the information.  Accordingly, they evolve to meet 
the information requirements of the stakeholders- information only being produced 
when the benefits of production outweigh the associated costs. 11 
Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XDI 
Stakeholders within any organisation can broadly be  divided into  two  groups -
external  and  internal.  External  stakeholders  will  include  shareholders,  the 
government, the revenue authorities, suppliers and customers, the NRA,  etc.  and 
this  necessitates  external  financial  reporting  of  cost  information.  Internal 
stakeholders  comprise  management,  employees,  etc.  These  groups  will  require 
internal financial and non financial reporting of cost information. 
Cost accounting systems are required by management for a number of purposes; 
pricing,  performance management, etc.  (see below).  However, traditionally they 
have generally developed within the framework of the external financial reporting 
system.  This is the system for reporting organisational results to the owners to allow 
them  to  assess  management's  performance,  to  the  revenue  authorities  for  the 
purposes of levying taxes and perhaps the government to ensure particular policy 
objectives are being met.  These are 'external' impositions and of more interest to 
commercial  organisations  has  been  the  use  of  cost  information  to  assist  in 
management 
Cave and Mills have suggested that the demand for management cost information 
for commercial organisations may spring from at least four sources11.  Firstly the 
desire  to  breakdown the firm into more manageable units,  secondly to  sustain a 
system of incentives to encourage efficient  production, thirdly to co-ordinate the 
activities of separate units and fourthly to provide information relevant to pricing. 
They point out that the cost information required for external financial reporting and 
internal management reporting is likely to differ, and even the four requirements of 
management  set  out  above  may  require  different  costing  procedures.  Where 
competitive commercial pressures do not necessitate management to seek this cost 
information costing systems often develop to support external financial reporting 
requirements only. 
It is intuitive that the cost accounting systems adopted in monopoly state controlled 
TOs whose principal objectives are the provision of a  universal service at specified 
engineering and quality standards are likely to  be  relatively unsophisticated, and 
Cave, Martin and Roger Mills.  Cost Allocation in Regulated Industries.  Centre for the study 
of Regulated Industries (CRI) Regulatory Brief 3.  Public Finance Foundation 1992.  ISBN 
085299 5520. 12 
13 
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may be based on concepts of cash accounting not accruals accounting.  Once these 
organisations  are  replaced  by  public  companies  with  monopoly  power  the 
requirement for cost information is likely to escalate if only to the point where the 
regulator can ensure that the return on total costs is equitable.  As  they become 
competitive organisations the management cost information requirements are likely 
to grow dramatically as managers try to identify the profitability of different services 
and customer groups to maximise profits and ensure an efficient allocation of the 
organisation's resources12. 
Arthur Andersen have conducted comparative US-UK research of the changes that 
take  place  when  utility  network  industries  are  opened·. to  competition13.  This 
research  concluded  that  worldwide  the  environment  for  utilities,  including 
telecommunications,  is  being  transformed  by  the  competitive  pressures  that 
inevitably  arise  following  privatisation  and  deregulation.  Protected  markets, 
predictable financial performance, unchallenged operating policies and job security 
can no longer be relied upon.  One by one, each industry has had to face the new 
challenges  created by emerging competition.  This  has necessitated cultural  and 
management changes within the industries not least of which are those concerned 
with cost management and service cost and profitability measurement. 
In summary, costing systems have developed, and will continue to develop, to meet 
the information demands placed upon them.  In the context of European TOs  a 
number of factors will have influenced the sophistication of existing cost accounting 
systems, and will continue to affect their future development, not least of which are 
the  ownership  structure  (government  department,  government  controlled 
independent company, public company), the competitiveness of the market place, 
the external reporting requirements and the regulatory requirements.  As detailed in 
section 5 these variables are quite different across the European Community and 
As network industries are privatised and liberalised there is a need for these organisations to 
adopt new management strategies and this requires them to develop new management 
techniques often based on new or improved information systems - including changed costing 
systems.  In the context of the majority of European TOs these organisations are yet to fully 
adapt and they do not therefore posses the sophisticated cost accounting systems that 
competitive industries possess.  These will be a pre-requisite to their future competitive 
success. 
Arthur Andersen.  Predictable patterns - Navigating the continuum from protected monopoly 
to market competition.  March 1994. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
influence on the sophistication of existing and future cost accounting systems should 
not be underestimated. 
4.3  Cost Accounting as a Regulatory Concern 
14 
The role that cost information plays in the regulatory enviroru:itent will influence the 
cost accounting systems and their development.  Costs have traditionally been, and 
will probably continue to be, an important feature in utility regulation, especially in 
the development and approval of tariffs.14  . 
As the extent of liberalisation increases so too does the demand for cost information 
by the regulator.  This is set out in more detail below, and serves as a good example 
of how the information requirements of a stakeholder are not static, but instead are 
dynamic, changing with the environment the TO operates within.  Regulation has 
long sought to substitute competitive market conditions and "hold the fort"  until 
competition arrives.  It  has attempted to achieve this by using costs as a benchmark 
against which prices can be measured. 
Regulation has three primary objectives in price setting: 
•  consumer protection  - prevention  of  customer  exploitation  in  the 
•  competition policy 
•  social obligations 
regulated  service  areas,  primarily  through  tariff 
controls. 
prevention of anti-competitive pricing strategies in 
competitive business areas, and the promotion of 
customer choice through competition. 
the administration of special service prescriptions 
for TOs which fulfil public policy objectives. 
Wissenschaftliches lnstitut fur Kommunikationsdienste GmbH (\VII<) (Weinkopf, Marcus). 
Regulatory Requirements on Cost Accounting Systems within the Framework of ONP.  A 
study carried out for CEC-DG Xlll.  Final Report.  Bad Honnef, February 1992. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlll 
The way that costing systems have evolved to help national regulators meet these 
objectives is often a by-product of the method of regulation chosen. 
Consumer Protection 
In  competitive  markets  purchasers  make  decisions  based  on  prices  offered  by 
different suppliers of goods relative to the utility they experience from making the 
purchase.  It is very rare for the purchaser to be interested in the cost of production 
of a particular good.  In a monopoly market place where no alternative competitive 
prices exist the purchaser is far more concerned about the costs of production of the 
underlying good or service so as to make a judgement about the "fairness"  of the 
price charged- "is it reasonable?".  The prevention of customer exploitation by undue 
high prices has been the overriding reason for the regulation of public utilities. 
The grant of a monopoly right to a supplier in a certain market reduces the elasticity 
of demand faced compared to that which would be faced under competitive market 
conditions.  In an attempt to prevent upward pricing flexibility regulators use cost 
information to  assess  the reasonableness  of tariffs  for  services  subject  to  quality 
benchmarks.  There  are  two  commo.n  approaches  to  this  problem.  Firstly 
endogenous  cost-based  approaches;  where  the  regulator  determines  appropriate 
tariff levels based upon an analysis of the costs actually incurred in the production of 
regulated services (i.e. "rate of return regulation").  Secondly exogenous index based 
approaches; where acceptable tariff levels are, after an initial assessment of future 
productivity development of the regulated firm for  an agreed number of periods, 
determined by the development of exogenous indices, like for example the Retail 
Price Index (e.g. "price-cap regulation").  The type of regulation chosen affects the 
regulatory demands made upon cost accounting system. 
In  the US  the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)  originally  adopted an 
endogenous cost-based rate of return regulation.  As a consequence the regulator 
had to formulate, supervise, and enforce detailed r:uJ.es  for the development of the 
reasonable cost base that should be used in rate of return calculations.  As a result US 
TOs have experienced extremely prescriptive rules and regulations  regarding the 
Universal System of Accounts (USOA) and detailed cost accounting principles.  The 
level of prescription was undoubtedly related to the fact that US TOs were not state 
owned but publicly  held  private  sector  companies,  and  the  threat  of  abuse  of 
monopoly power to the detriment of the general public was therefore more acute ArthUl' Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the EUiopean Communities, DG XIll 
than  would  be  expected  for  state  owned  companies.  More  recently  the  US 
regulatory environment has started to use exogenous index-based approaches. 
Exogenous index-based regulatory approaches, e.g. the price-caps applied in the UK 
and the Netherlands, which are more popular in Europe, also  aim to  prevent the 
national operator from exploiting its monopoly power at the expense of consumers. 
By contrast, however, they deploy a ceiling of reasonable pricing which is, in itself, 
completely independent of the actual costs incurred by the firm.  Whilst this form of 
regulation has the advantage of creating positive incentive  affects  on the TO  to 
reduce  its  cost  base  through  efficiency  it  also  means  that  there  has  been  no 
requirement imposed by the regulator on the operator for particular cost accounting 
methods and cost allocation methodologies. 
Although the above two approaches to monopoly regulation have different incentive 
effects, both are in essence designed to ensure that consumers only pay a price that 
allows the monopolist to recover all of its costs plus an "equitable" rate of return on 
its capital employed across all services. 
Competition Policy 
As competition develops regulatory concern changes.  No longer is  the regulator 
simply concerned with issues of monopoly tariffs, but as parts of the old integrated 
monopolies are opened to competition there is an asymmetric distribution of market 
power between new entrants and the incumbents.  Regulatory concern  needs to 
change to ensure that prices charged by regulated firms in the competitive elements 
of their business do not undercut the real costs of the respective service. 
Whilst this is true in the case of formerly vertically integrated monopolist TOs whose 
apparatus supply business has been liberalised, it will also be true where various 
"retail" businesses are liberalised, and where emerging new competitors rely on a 
product/  service purchased from the incumbent as a major input for  their service 
offerings, local loop terminations for example. 
The  regulatory  requirement  for  cost  information  to  ensure  fair  competition  is 
therefore somewhat more detailed.  It will require improved cost reporting by the 
incumbents if the regulator is  to  try and ensure "a  level playing field"  with the 
objective that both the "retail" and "wholesale" prices charged by the incumbent send • 
15 
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appropriate market signals encouraging efficient resource allocation,  market entry 
and market exit 
Social Obligations 
The third regulatory concern set out above was connected with social obligations. 
When these obligations are placed upon TOs such that they are required to perform 
certain functions that they would not perform for strictly economic or commercial 
reasons there is clearly a cost to the organisation. 
As competition develops regulators need to determine the magnitude of such costs 
and decide whether it is appropriate to share the obligations and/  or the funding of 
their costs, and if so, how.  The regulatory response will make differing demands 
upon  the  cost  accounting  systems  of  the  regulated  company.  There  are  two 
approaches, one implicit, the other explicit 
An implicit regulatory approach to obligation-related costs, and one that is typical in 
most European countries, is to grant the operator an exclusive right to  operate in 
certain  markets.  This  provides  barriers  to  competitive  entry,  and  there  is  no 
incentive  for  operators  to  identify  the  cost  of  social  obligations  as  they  are 
understood to be part of the monopoly service.  Accordingly they are recovered by 
the  services  where  public  concern  about  the  undesired  distributional  effects  is 
weakest  (e.g.  international  and  long  distance  calls,  and  more  recently  mobile 
telephony).  This  approach may have undesirable incentive effects  that lead the 
regulated firm to over invest in areas where it can claim to be acting in the public 
interest, and causes problems as markets are liberalised.  As WIK state this implicit 
approach is only sustainable in the long term in a monopoly environment15. 
An  explicit  regulatory  approach  requires  the  definition  of  the  obligation  and 
agreement  as  to  the  cost  associated  with  this  obligation.  It  also  requires  the 
incumbent to  measure the cost so  that as  compe~tion develops  the cost can  be 
equitably shared by all operators and thus does not create inefficient incentives. 
Wissenschaftliches lnstitut fur Kommunikationsdienste GmbH (WIK).  (Neu, Werner and Karl-
Heinz Newmann).  Interconnection Agreements in Telecommunications.  Study prepared for 
The Conurtission of the European Communities DG Xlll.  Bad Honnef, January 1993. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
In summary, the demand for cost information, and therefore the requirements of a 
TO's cost accounting system, will be influenced by the regulatory approaches taken. 
One should not presume that with the iritroduction of competition the responsibility 
of the regulator will automatically be reduced.  Indeed during the transition from 
protected monopoly to freely competitive markets the regulators requirement for 
cost  information  may  become  more  onerous  in  the  interim  period  until  the 
competition becomes established and market forces provide the necessary checks. 
Degree of Regulatory 
Demand Placed upon 
TO's Cost Accounnng 
System 
Protected State 
owned Monopoly 
Initial 
Liberabsation 
Compet1t1on 
beconung 
Established 
Established  Regulation 
Competition  by Market 
Forces 
Ttme 
The more active role envisaged for NRAs, particularly in refereeing the unbundling 
of tariffs, developing the cost methodology, and overseeing its implementation will 
require additional resources and funding if it is to achieve these policy aims. 
4.4  Cost Standards and Costing Terminology 
Sections 4.2  and 4.3  set out why organisations collect cost information,  and the 
impact of regulation on the type of information required.  However use of the term 
cost is often misunderstood.  If interconnect charges are to be cost orientated it is 
important to understand what is meant by cost.  There are many different definitions 
of cost.  Cost is a multi-dimensional conc~pt  and the term must be used with care. 
Before proceeding in Section 5 to look at the existing cost accounting practices of 
Member State operators it is perhaps pertinent to clarify and define the different cost 
categories that exist and the alternative cost standards that are available. 
• 16 
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Cost categories16 
Cost  categories  are  specific  classes  of  costs  differentiated  according  to  their 
relationship with changes in output In producing a product or service organisations 
incur fixed costs (which are independent of the level of output) and variable costs  (the 
size of which is dependent upon output levels).  The extent of fixed costs in most 
organisations will depend upon the time horizon viewed - in  ·the long run all costs 
are variable.  For a given level of output it is possible therefore to calculate total costs 
and unit average costs and their constituent fixed and variable elements. 
When an organisation provides more than one service some of its costs are service 
direct  costs  of a  particular service,  in  that there  is  an  unambiguous  relationship 
between the cost and the service.  Other costs may be either joint or common.  The 
definitions for joint and common costs are more liberal in telecommunications than 
the true economic definitions.  Joint costs arise where the incurrence of cost on a 
productive input is shared between a family of services (e.g. the cost of investment in 
a switching system).  Common costs arise, where the cost of a productive input is 
shared across  all  services of the firm (e.g.  executive salaries,  fixed  licence  costs). 
Certain joint and common costs may be directly or indirectly attributable to a service 
on a cost causative basis.  This leaves residual joint and residual common costs, the 
magnitude of which depends upon the rigour and detail of the direct and indirect 
attributions. 
The strictly economic definition of a joint cost is one where the cost of a productive 
input by necessity produces more than one good or service in strict proportions (e.g. 
wool and mutton); and common costs  are the costs  of inputs producing several 
different outputs but with the potential for varying the proportions of the service 
output 
In this report we have used the more liberal telecommunication definition for joint 
and common costs as opposed to the strict economic definitions described above. 
Cave, Martin and Roger Mills, Cost Allocation in Regulated Industries.  Centre for the study of 
Regulated Industries (CRI) Regulatory Brief 3.  Public Finance Foundation 1992.  ISBN  085299 
5520. 
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A directly attributable cost is one with an unambiguous relationship with the existence 
of a  product or service but which is not recorded against the specific product or 
service in the organisation's accounts  e.g.  product specific  software costs  can be 
directly attributed to call products based on usage. 
An indirectly attributable cost is not capable of direct identification against a specific 
product or service but allocation is possible on a measured non arbitrary basis e.g. 
power plant depreciation cost attributed to the relevant network equipment using 
the  power plant and  then  to  product based  on  product usage  of the  network 
equipment. 
The more rigorous the direct and indirect cost attributions made the greater the 
reduction of costs considered joint and common with less sophisticated attribution 
techniques. 
Joint and common costs  arise where organisations have economies  of scale and 
scope.  Economies  of scale  are present where unit costs  decrease  across  higher 
output levels and economies of scope exist where multiple outputs are produced 
more cheaply in combination than separately. 
Where a  firm stops production of a  particular product or service (e.g.  withdraws 
from the provision of local loop terminations) it will save the avoidable  costs,  and 
except in the case of a very long term time horizon the avoidable cost is unlikely to 
be equal to the incremental cost (defined below). 
Contras~gly,  where a firm commences production of a particular product or service 
there is usually a cost of contribution foregone from alternative applications of the 
resources.  This is called the Opportunity. Cost 
Finally,  the cost  of an  asset  should  be  considered  sunk when  these  costs,  once 
committed, cannot be avoided even if the volume of output served by the asset is 
reduced to zero. 
Cost categories are made up of individual and specific  cost items defined by the 
organisation,  e.g.  administrative  expenses,  marketing  expenses,  maintenance 
expenses. 
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Cost standards 
Cost standards are the economic and accounting methods used for establishing or 
estimating the cost of particular products or other cost objects and are comprised of 
different combinations of cost categories.  They are differentiated by the extent and . 
type of the organisation's total costs that are included.  Organisations may choose to 
use more than one cost standard, and employ different cost standards for different 
purposes.  The use of a particular cost standard for pricing and decision making can 
be  justified  if its  application  will  result  in  improved  economic  efficiency  and 
allocation of resources, with the resulting advantages passed on to consumers. 
This  section  presents  an  explanation  of  the  various  cost  standards  which  are 
commonly employed in the analysis of cost and includes marginal cost, incremental 
cost, fully distributed cost, embedded direct cost and stand alone cost  To simplify 
the analysis we will use as an example a five service firm, for which each service has 
elements of direct and attributable costs (both fixed and variable) and residual joint 
and common cost categories that are either common to a number of services, or to 
the firm as a whole.  We will define the cost standard as it relates to service A in each 
example. 
4.4.1  Marginal Cost (MC) 
The marginal cost standard measures the forward looking cost of producing one 
more unit of output or the cost saved by producing one less unit of output holding 
constant the production levels of all other products and services of the firm.  i.e. the 
change in the firms total cost as a result of a unitary change in output. 
Cost Categories Included 
SERVICE 
Volume 
sensitive 
cosu 
Fixed costs 
Service family 
residual joint 
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Firm residual 
common costs 
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The MC includes only those cost items in the direct variable cost category of the 
relevant service.  Thus margmal costing excludes all cost categories which do not 
~ary with output, or do not demonstrate any causal relationship with the unitary 
change in output 
Rationale 
Under certain assumptions it can be shown that economic welfare is maximised 
when the prices for goods and services are set at the MC of the resources used to 
produc:e those goods, and consequently an economically efficient outcome results. 
Practical Considerations 
Measurement is difficult in practice because costing unitary changes in output is 
rarely possible, primarily because division of labour and capital is never perfect. 
Furthermore the MC standard includes no fixed or joint and common costs,  and 
therefore prices set based on MC will not allow recovery of these or other sunk costs. 
These have historical financial implications (i.e. the company will not make a profit) 
and are relevant to the financial viability of the firm. 
The MC is however useful as it provides the theoretical price floor,  the minimum 
cost that must be recovered by the firm in the short run. 
4.4.2  Incremental Cost (I  C) 
The incremental cost standard measures the change in the total costs of the firm that 
arises from an increase or decrease in output by a substantial and discrete increment 
In the particular case where the increment under consideration is a single unit, IC 
and  MC  will  be  the  same.  The  principal  difference  between  MC  and  Total 
Incremental Cost (TIC)  is that the MC includes only those costs that change with a 
unitary change in output whereas the TIC includes the costs to  provide either an 
entire service or a substantial and discrete increase in output of an existing service 
and includes some capital and volume insensitive costs.  Most economists consider 
that the IC standard should adopt forward looking (rather than historical) costs. 
so • 
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Incremental costing incorporates  all  variable  costs  and  those fixed,  non volume 
sensitive, costs which relate to the incremental change in output  In the short-run 
this is constrained by the existing plant capacity.  In the long-run capital costs are 
treated as variable and incorporated into the IC using capacity costing principles. 
The  Long  Run  Incremental Cost (LRIC)  therefore includes both the capital costs 
associated with a  substantial change in output and the volume sensitive costs  of 
providing a service.  For an individual unit the LRIC is divided by the number of 
units in the increment to get the Long Run Average Incremental Cost (LRAIC). 
Volume sensitive costs are included by using cost causation rules to determine direct 
causal relationships between costs incurred and the activities  giving rise to  these 
costs.  Capital costs are included using a capacity costing approach which calculates 
the cost of the next increment of inveshll.ent capacity required by the firm to meet a 
permanent  substantial  increase  in  demand.  The  capacity  costing  approach 
recognises that most capital investment undertaken is not perfectly divisible, but is 
acquired  in  large lump sums.  Changes in demand  advance  or postpone  these 
investments and the change in Net Present Value  (NPV)  of the investment that 
results gives rise to the capital cost of the decision.  The capital costing approach is 
therefore a discounted cash flow concept.  Hence the cost of plant is calculated by 
spreading capital costs  across  the available capacity  and not across  the  units  of 
capacity actually used.  This is illustrated graphically below: 
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In this way it is possible to establish a  direct relationship between both volume 
sensitive and capital costs and changes in demand. 
Rationale 
Incremental costing establishes a link between a change in cost and the cause of that 
change and therefore is a 
11marginal" concept.  The only difference between LRAIC 
and MC relates to the units over which it is measured.  Conceptually therefore, there 
is little difference.  Use of IC will therefore lead to economic efficiency in the same 
manner as MC. 
Practical Consideration 
IC resolves some of the practical problems of measurement associated with MC. 
This is because the standard allows measurement in terms of discrete increments 
which can be as large or as small as the firm is capable of measuring. 
Because  of its  conceptual similarity  to  MC,  IC  is  therefore  useful practically  for 
setting the price floor (SRIC in the short run with constant capacity, LRIC in the long 
run with  variable  capacity),  and  in  the identification  of cross  subsidisation  and 
predatory pricing in transfers from monopoly to competitive environments. 
LRIC is therefore an appropriate substitute for MC in the long run - especially where 
capital can only be  acquired in large indivisible increments, as is the case in TOs. 
However, as with MC,  LRIC,  like all IC concepts, ignores the recovery of residual 
S2 
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joint and common costs.  These must be incorporated into any modelling to ensure 
long term financial viability of the firm.  LRIC provides the "price floor" and hence 
prices should be set not equal to the LRIC but based upon it. 
4.4.3  Fully Distributed Cost (FDC) 
This  cost  standard  allocates  all  of  an  organisation's  costs  to  services.  Fully 
distributed costs generally include the costs directly and indirectly attributable to the 
service, plus a share of those costs with no causal relationships, i.e. joint and residual 
common  costs.  The rules  for  determining the shares  of the  indirect  costs  and 
overheads are usually causally related but no entirely non-arbitrary set of rules exist. 
FDC is sometimes called "Fully Allocated Cost" (F AC). 
This is  the most common cost standard adopted by firms for  their own internal 
purposes and by US regulatory bodies.  It is usually based upon an organisation's 
historical costs. 
Cost Categories Included 
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FDC includes both the volume sensitive and fixed direct costs of the service together 
with a proportion of the residual service family joint costs and firm common costs. 
Historical  FDC  is  based  on  the  existing  physical  network  engineering  capacity 
together with the business processes within the company.  Information is  derived 
from the company's books and records, and as such, reflects the actual fixed assets 
used  to  provide  the  service,  and  the  existing  levels  of  capacity  and  network 
utilisation inherent in them. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
As a result of their nature there is no single way of allocating the residual joint and 
common costs to individual products.  These costs are allocated to services based on 
one of several allocation bases.  A crude, but illogical, basis would simply be to 
divide the common costs over all services equally.  The most common methods 
adopted in practice are: 
•  The Relative Output Method (ROM) where costs ·are allocated to services in 
proportion to their share of total output 
•  The Gross Revenue Method (GRM) where costs are allocated to services in 
proportion to their share of firm revenue. 
•  The Net Revenue Method (NRM) where costs are allocated to each service in 
proportion to its contribution to net revenue. 
•  The  Attributable  Cost Method  (ACM)  where costs  are  allocated  to  each 
service in proportion to  the  direct  and indirectly  attributable  cost  of the 
service. 
The ROM is only possible when all outputs can be expressed in terms of a common 
physical unit, and GRM and NRM are based on revenue - hence to use the costs of 
service to set prices would be a circular argument. 
Obviously there is also no single way of performing the direct and indirect cost 
attributions and different approaches may give rise to differing answers.  Any FDC 
standard relies  upon the subjective judgements of those implementing  the  FDC 
standard, and it is because of this arbitrariness that economists criticise FDC as a 
basis for pricing decisions. 
"The only costs  that have objective reality  are ones that describe  a  causal 
relationship  between  the  act  of  purchase  and  their  incurrence.  Cost 
allocations  that are not grounded in  causality  have no basis  in  objective 
• 17 
18 
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reality; they have no meaning independent of the prices they are supposed to 
justify, except in a rare ritualistic, incantational sense.  "17 
Cave and Mills suggest that economists have long argued that the adoption of a FDC 
standard does not achieve efficient resource allocation because it is based on average 
rather than incremental costs.  As Baumol has stated18 
"There is obviously not the slightest reason to expect that the prices emerging 
from a full-costing process will bear the slightest resemblance to those known 
to be necessary for efficiency in resource utilisation." 
Emmerson  has  demonstrated  the  potentially  unwelcome  economic  outcomes  of 
using a  FDC standard as the basis for pricing and decision taking relating to  the 
offering or withdrawal of services from a_ market in the "Death Spiral" example19• See 
Appendix 3. 
Rationale 
In light of the criticisms levelled at the FDC standard from the perspective of pricing, 
resource allocation and subsequent economic efficiency it is perhaps useful to look at 
why it is the most common cost standard adopted by organisations, operating in 
both competitive and monopolist situations. 
The likely reason for  its ubiquitous use is  probably to be found in history,  and 
through an understanding of the relative values placed upon cost information for 
different purposes by organisational stakeholders.  It has been a principal objective 
of all  firms  to  collect sufficient cost information to  monitor and report historical 
financial performance.  This has often been uppermost in management's minds since 
this  is  driven  by  external  requiremen_ts.  External  financial  reporting  and  the 
Kahn, A E and W B Shew.  Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing.  Yale 
Journal on Regulation, (1987) Vol. 4 No.2, pp 191-256. 
Baumol, William J.  Minimum and Maximum Pricing Prindples for Residual Regulation, in A. 
Danielsen and D. Kamerschen (eds}, Current Issues in Public Utility Economics.  Lexington 
Books, 1983. 
Emmerson.  Incremental cost concepts.  Emmerson Enterprises Inc, USA June 1992. 
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establishment of balance sheet valuations therefore lead to the development of the 
FDC standard.  From management's own point of view the use of this standard was 
often also incorporated into pricing decisions because if  a firm could not recover in 
its prices its total historical costs this would adversely affect reported profitability 
and therefore perhaps their tenure!  It is also the only cost standard that can be used 
for service costing that is capable of objective assessment and therefore independent 
verification. 
Given the adoption of the FDC standard management may then be guilty of trying 
to use the data produced without the appropriate analysis of changing circumstances 
and corresponding modifications to the cost information for other purposes, such as 
pricing, see the "Death Spiral" referred to above. 
From a regulatory standpoint a major advantage of adopting the FDC standard is 
that it corresponds with firms'  internal procedures and thus simplifies  the data 
collection tasks.  This allows the service costs to be "tied into the books" and audited 
where relevant.  However, if it does not promote economically efficient pricing its 
benefits for regulatory purposes are diminished. 
Obviously since FDC standards will continue, by necessity, to. be employed by firms 
for external reporting purposes the criticism of the standard is limited to its use for 
pricing decisions and regulatory purposes.  To  some extent these criticism can be 
overcome if greater attempts are made to ensure cost causative attribution (either 
directly or indirectly)  to  services and to reduce the arbitrariness of any "general" 
allocations of residual joint and common costs.  As stated previously, there is no 
single method of cost attribution and allocation and the more cost causative they are 
the less valid the criticisms. 
The FCC believes that with a well designed cost allocation system over 80%  of costs 
can be attributed to services on a cost-causative basis.  As Cave &  Mills have pointed 
out the use of Activity-Based Costing may overcome many of the criticisms relating 
to the arbitrariness of FDC20. 
Cave, Martin and Roger Mills, Cost Allocation in Regulated Industries.  Centre for the study of 
Regulated Industries (CRI), Regulatory Brief 3.  Public Finance Foundation 1992, ISBN 085299 
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Alfred Kahn, the American regulatory expert said 
"The fact that most services are typically provided in combinations, using 
the same facilities,  does not mean that definable shares of the common 
costs cannot in principle be causally attributed to each.  When the same 
equipment may be used to make products A and B, and when producing 
A uses capacity that could otherwise be used to supply B,  then we may 
speak of their costs as common .instead of joint and in this event,  the 
marginal cost of A  may  include an identifiable part of these common 
costs.  This situation is widespread in the public utilities, and in industry 
generally.  The same railway plant can be used for passenger or freight 
service,  and for  any number of kinds of freight,  over any number of 
routes.  The  same  coaxial  cable  may  transmit  telephone  messages, 
business data or TV  programs.  The same warehouse may be  used to 
store a  variety of products.  If any of these products or services uses 
freight cars, circuits, or warehouse space that would in fact otherwise be 
used for  one of the others, or if it requires the construction of greater 
capacity than would otherwise be necessary, then it does  bear a  causal 
responsibility for a share of common capacity costs.  The cost allocation 
formulae actually employed may achieve only a  rough,  rule-of-thumb 
approximation to the actual costs for which each product or service is 
responsible, but those costs have objective reality." 
Practical Application 
Even where the FDC standard has been accepted on the basis that all material cost 
attributions have been made on a cost causative basis, the outcome will greatly 
depend upon detailed decisions made in identifying cost drivers and the activities 
using these costs, i.e. in the implementation of the attribution and· allocation 
procedures.  This at a minimum raises the opportunity for discretion to be exercised 
and is therefore capable of manipulation.  For example, can the new entrant be sure 
that an incumbent TO will have been completely independent in its cost attribution 
process so as not to favour itself in any way? 
Consequently if  regulators wish to rely on an FDC standard they must satisfy 
themselves that appropriate decisions of this kind have been taken. 
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A final drawback of even this enhanced FDC approach is that it is based upon 
existing physical network engineering capacity and existing business processes and 
~ork  practices and it takes no account of technology changes, potential inefficiencies 
in business processes and work practices, and includes large elements of costs which 
are "sunk" or unavoidable in cost determination. 
4.4.4  Embedded Direct Cost (EDC) 
The Embedded Direct Cost standard allocates all of an organisation's historical direct 
and indirectly attributable volume sensitive costs and fixed costs to services. 
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In this respect it is akin to FDC but does not seek to allocate residual joint and 
common costs to products and services. 
Rationale 
Embedded Direct Cost Analysis is an historical cost contribution approach to 
attribute the actual historical network expenditure to individual services.  It  analyses 
the physical network engineering capacity, together with the business processes 
within the company. The analysis reflects historical traffic patterns and performance 
of the organisation and allows the services provided to be casted.  Information is 
derived from the company's books and records, and as such, reflects the actual fixed 
assets used to provide the service, and the existing levels of capacity and network 
utilisation inherent in them.  As with FDC certain costs have to be directly or 
indirectly attributed to services.  There are many different attribution methods and Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
those used should be cost causal in approach.  Activity-Based Costing is one such 
method of attribution which has received widespread support in providing a better 
understanding of the cost base of the organisation and the cause and effect 
relationship between activities performed, their associated costs, and the resulting 
output of those activities. 
Practical Considerations 
EDC contribution analyses are appealing to regulators and TO management because 
they "tie into the books" and explain recent, albeit past, performance.  Furthermore, 
such analyses provide management with a detailed knowledge of the costs incurred 
in running the existing network, and a detailed understanding of the relative 
contributions of individual services to the pool of joint and residual common costs 
highlighting revenue and cost imbalances.  They also provide a rigorous basis for 
setting prices which ensures that current revenues represent a full recovery of 
legitimate expenditure made in previous years.  Their shortcomings are that they 
take no account of technology changes, p·ossible efficiency improvements in business 
processes or work practices and include large elements of cost which are "sunk" or 
unavoidable in cost determination. 
As Michaelson points out ''EDC studies represent a halfway station between 
traditional [FDC] studies which are widely acknowledged to be inappropriate for 
pricing [decisions] and incremental cost analysis". 
4.4.5  Stand Alone Cost (SAC) 
A cost standard which measures the cost of providing a service in isolation from the 
rest of the business. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
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The  SAC  includes  all  directly  attributable  costs  and  all  shared  cost  categories 
associated with the production or provision of service and therefore includes volume 
sensitive, fixed, common and sunk costs associated with the product  Under SAC all 
shared cost categories which under FDC are allocated between two or more products 
are totally accounted for by one product 
Rationale 
The SAC standard does not produce eConomic  efficiency if used for  pricing and 
resource  allocation  decisions  as  it is not based on the marginal method  of cost 
allocation.  However, the standard is applicable to the pricing decision by setting a 
price ceiling- the cost of a hypothetical firm established to sell a single product or 
service only. 
Practical Consideration 
The  most common  method  of estimating SAC  is  by  setting  up  a  model  of  a 
hypothetical  firm.  The  operational  and  capital  requirements  of  producing  the 
product or service are determined.  Equipment requirements identified through this 
process  are  then  multiplied  by equipment cost  to  determine the partial cost  of 
service.  Overheads, administration expenses and other cost item associated with 
setting up a hypothetical firm are then added to produce total SAC. 
The SAC can therefore be  seen to be calculable - but elements of complexity and 
subjectively detract from its effectiveness. 
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4.4.6  Costs for Pricing Decisions 
21 
Having reviewed the various cost standards that can be adopted by an organisation 
it is possible to observe that there is no single cost standard that is appropriate for all 
uses. 
Section 4.4.1 suggested that economic efficiency is achieved if  prices are set equal to 
MC,  but that MC is a difficult practical measure due to the difficulty of analysing 
unitary changes in output.  Section 4.4.2 suggested that this practical measurement 
problem can be overcome if ICs are used and that the "marginal" nature of IC allows 
efficiency to be promoted.  However, the shortcoming of both cost concepts is that 
they do not allow long term financial viability because no account is taken of residual 
joint and common costs. 
Whilst IC provides the pricing floor and SAC provides the price ceiling the price that 
theoretically  encourages  economic  efficiency  and  permits  the  firm's  long  term 
financial viability will be somewhere in the middle and is likely to have as its basis 
the LRIC21• 
The extent to which this is approximated using the FDC standard will depend upon 
a number of factors including the technology the firm employs, the efficiency of its 
current organisation, and in no small measure the cost causative nature of the cost 
attribution and allocation process employed by those producing the information. 
Notwithstanding its potential failures as a pricing tool, however, the FDC standard 
will  continue  to  be  employed  for  external  financial  reporting  and  limited 
performance measurement. 
When used for pricing decisions, IC establishes the price floor for a service but not 
the actual tariff.  To the extent that market conditions permit, competitive services 
should be  priced to  yield  the highest level  of contribution  to  residual joint and 
common costs and the firms profitability as long as the tariff exceeds the IC.  Every 
enterprise has fixed common costs that cannot be classified as incremental to  any 
particular service.  Exclusive focus upon IC is not meant to deny the existence of 
fixed costs.  Collectively margins between prices and ICs must equal or exceed total 
Section 4.4.2 suggests that prices should be based upon LRIC not set equal to LRIC. 
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fixed or residual joint and common costs, or the enterprise cannot be self supporting 
in the long run.  To assign, or allocate shares of residual joint or common costs to 
individual  services  provided  is  however  flawed.  It  carries  with  it  the  self 
contradicting implication that an increase in the amount of service provided requires 
an increase in these fixed costs. 
When pricing based upon IC it is necessary to add a premium (or margin} to ensure 
the organisation recovers  the residual joint and common costs.  There are some 
economic theories to  determine how this premium is recovered from  a  particular 
service,  two  of which are set out below.  These theories  differ depending upon 
whether it is  a  final/"retail"  services or intermediatej"wholesale" service such as 
interconnection.  However, there are practical objections to each which limits their 
use. 
One economic theory suggests that the price of final or retail services should follow 
the Ramsey pricing principle where the percentage difference between the price of 
any good and the incremental cost of the good i.e. the premium/  margin, is inversely 
proportional to  the elasticity  of demand of the good.  This  minimises  economic 
welfare damage resulting from deviations of price from IC, and therefore maintains 
economic efficiency.  It appears to be an equitable principle to allocate common costs 
to services in proportion to the excess benefit which consumers derive from them 
over what they have to pay.  In effect, the common costs are loaded particularly onto 
services for which demand is unresponsive to price e.g. retail access charges. 
Another economic theory suggests that the pricing of intermediate or "wholesale" 
services should be based on the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) of Baumol 
and  Willig22•  This  rule  states  that  the  price  charged  should  be  equal  to  the 
incremental cost of providing the component as well as the opportunity cost to the 
first firm of selling the component to the second firm.  The opportunity cost is the 
foregone revenue the first firm loses from not being able to use that component itself. 
However,  this  rule  only  holds  true in  pract;ice  if  it  is  possible  to  quantify  the 
opportunity cost,  and only if it is  certain that such costs  only arise as  a  result of 
efficient service provision by the incumbent TO.  Given the widely held view that 
Baumel, William J.  Deregulation and Residual Regulation of Local Telephone Service.  AEI 
Studies in Telecommunications Deregulation.  March 1993. 
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many TOs are inefficient in their operation it seems likely that this is the greatest 
criticism of the ECPR23. 
In an ideal world we can see that organisations would rely on a  number of cost 
standards, incremental and stand alone cost standards for pricing, embedded direct 
costs for performance appraisal and fully distributed costing for financial reporting. 
Of necessity however, most organisations will not formally adopt all of these but are 
likely  to  use a  FDC system predominantly, with additional pricing and decision 
support systems surrounding it to the extent that they are required as a  result of 
commercial necessity. 
WIK24 have suggested that all prices should be based upon long run incremental cost 
and that the "illusive" margin to be added to this should be such as to ensure full 
recovery  of all past historical cost  As  a  pricing principle this  will  ensure that 
incumbent TOs remain financially viable, however, new entrants will argue that it 
still  sustains  prices  at a  level  that  allows  incumbents  to  recover  costs  incurred 
historically that have either arisen as a result of inefficient investment decisions, or 
that  allow  for  sub-optimal  netvvork  architectures,  business  processes,  or  staff 
utilisation.  The assumption that all past investment decisions reflected in incumbent 
operators' historical costs were undertaken in an efficient manner can be questioned 
on  the  basis  that  one  of  the  prime  motivations  for  liberalising  the 
telecommunications sector is that incumbent operators are believed to be inefficient. 
4.5  Some Words About "Cost Allocation• 
23 
24 
Due to the high proportion of joint and common costs that arise in TOs that are not 
solely incurred for a  particular product or service the issue of cost attribution and 
allocation with all cost standards is fundamental. 
Alban, Robert.  "Interconnection Pricing".  Telecommunication Policy 199418(5) 414-420 
concludes that the Efficient Component Pricing Rule does not provide an efficient basis for 
interconnect pricing. 
Wissenschaftliches lnstitut fur Kommunikationsdienste GmbH (WIK), and European American 
Centre for Policy Analysis (EAC).  Study on Network Interconnection in the Domain of ONP 
for the European Commission.  Draft Final Report.  WIK/EAC, September 1994. 
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Many commentators think of cost allocation as it relates to the "arbitrary" allocation 
of residual joint and common costs.  However, it is worth noting that although the 
majority of costs in a TO are joint and common costs, many of these can be causally 
attributed to different services either directly or indirectly.  Given the extent of these 
costs and the subjectivity that can be exercised in their "causal attribution" it is crucial 
to understand the range of different attribution or allocation methods that could be 
employed giving rise to different but equally justifiable service costs.  This subject 
will be examined more closely in section 9. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
KEY POINTS: SECfiON 4 
•  Cost accounting system have developed to meet user needs.  Historically these 
demands  have  come  from  external  stakeholders,  but  with  competition, 
management and internal stakeholders will have more extensive cost information 
requirements. 
•  Regulation of prices has three primary objectives: 
Consumer  protection  through  endogenous  or  exogenous  based  price 
control. 
Development of competition. 
Social obligations which may be fulfilled either implicitly or explicitly. 
•  Decisions made regarding regulatory policy can influence the development of cost 
accounting systems. 
•  'Cost'  is  a  multi-dimensional concept  Different measures of 'cost'  for  different 
uses  may  be  derived  through  the  application  of one  or  more  different  cost 
standards: 
MC will promote efficient resource allocation but is difficult to measure. 
LRIC is more practical to measure than MC and is still a marginal concept 
and will therefore promote economic efficiency.  However, neither LRIC or 
MC recover residual joint and common costs and therefore do not ensure the 
long term financial viability for the firm. 
FDC allocates all firm costs to services and involves subjective judgement in 
such  allocation.  FDC  takes  no  account  of past inefficiencies  or  future 
changes (e.g. in technology) and is therefore less suitable for pricing than it is 
for financial reporting. 
EDC is a  "halfway station" between FDC and IC.  Use of ABC  techniques 
enables a better understanding of cost causation and a more rigorous basis 
for price setting.  Neither FDC or EDC take account of changing technologies 
or past inefficiencies. 
SAC will not encourage economic efficiency  and in practice calculation  is 
complex and subjective. 
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KEY POINTS: SECTION 4 CONTINUED  ••••. 
•  Prices should be set at an amount equal to the LRIC plus a premium/  margin, such 
that  across  all  services  the  aggregate  premium/margin  above  total  LRIC  is 
sufficient  to  recover  joint  and  common  costs  and  allow  the  firm  to  remain 
financially viable. 
•  Whichever cost standard is used the cost attribution and allocation methodology is 
fundamental in industries where a high proportion of  .~osts are incurred to support 
multiple services. 
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5.  EXISTING COST ACCOUNTING PRACIICES AND COST 
ALLOCATION METHODS OF COMMUNITY OPERATORS 
5.1  Introduction 
25 
To  develop  detailed  recommendations  on the most appropriate cost  accounting 
practices for interconnect charges that are consistent with existing national practices 
it  is  necessary  to  have an  appreciation  of the existing  practices  of Community 
operators.  This section presents the results of interviews with TOs and NRAs in 
respect of cost accounting practices in each Member State of the Community.  In 
particular it examines existing cost accounting methods, and changes planned by 
TOs and NRAs.  It builds upon work already carried out in the Commission study 
"Regulatory Requirements on Cost Accounting Systems within the framework of 
ONP", February 1992.25 
The  section  discusses  the  financial  reporting  requirements  of  Member  State 
operators, both external and internal, and the resulting information requirements 
placed upon the costing systems.  It also examines the cost standards adopted by 
Community  operators  and sets  out information  regarding  their  existing  costing 
systems capabilities.  Given the context of this  study section 5  also  reviews  the 
relationship between costs  and retail tariffs  in each  Member State,  the status  of 
interconnection and the relationship between interconnect charges and associated 
costs.  Finally it also summarises existing information TOs maintain with respect to 
the magnitude of costs associated with the USO in each Member State. 
Most operators consider detailed information about their costing systems and cost 
information to be confidential as they contribute to their competitive advantage.  In 
the interests  of commercial confidentiality  section 5  does not present a  detailed 
country by country analysis of the existing cost accounting methods of Community 
operators.  Instead the analysis draws out the range of practices currently adopted, 
understood  and  planned  for  future  implementati.on  with  some  specific  country 
examples. 
Wissenschaftliches lnstitut fiir Kommunikationsdienste GmbH (WII<) (Weinkopf, Marcus). 
Regulatory Requirements on Cost Accounting Systems within the Framework of ONP.  A 
study carried out for CEC-DG Xlll.  Final Report.  Bad Honnef, February 1992. 
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5.2  Background Information 
The European Community includes countries of vastly different sizes, topographies, 
demographies,  histories  and  cultures  all  of  which  have  tailored  the 
telecommunications  industry  to  arrive  at  the  patchwork  of  design,  policy  and 
network architecture that exists today.  As discussed in section 4 this of itself has 
implications on the TO's cost structure and the cost accounting systems that have 
evolved.  It is worthwhile looking in more detail at this background to understand 
the source of a  number of the issues which currently affect  the  interconnection 
debate and to appreciate some of the practical problems associated with formulating 
a pan-European solution. 
Factors influencing TO costs and their cost accounting systems 
Population:  size 
density 
urbanisation 
culture 
••...  ·.·,  _ .. 
•  ,.  ..... w.  ,~ 
TO Status:  iT1 
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size 
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5.2.1  Population and Geography 
The  incumbent  operators  in  Europe  have  all  developed  primarily  within  their 
national boundaries  and  often  even within  regional  areas  of the country.  T  ele 
Danmark was established in 1991  from the combination of the four  old regional 
companies.  Portugal and Italy have regionally and functionally divided monopolies 
which  are  similarly  undergoing  merger.  The  merger in  Italy  of SIP  (national 
services},  Italcable  (intercontinental  services},  lritel  (international  services}, 
Telespazio (satellite links) and Si.rm  (radiomaritime links) forms a new incumbent 
company responsible for telecommunications services - Telecom ltalia.  Otherwise 
the  Member  States  have  historically  had  one  incumbent  operator.  Given  this 
national perspective it is understandable that the incumbents each have developed in 
accordance with the particular historical, cultural, political and other factors unique 
to that nation. 
Population size,  density, distribution, and culture have all had an impact on the 
incumbent operators.  The capacity of the network is determined by the size of the 
population and the demand they place upon it The coverage and architecture of the 
network has been determined by the size and density of the population. 
Geographical  diversity  also  plays  a  part  in  determining  the  incumbent  status. 
Network rollout is undoubtedly easier on flat land with homogeneous population 
density than on mountainous terrain or under seas to connect island populations. 
Some incumbents have had much larger nations  to  cover than others  (compare 
Luxembourg to Germany).  The existence of vast mountain ranges and sparsely 
populated  rural  areas  means  that  the  costs  of  setting  up  the  network  are 
disproportionately high in some parts of the country than others.  Where tariffs are 
averaged this  means that there are some interesting cross  subsidies and wealth 
redistribution effects. 
Further,  networks  are  likely  to  be  constructed  fu:stly  in  urban  areas  where  the 
demand and the return on the investment are likely to be larger.  Then, gradually, 
universal service obligations (USOs) will result in expanding the network to  those 
areas that are less attractive to  the industry.  Such network rollout has not been 
completed in all the European Community Member States but is treated as a matter 
of great importance in these nations.  It is generally a belief amongst economists that 
telecommunications confer benefits upon regions including increased employment 
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and general economic growth26.  It is therefore to the benefit of the nation as a whole 
to pursue universal service policies. 
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The link between economic growth and telecommunications is evident from graph 
5.2A above.  It is notable that the countries with the highest GOP figures per head of 
population are to be found generally in those countries with the most penetrative 
networks.  Whilst this simplistic view may ignore all the other factors which go to 
make  up  improvements  in  wealth,  the  correlation  between  GDP  and 
telecommunications is undeniable whichever is the cause and the effect. 
5.2.2  TO Status 
26 
Ownership 
The current situation in Europe is predominantly one where the provision of voice 
services is the restricted domain of the state-owned, corporatised TOs who enjoy 
monopoly rights (excluding mobile), the notable exception being the UK.  In some 
nations the monopoly rights have been divided either geographically or functionally 
as in Portugal and Italy.  Portugal's telecommunications industry, for example, has 
until recently been divided into two regional TOs for Lisbon/Porto and the rest of 
Cave, Martin, Claire Milne and Mark Scanlan.  Meeting Universal Service Obligations in a 
competitive Telecommunication Sector, Report to DG IV.  CEC, March 1994. 
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the country, with a submarine  cable and satellite company and a wireline service
comPany.  Denmark also had a regionally divided monopoly until in 1991 Tele
,Danmark A/S was forrned by udfying the regional entities. The Italian and
Portuguese TOs are currently undergoing similar mergers.
Incumbent  operator ownership
Wtrilst competition is evident amongst certain telecomrrrrrnications products and
services in Europe such as mobile and customer  premises equipment, wireline fixed
network voice telephony services  continue  to be offered only by the incumbent TO in
all European counbies except the UK.
The UK has the most competitive  market - but the situation is still far from
unregulated competition. Germany may well be the next country with competitive
wireline voice telephony with consideration currently being given to a number of
potential wireline competitors.
Mobile voice comrrrunications is where the most intensive competition is building
uP. In the UK trnlo cellular operators and two PCN operators are competin g for
r
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customer attention with 6 service offerings. ln Gerrnany two well established mobile
operators  have recently been joined by 
" 
thfud competitor. France have a function:ng
mobile duopoly with a third mobile licence recently awarded. Denmark, Greece and
Porhrgal also currerttly have a functioning duopoly in mobile comsturtications  and it
is anticipated that second licences will be issued in dl those countries where mobile
is currently monopolised before the end of the year.
T  e chno lo gi cal A do an ce m ent
Technological advances  are changrng the nature of the networks and therefore the
underlying cost base and recoverability of recorded asset balances. Radio based
networks may prove to be a more cost effective solution to serving remote areas.
Cable TV comparties are already providing local telephone services for more than
300,000 homes in the UKz and the other European countries are watching the
developments in the UK to see if such infrastmcture liberalisation could be effective
in their Member States. Digitalisation is increasing the service capabilities and
effectiveness of the TOs, affecting the cost base of the TOs, and their abilities to
capture detailed cost and revenue data (e.g. itemised bi[ing).
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It should be noted, however, that many incumbents have put significant investment 
into digitalisation since 1990. 
There  is  no  benefit  to  comparing  the  investments  in  networks  across  Europe. 
Problems in the definition of the "network" and differences  in the timing of the 
investments means that the historical costs of the network are not comparable.  The 
same networks may be  valued differently dependent upon tlie technology of the 
network and this, together with the time value of money, serves to illustrate one of 
the criticisms of basing interconnect charges on historical network cost 
Expenditure on the network in the future will to some extent depend on the coverage 
already achieved and the need for further network rollout  Network rollout is  also 
an issue that will need to be taken into consideration in interconnect charges where 
such rollout is still required. 
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Graph 5.2C above demonstrates the variety of penetration rates across the European 
continent.  Here,  penetration is  described as main lines per hundred inhabitants, 
where  main  lines  represent  the  lines  which  run  from  the  Customer  Premises 
Equipment (CPE)  to  the  Public  Switched  Telephone Network (PSTN)  and which 
have a dedicated port on a telephone exchange.  Much of the variety evidenced by 
the penetration rates relates to  the extent to which the network rollout has taken 
place in each country.  Countries where significant network rollout is  still ongoing 
include Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
The limitation of such analysis should, however, be borne in mind.  For example, no 
account is  taken  of  average  family  sizes,  or  the  degree  of business-line  switch 
boarding which both vary considerably in the Community.  These, and other factors, 
would explain why Greece has a comparatively high penetration (where one would 
expect it to be lower due to incomplete network rollout) and Ireland has a relatively 
low penetration (where one would expect it to be higher)  .  . 
Size ofTOs 
TOs of a larger size will, by necessity, have more complex and potentially even more 
sophisticated  cost  accounting and cost allocation  systems in an attempt to  help 
improve the manageability of the business.  In this regard one would expect,  for 
example,  the  cost  accounting  systems  to  be more  complex  in  France  Telecom, 
Deutsche Bundespost T  elekom,  Telecom  ltalia and British  Telecom  than  in  T  ele 
Danmark, PTT Telecom BV or Entreprise des Postes et Telecommunications. 
The importance of telecommunications to a nation can also be viewed as a driver for 
improved  products  and  services,  investment  in  new  technology  or  other 
improvements  and  therefore  alterations  in  the  cost  base  of  the  industry. 
"Telecommunications  revenues  per main  line"  is  a  statistic  often  viewed  as  an 
indicator of the importance of telecommunications to the country. 
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Graph 5.20 above indicates a degree of diversity in the extent of telecommunications 
revenues achieved from each main line in the Community.  Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Germany and the Netherlands indicate particularly high revenues per main line - a 
function  of  the  importance  attributed  to  telephone  communications  in  these 
countries along with other factors such as the mix of international, trunk and local 
calls, size and simplicity of the networks, etc.  Contrastingly, Greece has a very low 
revenue per main line - a function of the undeveloped state of  their network and its 
under utilisation. 
Examining main lines per telecommunications employee gives an indication of the 
manning levels  of the Community  operators.  It is  a  generally  held  belief  that 
monopolies are usually overmanned such that with the onset of  competition a large 
degree of rationalisation, or downsizing, is necessary thereby affecting the cost base 
of the organisation. 
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Graph 5.2E above illustrates that the smaller Member States (Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) particularly demonstrate high efficiencies based on the "main lines per 
employee" statistic.  This  mainly derives from their smaller and less  complicated 
networks.  According to this indicator Italy would also demonstrate efficient use of 
their network.  Ireland and Portugal demonstrate a  much lower number of main 
lines per employee - a function, perhaps, of the fact that both these countries are still 
developing their networks and have relatively high employment levels. 
X 
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The UK, whilst the most competitive mel!ket in voice telephony in Europe, does not 
seem to demonstrate a high degree of efficiency.  However, graph 5.2£ ignores a 
number of factors.  Firstly, the UK  has a high degree of external switchboarding 
where companies may only have a  few  lines  serving several people.  Also,  the 
ongoing trends of the past few years have seen British Telecom's employment levels 
drop from just under 250,000 in 1990 to just over 150,000 in 1994 thus demonstrating 
the downsizing influence and search for efficiencies which have been brought about 
by competition. 
Regulation 
The diversity of telecommunications in Europe extends to the regulatory regime in 
each country.  Regulation has an important role to play in the transition period from 
monopoly to a  fully  competitive market place and in particular the regulation of 
interconnect agreements. 
The current status of the NRAs around Europe is important to consider as it impacts 
the authority of the NRA to  implement policy and demand information.  It  also 
indicates current regulatory demands which the TO must be capable of complying 
with, and helps identify the roles which the nations currently expect the NRAs to be 
capable of carrying out. 
Role of  the Regulator 
-
Bel  Den  Fra  Ger  Gre•  Ire  Ita  Lux  Net  Por  Spa  U.K. 
Promote competition  J  J  J  J  J  J  J  J 
Control tariffs  J  J  ./  J  J  J  J  J  J  J 
Control costs  J  J  J  ./  ./ 
Control structure of  ./  J  J  ./  ./  ./ 
Telecom industry 
Set industry standards for  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./ 
accounting & reporting 
Issue licences to  J  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./ 
operate as a TO 
Quality watchdog/control  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  J  ./  ./  ./ 
Deal with consumer issues  J  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./ 
Others (e.g. control numbering)  ./  ./  ./  ./  ./  J  ./  ./  ./  ./  J 
* • no information provided 
Source: Arthur Andersen TO and NRA Questionnaires {1994) 
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The table above indicates the views of the operators and NRAs of the regulatory role 
in their respective  Member States.  In most European Community countries  the 
primary goal of the NRA appears to be the controlling of the operator tariffs and the 
issue of new licences.  Few respondents answered that the NRA is responsible for 
controlling costs or setting industry standards in accounting and reporting. 
Many of the NRAs have only recently been established in their current form but all 
twelve Member States have now separated the NRAs from the operators.  Belgium 
and  Denmark  are  two  examples  of  where  the  NRA  has  only  recently  been 
established and so the role which the NRA is seen as having to fulfil has not yet been 
fully determined.  This is also partly true in Ireland. 
One area of social policy that regulators appear to  be mindfull of is  the issue of 
employment protection.  Incumbents historically have employed large numbers of 
people.  To lose even small proportions of such large workforces due to restructuring 
and downsizing is often a political issue of  extreme sensitivity. 
One of the principal aims of liberalisation is to ensure incumbent operators improve 
their efficiency.  This will be achieved in a number of ways, but primarily through 
improved business processes, staffing levels and improved effectiveness.  This may 
therefore  provide  a  conflict  between  p.olitical  employment  policy  objectives  and 
telecommunications  policy.  If the  Community  is  to  benefit  from  a  liberalised 
telecommunications environment,  downsizing of a  number of incumbent TOs  is 
likely.  If this is not permitted due to the effect on employment, inefficiency will 
remain a feature of the industry. 
In conclusion, the European Member States can be seen to be very different in terms 
of  geography,  history,  culture,  etc.  The  incumbent TOs  and  particularly  their 
network structures and cost bases have developed out of their unique histories in 
their  individual  nations.  The  incumbents  are  generally  long  established 
organisations but often only recently corporatised and sometimes privatised.  The 
regulatory environment is also generally in the early stages of development. 
5.3  Financial Reporting Requirements 
As  discussed in section 4.2  cost accounting systems have developed to  meet the 
information needs of users.  The financial reporting requirements placed upon TOs 
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dictate  to  a  large  extent  the level  and  detail  of revenue  and  cost  information 
collected,  analysed  and reported  for  those  organisations.  If information  is  not 
requested, either internally or externally, then it is unlikely that the TO will produce 
such information. 
Therefore,  by understanding the information requirements placed upon Europe's 
TOs it is possible to gain a valuable insight into the infon:ltation management of the 
organisation,  and  therefore  to  obtain  insight  into  the  cost  accounting  systems 
adopted. 
5.3.1  External Reporting Requirements 
Graph: 5.3A 
Types of financial report prepared by incumbents 
Financtal Statements: 
Stoc:k exchange Reports 
Regulatory Reports 
Government Reports 
Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Lux' 
Notes: 
(1) Progress Reports: Implementation of 315 year plan 
(2) Progress Reports : Implementation of  315 year plan, demand status &  quality of service 
no segmental information produced until EC 4th Directive of 1993. 
(3) Financial repor1s are produced by KPN, the group holding company; an annual 
concession report is produced by PTT for the government. 
(4)These incumbents have been privatised since receipt of  questionnaire.  Stock exchange 
reporting should therefore become a feature of these TOs 
Source:  Arthur Andersen TO and NRA Questionnaires and Interviews, 1994 
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The external reporting requirements placed upon European TOs are not currently 
very extensive.  Financial Statements are currently produced by the incumbent TOs 
in each Member State except for PIT Telecom BV in the Netherlands.  These financial 
statements  are  in  most  instances  fairly  detailed  requiring  as  a  minimum  the 
presentation  of  a  balance  sheet,  profit  and  loss  account  and  various  footnote 
disclosures including cash flow statements in some Member States.  P1l Telecom BV 
produce  a  "Concession"  report  for  the  Dutch  government  on  key  performance 
indicators with financial statements being produced by KPN, the holding company 
for the national telecommunications and postal companies.  However, the fact that 
consolidated financial statements are produced is evidence of the ability of the Dutch Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
incumbent to produce much of the data necessary for the preparation of financial 
statements. 
The financial statements produced all adhere to the requirements of local Generally 
Accepted  Accounting  Principles  (GAAP)  and  other  relevant  legislation  (e.g. 
Companies Act (UK),  Law on Commercial Accounting (Luxembourg).  At a broad 
level  these have been  harmonised throughout the Member States  subject to  this 
study as a result of the EC 4th and 7th Directives which have been adopted in all12 
Member States. 
The requirement to produce such financial statements generally arises from the point 
in time that a company is  corporatised.  Prior to corporatisation a number of the 
incumbents were only required to prepare accounts on cash accounting principles or 
limited financial information to enable government control.  The cost of individual 
products and services  was not a  significant issue for  either managers  or policy 
makers.  As long as total revenues were in excess of total costs by an extent sufficient 
to fund investment, and to provide a contribution to state treasuries no-one focused 
on the relative profitability of different services.  Except for France Telecom, all the 
incumbent  TOs  in  Europe  have  now  been  corporatised.  However,  this 
corporatisation has only been a recent phenomenon in the majority of European TOs 
as shown in figure 5.3B below. 
Figure 5.3B 
Nb.ltaly has undergone reorganisation in 1994 to formulate a new incumbent company- Telecom Italia.  SIP has been u~  here for 
the purposes of demonstrating the recency of requirements to prepare financia.l statements. 
Source:  OECD, Communications Outlook (1993), Arthw Anderwn interviews (1994) Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xni 
In  many countries corporatisation was seen as  a  first  step prior to  privatisation 
(shares listed on a stock exchange), and the sale of part of the government's interest 
in  these  organisations  to  the  public.  Where privatisation  has  occurred,  this  is 
indicated above also. 
Figure 5.3B demonstrates the comparative recency of corporatisation amongst most 
of the incumbent European TOs.  The fact  that for many TOs the corresponding 
reporting requirements have not been in place for long means that the historical 
accounting information often does not possess the rigorous detail that exists in long 
standing  independent  companies  which  have  been  subject  to  such  reporting 
requirements  for  many years.  As  a  result,  in many of these  organisations  the 
historical information is not robust and the cost accounting systems are still in the 
early stages of development or refinement  By way of example, Germany's Deutsche 
Bun  des  post T  elekom did not maintain a full fixed asset register up until the end of 
1992 when a count was conducted in conjunction with the implementation of a new 
cost accounting system.  Complete historical cost analyses of fixed assets are also not 
maintained  by  Belgacom,  Tele  Danmark  A/S,  Entreprise  des  Postes  et 
Telecommunications and OTE. 
As detailed in section 5.5.5 most European incumbent operators are also either in the 
process of implementing more detailed cost accounting systems or planning such 
improvements. 
The  necessity  for  additional  and  more  detailed  external  financial  reporting 
information often becomes  greater with  privatisation.  Currently only  Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK and recently The Netherlands have incumbent TOs 
which are public enterprises.  Such countries possess accounting systems that must 
be capable of handling the burden of extra stock exchange reporting both locally and 
in other countries where the financial instruments are publicly traded, such as the 
form 20-F for the New York Stock Exchange. 
Detailed  information  is  often  required  by  the  government  in  cases  where  the 
incumbent TO is state owned.  As "owners" of the business this is a formal method of 
finding  out  how  the  company  is  performing.  For  example,  in  Ireland  the 
management have  to  produce  a  progress  report  on  the  implementation  of  the 
company's  5  year  plan  as  well  as  quarterly  reports  to  shareholders  on  quality 
performance indicators and profit forecasts.  SIP of Italy also has additional reporting 
demands placed upon it by the licence with a requirement to prepare reports on the 
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implementation of 3 year plans annually, the demand conditions monthly and the 
quality  of service  six  monthly.  Such  demands  may be under review  with  the 
formulation of the new Italian incumbent-Telecom ltalia. 
With the opening up of the market to competition, the NRA places demands upon 
TOs for sufficient information to ensure that the old monopolies do not abuse their 
dominant position  (e.g.  through cross subsidisation of competitive services  from 
monopoly services) or that new entrants exploit inefficient arbitrage opportunities. 
Such regulatory intervention necessitates increased information demands upon the 
TOs.  Whilst regulatory  reporting requirements  are a  form  of  external  financial 
reporting requirement, their use is of particular importance to this study and they 
are therefore analysed separately in the next section. 
5.3.2  Regulatory Reporting Requirements 
Most of the questionnaire respondents stated that some form of regulatory reporting 
requirements were placed upon their organisation.  However, the degree to which 
those regulatory requirements place additional demands upon the cost accounting 
systems  of the TOs  in  each  Member State  varies.  Such  variety  stems  from  the 
regularity  of  the  reporting  demands,  the  extent  to  which  the  NRAs  involve 
themselves  in  pricing  policies,  investment  decisions,  etc.,  and  the  degree  of 
competition in the market place. 
Regularity of Reporting 
In the majority of the Member States the TOs are required to produce reports and 
other specific information requirements for the NRA in line with statute, or contracts. 
Such situations require the TOs to have cost accounting systems that are capable of 
producing the information  (at  least where the requirement is· so  regular  that it 
discourages the use of "one-off" data collection exercises). 
In addition, most NRAs in the Community are empowered to request ad-hoc reports 
as  and when the information is  required for  a  particular function  and do  so  to 
varying degrees.  For example, tariff changes have to be approved by the NRA after 
assessing  cost  information  in  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy  and  the 
Netherlands.  Such  demands  often  call  for  one-off costing exercises  and do not 
necessarily indicate the ability  of the costing systems to  cope with evaluating the 
ongoing costs of particular services. 
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Luxembourg  and  Denmark provide  two  examples  of where  the full extent  of 
regulatory reporting is irregular, or ad-hoc.  Furthermore,  the limitations  of the 
~osting systems restrict the reports which the regulator can realistically request.  This 
contrasts with those Member States where the reporting requirements are laid down 
specifically in the legislation or regulatory framework such that the costing systems 
have to be adapted to be capable of producing the necessary reports, e.g. in the UK 
Oftel have a requirement for BT to produce Financial Results by Service. 
In Luxembourg Article 22(1) of the "Concession" licence enables the NRA to request 
virtually  any  information  from  the  operator,  Entreprise  des  Postes  et 
Telecommunications. 
In Denmark there are no standard regulatory reporting requirements.  At present 
Telestyrelsen  is  unable  to  'demand'  any  information  from  Tele  Danmark  A/S. 
However,  Telestyrelsen  does  'request'  externally  audited  information  on  cost 
allocation methods applied to ensure these are in accordance with the EU  rules. 
Currently  Telestyrelsen  is  utilised  mainly  for  implementation  of  legislation, 
discussion  of  telecommunications  issues  and  handling  customer  queries  and 
complaints. 
NRA Involvement in the Business 
In some Member States the regulatory role appears to be blurred with that of an 
investment monitoring role, i.e. where the NRA is "an extension" of the government 
and the  state continues  to  be  the owner or major  shareholder of the  business. 
Countries where this is the case include Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
There is clearly significant potential for c?nflicts where such a situation exists. 
In Belgium Belgacom has a  "Management Contract"  with the government which 
stipulates that Belgacom must produce a Strategic Plan.  The financial plan forms 
part of this overall strategic plan and contains information of results by service or 
groups of services including turnover, costs, investments and profits.  In this way 
the  government  via  the  Belgian  Institute  for  Post  and  Telecommunications  is 
appraised of the performance of the state owned asset.  In  addition the Belgian 
Institute for Post and Telecommunications can also request data on tariffs by service 
from Belgacom at any time. 
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In  Ireland,  the  NRA  performs  a  dual  function  of  "shareholder"  and  regulator 
receiving annual reports and 5 year company plans of Telecom Eireann annually, but 
with no segmental or additional detail.  In addition the Department of  Transport, 
Energy  and  Communication  receives  ad-hoc  reports  on  non-financial  data, 
applications for increases in investment and any other information that they may 
require.  The Department of Transport, Energy and Communications is  currently 
considering proposals to split this dual function formally in the future. 
In Italy, the operator is required to produce 3 year plans for the NRA setting out its 
main objectives, strategies, investment decisions and financial forecasts.  In addition, 
to  ensure optimal costing  within  the organisation,  the operator has  to  produce 
reports on productivity standards with comparatives from other TOs. 
In the Netherlands  PTI Telecom BV has to produce a "Concession Report" which 
describes how all the company's obligations have been met including a  summary 
profit and loss account  In addition PIT Telecom BV has to provide a  Multi-year 
policy report together with an annual update which surveys the prospects for the 
next five years together with expected infrastructure investment.  The Netherlands 
has  recently  undergone  privatisation  and  hence  requirements  may  therefore  be 
under review. 
Degree of Competition 
One of the most significant long run impacts on management and the information 
they require to effectively manage their business is the level of competition.  Where 
only certain services are exposed to competition it is necessary for the NRA to view 
separate cost and revenue information for each service to ensure that the cost and/  or 
pricing structure are within the  regulatory constraints  and that no  unfair  cross 
subsidisation is being undertaken between regulated and unregulated services. 
To  regulate  such  regimes  the  NRAs  generally  r~uire cost,  revenue  and  other 
information  to  be  broken  down  into  the  individual  regulated  and  unregulated 
services.  Such  demands  place  segmental  data  capture  requirements  upon  the 
costing system with potentially more elaborate cost allocation methods.  At present 
such service cost and profitability reports are produced by British Telecom, Telecom 
Eireann,  France  Telecom,  PIT Telecom  BV,  T  elef6nica,  Belgacom  and  Deutsche 
Bundespost T  elekom.  However, these usually comprise the allocation of cost to the 
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drawn  up  using  tariff  based  costing  principles  than  cost  orientated  tariffing 
principles.  Not all of these reports are publicly available. 
As interconnection becomes more of an issue, the regulatory role will be extended to 
regulating interconnect agreements  and ensuring fairness  and efficiencies  in the 
market place.  In no other country in Europe is this more apparent than in the UK. 
Here the regulation is stricter and more extensive than in any other Member State 
with consequent demands on the complexity and abilities  of the cost accounting 
system of the incumbent TO, British Telecom. 
Oftel require British Telecom to produce a "Financial Results By  Service" report on 
the revenues and costs associated with the regulated fundamental service offerings 
and  a  report on  any  changes  to  controlled  prices  to  ensure  that  the  price-cap 
restrictions have been met  From all TOs (i.e. not just British Telecom) Oftel request 
a number of reports including separated accounts for the different service provisions, 
the provision of telephony equipment and the production of telephony equipment. 
These accounts are required annually and consist of Profit and Loss statements and 
capital employed information for each  of the Business  sections.  In addition  the 
Director General can require from all operators such documents, accounts, estimates, 
returns and reports that he may reasonably require to carry out his functions under 
the Telecommunications Act 1984.  In the near future British Telecom will also be 
required to produce current cost accounts which require enhanced costing data and 
will therefore place additional demands upon the cost accounting system. 
Future changes to NRA reporting requirements are examined in section 5.3.6 below. 
From the above, regulatory requirements can be seen to be quite varied throughout 
the Community.  In most Member States NRAs impose very little regular financial 
reporting requirements of any significant nature.  Consequently demands upon the 
cost accounting systems also  vary.  As the market evolves  the  NRAs  reporting 
requirements  will  change.  This  is  likely  to.  place  new  demands  on  TOs  cost 
accounting systems which may then require further development. 
5.3.3  Internal Reporting Requirements 
In order to better understand the full capabilities of the TOs information systems, 
particularly  the  cost  accounting  systems,  it  is  important  to  determine  whether 
management  decisions  are  based  upon  cost  information  derived  from  systems 
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integrated with those which support the external financial reports or from separate 
or supplementary sources such as projected or "forward looking" cost and revenue 
information. 
Our interviews  with  most incumbent TOs  suggest that management and  other 
internal cost information is sourced primarily from the same system responsible for 
the external financial reporting.  Most TOs indicated that management information 
was prepared from "other sources" of data but generally these sources are forward 
looking  budgets  and  plans  which  in  the  main  are  based  upon  historical  cost 
information from the external financial  reporting system together with subjective 
adjustments to take account of expected trends in the industry. 
By  way of example,  PIT Telecom  BV  in the Netherlands rely  on their  external 
financial reporting system for their regular management reporting.  Use is made of 
other information sources for ad-hoc reports and projects. 
Reports indicated by respondents as produced from information sourced from areas 
other than the external financial reporting system are generally prepared without the 
use of a separate accounting system, although reliance may be placed on different 
cost standards.  This suggests that the information systems of the Member State 
operators are generally simplified and historical accounts orientated.  With the onset 
of  competition  the  internal  information  requirements  of  the  management  will 
become more demanding as the efficient allocation of organisation's resources and 
customer and service profitability together with customer satisfaction become the 
key issues for competitive success. 
In the competitive UK marketplace Mercury Communications Limited demonstrates 
this process with extensive internal management reporting drawing from activity-
based management analyses, benchmarking reports and detailed segmental reports 
product, call type etc.  Increased customer orientation is also evident with analyses 
by retail business unit and market sectors. 
5.3.4  Requirements to Produce Segmental lnfonnation 
All incumbent TOs have to produce data of sufficient detail for financial statements. 
Any analyses of revenue, cost and profitability into more detailed pools than the 
company reported results as a whole can be termed segmental analyses.  Examples 
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of such segmental analyses include service and product profitability analyses, fixed 
assets by geographical location, by asset type, by service, etc  .. 
The  requirements  placed  upon  TOs  to  provide  segmental  information  in  their 
external and internal reporting determines the level  of detail  which  the costing 
system  has  to  be  capable  of  producing  in  a  disaggregated  form.  Increased 
disaggregation of financial information is often used to assist management of these  .. 
large businesses.  In monopoly organisations the primary goal is usually to make a 
profit on the operation as a whole whilst maintaining required social obligations. 
With competition, however, management become increasingly concerned about the 
profitability of different services and customer groups to determine the best markets 
in which  to  operate  and  to  ration  investment.  Such  differences  in  outlook  are 
important  to  this  study  as  they  are  reflected  in  the  demands  upon  the  cost 
accounting system. 
Segmental  analyses  of  varying  degrees  of  sophistication  are  conducted  by  all 
organisations to determine profitability and efficiency of the different parts of the 
business.  The "ideal" situation would be one where the full details of the costs of all 
the individual parts of the business was known together with a knowledge of the 
cost drivers and the interaction of the different parts of the business in determining 
those costs.  This would enable businesses to price the cost to the business of,  say, 
making a call from one location to another at different times of the day, or, the cost to 
the business of interconnecting operators using specific parts of the network.  The 
actual situation is one where more rudimentary information is collected. 
In broad terms the capabilities of incumbents' cost accounting systems to produce 
segmental information is currently limited.  The overall impression is one of more 
rudimentary  information  being  collected  than  would  be- the  case  in  a  truly 
competitive operation.  Limited profitability studies appear to be carried out with 
revenue information collected when cost-information is not and vice-versa.  Much of 
this has to do with the difficulty of collecting the information.  For example, it is 
easier to record the revenues received than it is to allocate the associated costs of the 
network  to  the  different  user  groups  as  predominantly  they  all  use  the  same 
network. 
Even where it would appear segmental information is maintained it is often more a 
function of administrative simplification than of production of information suitable 
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regions by British Telecom (counties), P1T Telecom BV (13 districts and 32 regions), 
SIP (revenue and direct costs analysed into "compartimental" regions and strategic 
business  areas),  Denmark  (subsidiary  company  regions)  and  Spain  (provinces). 
Whilst such information is not so specific that it could be used for decision making it 
does help in making the business more manageable. 
It is  interesting to note, however, that where information iS  not already obtained 
about  corresponding  costs  or revenues  the  operators  interviewed  show  a  keen 
interest to capture these costs or revenues. 
Of all the cost segmental information not currently generated by the operators it is 
the cost of the individual service elements that most TOs indicated a willingness to 
produce.  Such  information  would  give  operators  the  ability  to  set  truly  cost 
orientated tariffs for the services offered which is not the case at present  This ability 
would specifically enable the calculation of the cost orientated interconnect charges 
which TOs will be expected to provide. 
Operators are also very keen to obtain information on the costs of servicing different 
user groups and the costs of making individual calls.  Obtaining such information 
would allow the operators to ensure profitability across the range of customers or at 
the very least ensure a  more accurate measure of the costs of the USO  would be 
possible. 
The abilities  of the European incumbent's present accounting systems are not as 
sophisticated  as  they  could  be,  but TOs  are  demonstrating  a  keen  interest  in 
collecting additional, more detailed and very useful information to develop a better 
understanding of their cost base and enable true cost orientated charging. 
In terms of demands upon the costing system it is fair to state that in most European 
TOs  the segmental requirements of external and internal reporting do not pose 
stringent demands upon the cost accounting system.  Most TOs are only capable of 
rigorously  analysing  geographical,  service  and  customer profitability  on  a  very 
aggregated basis.  Most incumbent TOs interviewed acknowledged this as an area 
where improvement was needed in the light of future liberalisation.  Indeed, this will 
be a prerequisite to their success in competitive arenas.  This is evidenced in the UK 
marketplace by Mercury Communications Limited who already conduct detailed 
analyses by products and services, call types, market sectors and geographical areas. 
BT, in facing up to competition also conduct similarly detailed analyses. 
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5.3.5  Financial Planning and Forecasting 
Financial planning and forecasting is an area in organisations where forward looking 
cost data and alternatives to the external financial reporting system would often 
more usually be used.  From our questionnaires and interviews the following major 
points arose: 
•  Most TOs understand the processes required to create the forward looking 
data  but  the  use  of  relevant  c~st information  is  not  always  rigorously 
employed as there are few compelling competitive reasons for doing so. 
•  There is widespread dependence on the use of the external financial reporting 
system as the source and/  or basis for much of the planning and forecasting. 
•  External financial  reporting information is generally coupled with market 
studies  and  investment  appraisal  reports  to  determine  future  capital 
expenditure forecasts. 
•  Where universal service obligations determine the need for  capital outlay 
incumbents generally do not carry out investment appraisal. 
•  Most incumbent TOs acknowledge that this area of information needs to be 
greatly developed. 
•  In  competitive  environments  such  as  the  UK,  financial  planning  and 
forecasting is  a much more thorough and detailed process utilising capital 
budgeting forecasts, demand and engineering studies, and with limited use, 
if  at all, of historical cost data. 
5.3.6  Planned Changes to Reporting Requirements 
The  general  consensus  of  opiiU.on  amongst TOs  and  NRAs  in  Europe  is  that 
reporting requirements will change dramatically in the short and long term.  These 
changes  will  arise  from  more  intensive  regulation  of  the  industry  during  the 
liberalisation  process  and  the  management  demand  for  more  meaningful 
information for  decision  making and control of the business  as  markets become 
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systems will require some development, or even replacement, to keep pace with the 
additional requirements placed upon the organisation. 
In Belgium, the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommunications anticipates some 
significant changes over the next few  years.  Belgacom expects  the regulation  to 
develop along the same lines as the other European nations whilst maintaining some 
control over the employment of the organisation. 
The Danish NRA, T  elestyrelsen, is going through the process of implementing the 
procedures that it will apply to regulate the industry.  In addition Telestyrelsen is 
implementing  an  indexed  based  method  of  price  control  for  which  additional 
reporting demands will be placed upon Tele Danmark A/5 to ensure compliance 
with the new price-caps. 
In  France,  over the next few years it is anticipated that France Telecom will be 
required to separately account for the operations of the network from the other 
activities with the implementation of a corresponding new internal pricing policy. 
Additionally TOs will be required to separately account for the different activities of 
the  business.  The  Direction  Generale  des  Pastes  et  Telecommunications  also 
anticipates greater access to information on the methods of cost allocation and the 
breakdown of costs (e.g. by network use) per product per TO.  This will enable the 
NRA to ensure the suitability of regulatory reports for specific purposes. 
In Germany, from the financial year 1993 onwards the NRA, the Federal Ministry of 
Post and Telecommunications, requires detailed segmental information on costs and 
revenues  for  all  of the fundamental  products  and services  offered  by  Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom. 
The Irish NRA is currently reviewing the regulatory regime.  The Department of 
Transport,  Energy  and  Communication  is  looking  into  a  move  away  from  the 
shareholder type information previously requested to more statistical reports from 
operators to aid regulation in the changing industry.  Annual Accounting Separation 
reports may become due from Telecom Eireann in balance sheet and profit and loss 
account  format.  These  regulatory  requirements  are  likely  to  place  additional 
demands  upon,  and  therefore  develop,  the  cost  accounting  system  of Telecom 
Eire  ann. 
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Telecom  Eireann  is  reviewing the information needs of management in  internal 
reporting.  The use of Activity-Based Costing for cost attribution within the historical 
FDC system is  being considered for  CQst  statements on individual activities  as  a 
means of cost control and additional useful management information. 
SIP  also  anticipates collecting more detailed management information.  Financial  . 
data will be collected by service, customer groups, and network elements along the 
lines of British Telecom's current FRBS model.  Benchmarking will be introduced to 
compare costs with those of other TOs.  More forward looking investment appraisal 
and capital budgetary information will also be collected in the near future. 
In  Luxembourg the development of further external reporting requirements very 
much depends on the potential introduction of new laws.  The incumbent, Entreprise 
des Pastes et Telecommunications, anticipates the development of more detailed cost 
information by service and business unit for management purposes. 
In the Netherlands, the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
is considering the requirement for additional and more detailed cost and revenue 
data on voice services with additional ad-hoc reports to assist in the regulation of 
interconnect and the funding of the local access loss and the USO.  PIT Telecom BV 
is looking to collect more detailed cost and revenue information for its own internal 
use. 
In Spain the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communications is setting up the 
requirement  for  accounting  separation  reports  between  the  network  and  other 
services on an annual basis.  In addition the costs of public service obligations will be 
analysed in a  future required report.  T  elef6nica is looking at improving the cost 
system to produce greater detail on costs for cost management. 
In the UK,  British Telecom will be required to produce current cost accounts from 
1994/95 onwards which will be subject to an independent audit from the following 
year.  The  company  itself  is  looking  at  producing  ad-hoc  reports  utilising 
incremental  and  marginal costing  techniques,  collecting  more  detailed  customer 
information  in  the  drive  for  competitive  customer  orientation  and  general 
enhancements to cost information detail with improvements in the cost accounting 
system. 
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Mercury  Communications  Limited  have  stated  that  competitive  pressures  are 
responsible for the future additional reporting requirements they foresee.  A 'flexible' 
employee information system is to be established using a building block approach 
which will enable tailoring of the system to the many different users, services and 
products, and to changing customer requirements  . 
.  A general pattern can.therefore.be said tc:> exisL NRAs.are requiring more.details on 
the historical cost make-up of the incumbents to ensure fair interconnect agreements, 
the absence  of discriminatory  cross  subsidisation and to  learn  the extent of  the 
burden of public commitments such as the USO and local access loss.  The TOs are 
demanding more detailed and more meaningful cost information as they orientate 
themselves towards customers and prepare themselves for future competition.  Such 
additional requirements will, as a matter of course, place additional demands upon, 
and enforce improvements and changes in, the cost accounting systems of the TOs. 
Of  all  the  respondents  only  Luxembourg's  Entreprise  des  Postes  et 
Telecommunications  expressed  the ·view that the  additional future  requirements 
currently anticipated would not require significant investment in new or modified 
accounting systems. 
5.3. 7  Conclusion on The Importance of  Financial Reporting Requirements to Cost 
Accounting 
As recently corporatised entities the majority of the European incumbent TOs have 
cost accounting systems which are geared towards the external financial reporting 
system.  The information  demands placed upon the organisations are similar in 
degree of detail, especially where disclosure is governed by European Community 
Directives.  The cost accounting requirements and cost allocation  methodologies 
employed for  external  financial  reporting  may not be state  of  the  art but they 
describe a common denorrtinator of costing system ability for European TOs. 
Most incumbents and NRAs agree that the reporting demands placed upon the TOs 
in the future, both internal and external, will encourage the improvement and even 
replacement  of  the  costing  systems  in  the  future.  Such  development  of  the 
accounting systems would come about by competitive forces  in time but may be 
encouraged by  regulatory  reporting  demands  for  additional  and  more  detailed 
information in the interim. 
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5.4  Cost Standards 
Having  now  reviewed  the  internal  and  external  reporting  requirements  to 
understand the demands for information placed upon the accounting system it is 
also sensible to review the cost standards adopted.  An analysis of the cost standards 
used  by  organisations  gives  an  understanding  of how  TOs  view  costs  in  the 
_  reporting __ system .and _the  -~pes  ...  oL-cast_.information  . .used  by .  TOs _for  different 
purposes. 
Cost standards are an important element of the accounting system as use of different 
standards can reveal very different answers to the specific applications to which they 
are applied.  This argument has been pt.irsued more fully in section 4.  This section 
describes  the current use  and potential use  of the different  cost  standards  and 
provides details of the feasibility of the implementation of specific cost standards in 
the overall solution to the question of interconnect charges. 
5.4.1  Incumbent Operators 
The following graphs indicate incumbent operators' awareness, use and views on the 
usefulness of cost standards for  different applications.  It is  therefore possible for 
incumbents to consider more than one cost standard to be appropriate to a particular 
application. 
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Graph 5.4B 
Use of cost standards for financial reporting 
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Graph 5.40 
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Graph 5.4E 
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The most revealing information from the graphs above is the ubiquitous use of the 
FDC  cost  standard  amongst  incumbent  TOs.  All  of  the  incumbent  TOs  who 
responded are currently utilising the FDC cost standard for their financial reporting 
requirements (in Luxembourg
1s Entreprise des Postes et Telecommunications this is 
combined  with  marginal  cost  standard  elements)  and  for  their  management 
reporting requirement.  Most European TOs are also using FDC for their segmental 
reporting requirements. 
None of the European TOs have a  system capable of using long-run incremental 
costing or stand-alone costing to determine service costs. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
This is much the picture one might expect at the outset  FDC is the most appropriate 
cost standard for financial reporting purposes and one usually required by law for 
financial  reporting.  The  requirements  placed  upon  the  incumbents  in  most 
European countries up until now have been mostly in the area of external financial 
reporting with very little  rigorous demand for  internal,  managerial,  information. 
Thus FDC is the cost standard chosen. 
Incumbent TOs generally expressed an awareness of cost standards other than FDC 
but few TOs utilise other cost standards.  In no incumbent TO is it evident that the 
operator is running two different cost accounting systems utilising two different cost 
standards.  Where more than one cost standard is in use this means  that for one-off 
budgeting, forecasting or other ad hoc reports consideration has been made of other 
cost standards for the calculations. 
EDC  is  the  second  most  popularly  utilised  cost  standard  but  generally  for 
management and segmental reporting.  As with FDC this is probably due to  the 
simplicity of calculation. 
Amongst incumbents familiarity and usage is rarest for the 'incremental' and 'stand 
alone' cost standards.  This is unfortunate given that these two cost standards are 
theoretically sound as the basis for decision making and pricing decisions from an 
economic  perspective.  Incremental  costs  are  useful  as  price  floors  for  decision 
making while stand alone costs can be used to establish a price ceiling for decision 
making.  However, it is notable, that of the 8 respondents (Belgacom, Tele Danmark 
A/5, France Telecom, Telecom Eireann, SIP, PIT Telecom BV, Portugal Telecom and 
British  Telecom)  who  expressed  familiarity  with  the  long-run  incremental  cost 
standard 6 stated that they either utilised the standard currently (Belgacom,  Tele 
Danmark, Telecom Eireann and British Telecom) or believed it would be useful to do 
so (PIT Telecom BV, SIP). 
There is more appreciation of the usefulness of other cost standards to FDC in the 
area of decision making than for any other application.  However, this appreciation 
has generally not been translated into actual utilisation of alternative cost standards 
to FDC. 
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5.4.2  Other Operators 
Graph 5.41 
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Graph 5.4L 
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A comparison of graphs 5.4A and 5.41  reveals that there is more awareness of cost 
standards other than FDC amongst the mobile operators and wireline competitors 
interviewed as part of this study.  Mannesmann Mobilfunk, Cellnet, Vodafone, and 
Mercury Communications Limited all indicated awareness of  the FDC, EDC, SRIC 
and MC costing standards.  In addition, they also utilise other types of cost standard 
to FDC to a greater degree than the incumbent operators.  Mercury Communications 
Limited, Vodafone and Cellnet all utilise .Me .for management reporting.  Less use is 
made of MC for such applications amongst incumbent operators. 
Mercury  Communications  Limited,  the  wireline  competitor  in  the  UK,  has 
developed its accounting system based on the concepts of Embedded Direct Costing 
to  allow its retail business units to push accountability for  contributions down the 
organisation  and  thereby  increase  customer  responsiveness.  This  system  is 
augmented by Activity-Based Costing to  attribute costs using a  direct or indirect 
causal link between cost drivers and activities. 
It is interesting to note that FDC is not held in such high regard for management 
reporting, segmental analysis and decision making by the TOs in competitive arenas 
as it is by the incumbent operators in non-competitive markets.  As can be seen by 
graph  5.4M  this  is  especially  true  with  regard  to  decision  making  where  the 
incremental cost standards are viewed by "competing" TOs as more useful than FDC. 
Such interest in,  experimentation with, and utilisation of,  other cost standards to 
FDC is a function of the more competitive environment in which these organisations 
have developed and an indicator of the likely trends in a more liberalised European 
market. 
5.4.3  Regulatory Awareness 
The TOs have indicated generally more awareness of the issues associated with the 
use of different cost standards than the NRAs.  All the European NRAs are fully 
aware  of  the  FDC  cost  standard  but  awareness  of the  other  cost  standards  is 
generally below that of the operators. 
Less  than  half  of  the  NRAs  indicated  an  awareness  of  the  other  types  of cost 
standard, and support for  these standards is even weaker with only 1 respondent 
indicating that they might consider each cost standard useful. 
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Furthermore, NRAs generally expressed·no intention to see any other cost standard 
than FDC utilised for  any application in the future.  To  some extent the lack of 
comment is due to current consideration of the issue as is the case in the Netherlands 
and  Ireland.  However,  this  general  popularity  amongst  NRAs  of  FDC  is  an 
important issue for several reasons: 
•  If NRAs  are.  unfamiliar  with  the  range  of cost standards  they  are  also 
unfamiliar with the potential advantages and disadvantages, uses and abuses 
of the different standards. 
•  The FDC standard utilised by all the incumbent operators and familiar to the 
NRAs is not suited to all the management information needs of a modem TO, 
particularly  in  the  area  of  service  costing  and  pricing  (see  for  example 
appendix 3 for  commentary on the "death spiral") 
•  NRAs are generally responsible "for  ensuring fair  treatment for  consumers 
and fair competition between the new entrants and the incumbent.  With 
interconnect  charges  being  the  biggest  single  cost  to  new  entrants  the 
interconnect tariff is of great importance to  their success.  Use  of FDC  in 
interconnect  involves  allocations  of  some  costs  which  is,  by  definition, 
arbitrary and therefore interconnect charges can vary considerably  in size 
with the use of different allocation methods. 
Summary of  Cost Standards in General 
From the above, FDC can be seen to be the cost standard that is most familiar to TOs 
and NRAs in Europe and the most used by incumbent TOs.  All incumbent TOs use 
FDC for  their external financial reporting and hence NRAs prefer FDC because it 
enables them to tie regulatory reports back to  audited figures  and hence provides 
"confidence" in the regulatory reports.  The competitors in more liberalised markets 
generally appreciate the applicability of other cost standards to particular procedures 
more than the incumbents.  Use of the alternative cost standards to  FDC  is  also 
concentrated amongst operators in competitive markets. 
A practical, implementable solution to the question of interconnect charges requires 
the consideration  of  the  current  use  of cost  standards  in  interconnect  and  the 
flexibility of the accounting systems to be adapted to different cost standards.  It is 
these areas which are examined in the next sections. 
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5.4.4  Cost Standards in Interconnect 
The graph below indicates the current use of cost standards in interconnect charges. 
Given that some TOs are connected to  more than one other operator, and some 
interconnect charges may incorporate elements of more than one cost standard - it is 
possible for more than one cost standard to be currently utilised by each respondent. 
Graph 5.40 
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It has already been discussed in section 4 that the use of incremental costing with an 
additional margin for a contribution to joint and residual common cost plus a return 
on investment is  theoretically  the optimum solution for  use in pricing decisions. 
Practically speaking it is shown in graph 5.40 above that little use is currently made 
of the incremental costing standards and at present there appears to be little interest 
in its potential development for later use by the incumbent operators in interconnect. 
This  may  be  explained  in  part  by  the  perceived  practical  difficulties  of  its 
implementation but may also be explained by the incumbent TOs perception of their 
inability to support existing cost structures if a move is made to an incremental cost 
based approach to interconnect charging. 
The graph 5.40 above indicates that FDC is still the favoured cost standard in terms 
of current application and future application in the area of interconnect.  This is not 
surprising given that most of the TO's accounting systems are set up to  produce 
FDC based information, but what is  more surprising is the lack of interest in the 
other cost standards - rarely even indicating an appreciation of their worth as useful 
information. 
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Entreprise des Pastes et Telecommunications proved exceptional in revealing their 
intention to use elements of SAC and MC cost standards in setting the charges for 
interconnect 
The results obtained above are hardly surprising.  FDC is the most suitable cost 
standard to be utilised in interconnect from the incumbent operator's stand point as 
many would presume it ensures the highest recovery of costs with the declining 
costs of technology. 
This preference for FDC is not so widely held amongst competing TOs.  Mercury 
Communications Limited (MCL), the wireline competitor to British Telecom in the 
UK,  expressed a  different opinion.  MCL currently use FDC in their interconnect 
agreements with British Telecom and others but state an intention to consider the use 
of the incremental cost standard in the future.  MCL's preference for incremental 
costing over FDC in interconnect may serve to reduce the costs of interconnect with 
British  Telecom but  MCL  are  also  considering  offering  incremental  cost  based 
agreements to new entrants thus indicating the strength of their opinion that this is 
the best cost standard for interconnect charges for the particular conditions they face. 
5.4.5  Practicality of  Adopting different Cost Standards 
To  determine  a  practical  and  implementable  solution  to  interconnect  charges 
consideration must be given to the opinions of the TOs on the adoption of different 
cost standards or potential barriers to their adoption. 
Specific comments on why certain cost standards may be impractical to implement in 
TOs have been put forward by a number of incumbents.  FDC, predictably, but also 
EDC  received no comments of impracticality  in implementation.  Contrastingly, 
LRIC is perceived to be problematic by a number of incumbent TOs. 
France Telecom do not advocate the use of LRIC as "it is easy to make mistakes in 
computation and interpretation of the results".  SIP regard the change required in the 
management accounting system and management practices to be too great to make 
application  of  LRIC  feasible.  Belgacom  also  expressed  their  opinion  on  the 
impracticality of the LRIC  standard but without offering an explanation of their 
reasoning. 
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SRIC is also deemed impractical by SIP for the same reasoning applied to LRIC.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that operators in competitive environments generally 
hold different opinions.  Whilst Mercury Communications Limited appreciate the 
subjectivity  attached  to  forward  looking  cost  standards  they  are  developing 
incremental costing techniques "within the wholesale parts of their business where 
historical costs are irrelevant for  decision making given the rate of technological 
change."  -British Telecom and Vodafone-are ·also-developing incremental cost based 
decision making tools for the future. 
SAC  is  deemed  impractical  by  Belgacom,  PTr  Telecom  BV,  Mercury 
Communications Limited, and British Telecom.  PTT Telecom BV,  the only TO to 
offer  the  reasoning  for  their belief,  stated  that  for  service  pricing  it  is  "almost 
impossible to  gather information and the price per product will be  very high as 
almost all the costs [in TOs] are fixed, common or shared".  However, PTT Telecom 
BV do consider SAC to be useful for project costing and certain other applications. 
MC also received a comment on impracticality from France Telecom who believe the 
cost standard makes "no sense for highly capitalised services such as telecoms". 
On  the  more  specific  topic  of  "the  practicality  of  adopting  a  cost  standard  to 
determine service cost"  FDC received the most support.  A few TOs did put other 
cost standards at the top of their list.  Belgacom and PTT Telecom BV  believe that 
EDC is the easiest cost standard to adopt for costing services while Entreprise des 
Pastes et Telecommunications proposed MC as  the most practical solution.  The 
determination of service cost is not a process closely linked to the financial reporting 
function  and  these  responses  bear  out  the  closer  relationship  to  management 
reporting  where  operators  utilise  different  cost  standards  to  FDC  in  their 
management reporting function. 
EDC was the next most highly regarded cost standard to FDC for the purpose of 
service  costing.  This  is  very  encouraging  with  EDC  possessing  some  of  the 
theoretical benefits of the incremental cost standard and the more practical elements 
of a historical cost basis. 
The main conclusions to be drawn from this data are that FDC utilised as the cost 
standard  for  interconnection  would  give  the  most  palatable  solution  to  the 
incumbent Community operators and that incremental costing, whilst theoretically 
the optimum solution, would not be a practical solution for the incumbent operators 
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of  the existing  Member States.  EDC  seems  to  be a  solution  that might  prove 
acceptable to the operators whilst maintaining an incremental approach that would 
find favour as a more theoretically appropriate solution. 
The cost standards to be utilised by TOs in the future is an issue of current debate by 
NRAs in many Member States e.g. France, Ireland and Belgium. 
Generally,  however,  NRAs  are  quiet on this  issue.  Few  NRAs  were willing  to 
advocate  the  use  of  other  cost  standards  than  FDC  in  the  future.  Even  the 
Netherlands Directorate General of Telecommunications who indicated a preference 
for  EDC,  LRIC and SIC for  management reporting within PTT Telecom will only 
'require' PTI to utilise FDC in the future. 
5.4.6  Planned Changes to Cost Standards Used by TOs 
Few TOs in Europe currently foresee changes to costs standards utilised in their cost 
accounting system.  In the UK,  Ireland and the Netherlands this issue is currently 
under discussion for interconnect and in all cases other cost standards to FDC are 
being considered.  Generally, however, incumbents are of the opinion that they will 
~o on utilising FDC until such time as they require, or are required, to use a different 
cost standard.  Entreprise des Postes et Telecommunications and Belgacom believe 
that  voluntary  uptake  of  other  cost  standards  will  result  from  management 
information demands within the organisation. 
5.5  Cost Accounting Systems Currently used by Community Operators 
Having  established  that  the  FDC  cost  standard  is  used  by  all  the  incumbent 
operators of the Community it is now necessary to look in more detail at the cost 
accounting systems which use FDC.  As  discussed in section 4,  FDC requires  all 
costs to be allocated to products and services.  However, as demonstrated in graph 
5.5A  below  only between 10%  - 20%  of a  TO's  cost base  are direct costs.  The 
remainder are joint and common costs ·which require indirect attribution or more 
arbitrary allocation. 
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Therefore the important aspects in determining service costs are the cost accounting 
practices and cost allocation methods that allow cost data to be captured, recorded, 
grouped, and attributed with only the residual costs being arbitrarily allocated. 
The flow of costs through a typical TO utilising the FDC cost standard is illustrated 
in  figure  S.SB  below.  The  diagram  demonstrates  the  number  of  areas  where 
subjective decisions are made to arrive at the final destination of product or service 
cost. 
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Figure: 5.5B 
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More detail regarding this diagram is given in section 9. 9. 
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In order to establish the practicality of a pan European solution to interconnect it is 
necessary  to  understand  the  comparability  of accounting  systems  amongst  the 
Community operators to determine the level of detail to which the recommendations 
are feasible and i.mplementable.  In order to achieve this we will now look at distinct 
areas of the cost flow through the system. 
5.5.1  .  Fixed.Assets Data Capture 
Data capture is the first stage in the cost flow process.  If cost information is not 
captured in an appropriate form in the first place it will not be possible to attribute 
that cost to any products or services. 
If unbundled services are to  be offered to interconnecting operators then the TOs 
must be capable of producing costs by service and geographical area. 
Fixed assets generally make up the largest cost of TOs and as such we have analysed 
their capture here. 
To produce costs by service TOs need to separately identify the assets used by each 
service.  Equally, for  costs to be collected geographically the assets used in each 
geographical location need to be identified. 
In  order  for  unbundled  services  to  be  offered,  both  service  asset  data  and 
geographical asset data need to be collected and connected in a complex database. 
None of the incumbent TOs indicated any ability to collect and analyse their costs in 
such a manner. 
Our findings indicated a general lack of rigorous historical fixed asset information by 
a number of European incumbents. 
Full  fixed  asset registers are maintained and reconciled  to  the general ledger by 
British  Telecom,  PTT  Telecom  BV,  France  Telecom,  Telecom  Eireann,  SIP  and 
Telef6nica.  Tele Danmark A/5 maintains a  fixed asset register but states that the 
nature of some of the costs (cable was used as an example) do not lend themselves to 
capture on a  register.  Deutsche Bundespost Telekom has only maintained a  full 
fixed asset register since 1992.  Similarly, Luxembourg has only been collecting fixed 
asset register information for acquisitions since January 1993.  Belgacom also do not 
maintain a full fixed asset register. 
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A number of the operators indicated that they do not maintain sufficiently detailed 
registers  to  identify  the  costs  of the individual  assets  including  Belgacom,  PTI 
Telecom BV,  Entreprise des Postes et Telecommunications and Tele Danmark A/S. 
The  fixed  asset  registers  of  Entreprise  des  Postes  et  TelE~communications  and 
Belgacom are also not capable of separately identifying the costs of individual asset 
groups such as switching, transmission or service.  Full registers would have to be 
compiled in such organisations via .a .fixed. asset. count. if the depreciation of the 
assets is to be applied to service cost in a reliable manner. 
Some TOs maintain geographical fixed asset information in the form of the company 
structure such as SIP, France Telecom, Telecom Eireann, PTI Telecom BV, Telef6nica 
and British Telecom.  Such analysis confers a benefit upon the organisation in terms 
of dividing the organisation into more manageable units but is probably not of great 
use in assigning costs to products. 
Whilst the limitations of some of the European incumbent fixed asset recordings are 
obvious  from  the  above  analysis  there  are  some  cases  where  fixed  assets  are 
recorded in such detail to enable meaningful attribution of depreciation to products 
and  services.  For  example,  PTI Telecom  BV  of  the  Netherlands  runs  a  new 
11Componist" system for  leased lines business and other telephony services.  This 
system allows the costs of assets to be attributed to individual equipment elements 
allowing more accurate historical costing of services. 
More commonly, however, examples of greater detail and complexity in recording 
fixed asset information are to be found in TOs which operate in competitive markets. 
Mannesmann Mobilfunk, for  example, have a complete historical cost fixed  asset 
register which identifies the individual assets and enables grouping into switching, 
transmission or service etc.  The fixed asset register is also capable of analysing each 
asset type geographically, andre-analysing the assets into other cost classes (such as 
local loop, constructions, local exchanges, etc.).  Vodafone, the UK mobile operator 
also indicated similar capabilities in their fixed asset data capture. 
Even these competing operators, however, did not indicate an ability to analyse their 
fixed assets in the detail required for unbundling service costs for interconnect. 
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5.5.2  Amortisation and Depreciation Policies 
The Telecommunications industry is one where fixed asset costs form the bulk of the 
investment  The depreciation or amortisation of those fixed asset costs also generally 
makes up a  large element of the operating costs  to  be applied to  products and 
services.  The accounting policies  on depreciation are therefore important to  the 
determination of service costs. 
As with the revenue Vs  capital differences amongst European TOs outlined below 
large disparities exist over the amortisation of this capital expenditure to the profit 
and loss  statement through different depreciation and amortisation policies.  The 
table in Appendix 9 indicates these vast differences- not just in the number of years 
over which expenditure is released to the profit statement but also in how the assets 
are categorised in the first place.  For example: 
•  Tele  Danmark  depreciate  land  at  5%.  No  other  country  respondents 
depreciated land at all; 
•  T  elef6nica has a separate asset category for subscriber equipment - no other 
respondents  separately  categorised  such  assets  and  so  no  comparison  is 
possible at that level; 
•  Deutsche  Bundespost T  elekom  has  to  categorise  and  amortise  its  assets 
according to tax authority tables ..  Although some scope is given for assigning 
estimated useful economic lives there is no comparable system employed in 
other European TOs; 
•  Buildings are depreciated over 60 years by Telecom Eireann, 25-33  years by 
SIP,  20  years by Tele Danmark and up to a  maximum of 10 years by PTI 
Telecom BV; 
•  Fixed assets under construction and advance payments are depreciated in the 
same way as the fixed assets to which they relate by Belgacom.  These are not 
depreciated by OTE,  PTI Telecom and BT  and not separately analysed by 
any of the other operators. 
108 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG X1D 
5.5.3  Revenue Vs Capital Cost 
The second stage in the cost flow process is  to  determine whether a  cost is  to be 
attributed to any of the expense cost pools or to be capitalised for later amortisation 
into the cost pool.  In order to assess the comparability of the accounting policies of 
European TOs generally we analysed the policies adopted for certain types of costs  . 
.  The results of our analysis are illustrated below. 
Chart: 5.5C 
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Despite the implementation of the EC 4th and 7th Directives  there is  still  much 
diversity  in  the  accounting  treatment  of  different  types  of  expenditure  which 
perhaps  reflects  the  range  of  alternatives  permitted  under  the  Member  States' 
accounting standards.  Graph 5.5C above demonstrates the variety of ways in which 
European  TOs  treat  certain  expenditure  types.  Almost  an  equal  number  of 
respondents  capitalise  direct  and  indirect  construction  overhead  as  write  it  off. 
Similarly  there is a general lack of consensus on the treatment of computer software 
and systems costs, development costs, business start up costs, and improvements. 
Of the nine categories of expenditure evaluated only one- repairs and maintenance-
received universal agreement on accounting treatment. 
Research costs almost received universal agreement with only Portugal Telecom and 
T  elef6nica  stating  that  they  might  capitalise  such  costs.  The  general  pattern 
revealed, however, is one of inconsistent accounting treatment amongst European 
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TOs.  With the Commission's intention to base interconnect charges on service cost 
this diversity of accounting treatment is concerning. 
The comments received from the European TOs suggest that with an identical cost 
structure each TO could in theory arrive at a different measure of service cost based 
on their  different  accounting  treatment  of expenditure  alone,  and  hence  would 
calculate different interconnect charges. 
5.5.4  Degrees and Methods of  Allocation 
To determine product cost for interconnect and other services the costs collected and 
recorded by the organisation have to be analysed into business areas and ultimately 
the product pools. 
Degree of  Allocation 
The number and type of levels to which costs are allocated in the costing systems is 
different amongst the TOs.  Some operators indicated that only one level of costs was 
maintained.  More commonly, others stated that direct costs are recorded on 3 or 4 
levels with more levels required for indirect costs.  The information provided by TOs 
is sufficient to conclude that the operators all collect and analyse costs differently 
without elaborating on the actual levels of cost allocation used by each organisation. 
Methods of  Allocation 
A variety of methods are used by the European TOs in allocating residual joint and 
common costs to reported segments.  Whilst no one allocation method is particularly 
wrong  the  fact  that  a  variety  of  methods  are  used  goes  further  towards 
demonstrating that the European TOs could all come up with different product costs 
from the same cost base. 
Many of the operators use more than one type of cost allocation method for different 
types of costs and different analyses.  This implies some thought is given to the most 
applicable  attribution  and  allocation  methodology  utilised.  Some  operators, 
however, do not even go so far as to specify particular allocation methodologies.  For 
example,  Entreprise  des  Pastes  et Telecommunications  describe  their  allocation 
methods as "Judgemental".  Whilst this may not be the most scientific approach to 
cost allocation, it may not be much better or worse than the other methods applied 
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and  merely  highlights  the  degree  of  subjectivity  in  costing  within  the 
telecommunications industry. 
There is an increasing awareness of Activity-Based Costing amongst European TOs, 
especially in the operators in more competitive markets.  Activity-Based Costing 
seeks to attribute costs based on the cost drivers of the business and not merely some 
connected or causally 
1associated
1 criteria.  In most cases the current use of ABC is, 
however, limited.  For example, one TO explained that their use of ABC techniques 
was currently restricted to limited applications (e.g. for cash collection, billing and 
transport). 
5.5.5  Changes to Cost Accounting Systems 
Most TOs seem to have undergone recent changes to their cost accounting systems. 
Only PTT Telecom BV  stated that a change in accounting system took place more 
than two years previously, but even here changes are currently underway.  The fact 
that this area of the business is becoming more closely scrutinised is evidenced by 
the immediacy of the anticipated changes.  Most TOs stated that updating the cost 
accounting system is a continuous process and anticipated changes would therefore 
take place within the next year.  Telef6nica is the only exception anticipating the next 
change in their accounting system not to take place before 1 January 1998.  Generally 
the reasons given for anticipated  changes were to give more detail, more accurate 
information, more relevant information and more control over the business. 
This anticipation of change in TOs accounting systems should make the job of the 
NRA much easier when requesting new information. 
5.5.6  Accounting System Conclusions 
These results serve to  illustrate the lack of compatibility between the accounting 
systems of the Community operators despite the Communitts attempts at unifying 
accounting  treatments  across  the  continent  Such  incompatibility  indicates  the 
difficulty  in designing a  detailed  pan-European solution  to  the question  of cost 
orientated interconnect charges.  As stated above, two operators with identical cost 
bases could calculate entirely different service costs and therefore tariffs and charges. 
The current capabilities of incumbent TOs accounting systems do not conform to the 
rigorous standards that will be required in fully competitive environments, or even 
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generally for the implementation of accurate cost based interconnect charges, but 
most TOs appreciate the way forward and anticipate changes in the future. 
5.6  Costs and Tariffs in each Member State 
The European Commission has a desire for cost orientated interconnect charges.  As 
discussed  in .further  detail  .. in ·section  6.3,  a. number of· the.· issues  pertaining  to 
interconnect charges have resulted from historical imbalances between costs  and 
revenues  geographically,  by service,  and by subscriber group  resulting in cross 
subsidies.  These  have  arisen  out  of  the  political  and  social  policies  of  the 
governments and NRAs as much as the. price elasticity of demand for the different 
services.  This section describes in broad terms how prices currently relate to costs 
within  the  Community  incumbents  and  to  determine  how  TOs  and  NRAs  are 
currently planning to address any imbalances.  This information is relevant due to 
the  contributions  that  might  be  made  towards  retail  tariff  imbalances  through 
interconnect agreements. 
5.6.1  Geographical Averaging 
Historical social policies in many Member States have resulted in the geographical 
averaging of tariffs.  Geographical averaging incorporates by its very nature a form 
of cross subsidisation.  If this is  inherent in retail tariffs and not reflected in cost 
orientated interconnect charges in particular, this will distort the competitive retail 
position and encourage inefficiencies through artificial arbitrage opportunities. 
Of all the Member States only Denmark possesses tariffs which reflect the different 
costs of serving different geographical regions.  Geographical variation is evident in 
the different cost and tariff structures of the historical regional monopoly companies. 
Bearing in mind the topography of Denmark and the relatively uniform population 
density and wealth distribution outside of Copenhagen this achievement is perhaps 
easier for  Denmark than it will be for  the other European nations.  Some other 
incumbents have geographically  varied tariffs  but not always  to  reflect  the cost 
differences of geographical regions in their tariffs, for example Belgacom and SIP. 
Belgacom charges  lower subscription  fees  in rural areas  (a  feature  that is  to  be 
eradicated shortly) and also domestic calls are cheaper in rural areas than in urban 
areas  as  long  as  the call  is  within  the  local  call  area.  This  latter  geographical 
variation was set up to enable rural populations to call more people on the cheaper 
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local tariffs due to the lower inherent value of service in rural locations where fewer 
people could  be reached  within  a  slmilarly sized geographical  area.  This  tariff 
difference was not therefore set up to rebalance tariffs with the underlying costs. 
SIP possesses some small regional variations with specific connection fees  for rural 
areas and unmetered local calls provision in minor local networks (generally less 
than 10,000 subscribers).  However, these. minor geographical.tariff variations bear 
more relation to a social policy than an attempt to set tariffs such that they relate 
closer to the underlying costs of providing a service. 
On the whole therefore,  with the exception of Denmark,  the  European  Member 
States maintain geographically averaged tariffs. 
Geographical Cost Collection 
Five Member State incumbents (Belgacom, France Telecom, Telecom Eireann, PIT 
Telecom  BV  and  British  Telecom)  reported  that  they  are  able  to  estimate 
geographical data to  be able  to  establish the full cost to  the different regions  of 
maintaining averaged tariffs throughout the network (Not by service).  Three more 
_Member State incumbents (SIP,  PTI Telecom BV,  Portugal Telecom and Telef6nica) 
expressed  an  interest in obtaining  information  on  the  full  cost  of  geographical 
variations.  Entreprise des Paste et Telecomunications is  the only incumbent which 
stated that it felt  geographical information would not be useful and this may be 
understandable in view of the size of Luxembourg.  No response was received from 
Greece. 
Planned De-averaging 
Most Member State incumbents and NRAs are non-committal on whether tariffs are 
to be geographically de-averaged in the foreseeable future.  Only two incumbents 
(France and the Netherlands) stated that de-averaging is  an issue under current 
~- consideration.  One incumbent (Belgacom) has indicated its intention to partially de-
average its tariffs.  This situation is likely to be a reflection of the unpalatable nature 
of geographically  de-averaged tariffs  as far  as political policy  is  concerned,  with 
governments unwilling, rather than unable,  to  risk permitting such a  potentially 
unpopular  change  to  telecommunications  retail  tariffs.  The  legality  of  such 
geographical de-averaging is also not always certain. 
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5.6.2  Service Averaging 
The historical cross subsidisation that exists between services is also an issue to  be 
addressed either by rebalancing or through interconnect charges.  Some of these 
cross subsidies give rise to a  major part of the local access loss.  Consideration of 
service averaging is therefore important  ~o this study to establish the size of the issue 
and unders:tand  __ current  .plans .bJU:he. TOs. and  NRA.s .to._address it  as.an issue. 
Except  for  Denmark,  local  access  losses  are a  feature  of all  the  Member States. 
Denmark report that they have rebalanced their tariffs to reflect the underlying costs 
of their business.  Consideration of the size of the service tariff imbalance (the local 
access loss) is given in section 5.8.2. 
In  the  UK,  Condition  13  of  BT's  licence,  which  establishes  the  terms  for 
interconnection, entitles BT to a contribution towards its access deficit, i.e.  the local 
access loss.  This constitutes an acknowledgement of the cross subsidies present in 
BT's retail tariff structure.  Such "Access Deficit Contributions", or ADCs, have so far 
been waived by the Director General of Telecommunications to allow competition to 
develop,  but as  soon as  the operator's share of the market exceeds  10%  partial 
payment for ADCs will be forthcoming.  Once BT's share of the market falls  below 
85%  all other licence holders will be liabl~ for ADC payment. 
Other  cross  subsidies  that  exist  within  all  the  European  telecommunications 
operators are between the Business and Residential services.  Most respondents also 
agree  that subsidies are made from  international services  to  domestic  telephone 
services. 
Except for Luxembourg and Italy, all of the European incumbents who responded 
currently  measure  the  full  cost  and  revenue  imbalance  by  major  revenue  lines 
indicating  an  ability  to  measure  the  necessary  rebalancing  required  should  the 
political environment be conducive to such a change.  The importance of rebalancing 
tariffs  by service  in  a  competitive environment has not  gone  unnoticed  by  the 
operators  with  seven  of  the  incumbent  respondents  indicating  an  intention  to 
rebalance tariffs at least partially.  This information is an encouraging sign of the 
preparation of the European incumbents for the impending competition. 
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5.7  Existence of Interconnect in each Member State 
This section provides details of current interconnection in the Member States and the 
way in which TOs would like interconnection agreements to be  developed in  the 
future. 
Six Member States incumbent operators have yet to interconnect with an external TO 
(for these purposes excluding mobile operators which are (part) owned or run by the 
incumbent) being Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. 
In  four  Member States external interconnection only extends  as  far  as  a  second 
mobile operator.  This incorporates Denmark, France, Greece and Portugal.  Beyond 
this there is Germany with a third mobile operator and the UK. 
The UK is the most liberalised market of Europe with four operating mobile/PCN 
operators,  a  regional  monopoly  wireline  competitor  in  Hull  (Kingston 
Communications Limited), a major wireline competitor (Mercury Communications 
Limited), a large number of locally competitive cable networks and other expanding 
new entrants such as Energis, and competitive access providers such as Colt and 
MFS.  Many more licences have been issued to companies to operate a  telephone 
service but most of these have yet to commence operations. 
The  fact  that  there  will  be  much  more  interconnection  in  the  future  is  well 
understood by most incumbents.  Consideration is  being given by some TOs  to 
standardised  interconnect  agreements  which  would  make  the  process  of 
interconnection  more efficient and less  costly  in terms  of  negotiations  and legal 
proceedings. 
5.7.1  Separate Costing of  Interconnect 
To  formulate cost  orientated  interconnect charges requires  the collection  of costs 
associated with the interconnection.  This section describes the current abilities of the 
incumbents and other TOs to collect such information and any plans to address this 
issue in future. 
Where interconnection exists in Europe it is usually the case that the interconnect 
charge is not based upon separately analysed costs for the specific demands of the 
interconnect arrangement.  Of all the respondents to this section of the questionnaire 
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only one operator stated that they separately collect all the costs associated with 
providing network access to a TO and this was a UK mobile telephone operator. 
Denmark and France stated that the interconnect cost was estimated based on fully 
allocated  costs  of  the  business  as  a  whole.  In  the  UK  the  British  Telecom 
interconnect charge  to  Mercury,  the major wireline competitor,  is  based  on  the 
Financial Results By Service-(FRBS). an.approach-.which uses  .FDC. to.allocate costs to 
the  different network elements  of the  regulated  services.  Whilst  this  does  not 
separately collect the costs it is  a  more thorough approach to costing interconnect 
than that operating in Denmark and France.  Seven Member States'  incumbents 
(France,  Germany, Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain) stated 
their  intention  to  be  able  to  separately  identify  all  the  costs  associated  with 
interconnect.  Some operators avoided answering the question directly. 
This  situation  is  inconsistent  with  the. European  Commission  intention  to  base 
interconnect  charges on their related costs but illustrates a general awareness of the 
issue and a  willingness,  in  the main,  to  develop  costing  systems  to  record  the 
relevant costs. 
5.7.2  Regulatory Involvement in Setting Interconnect Tariffs 
NRAs in Europe appear to be contributing to the formulation of most interconnect 
agreements.  Most incumbent respondents stated that their interconnect charges are 
first formulated through negotiation and then either approved by the NRA  or the 
NRA is brought in where the negotiations are proving unsuccessful.  It is rare that 
the NRA  does not get involved at some point in the interconnection negotiation 
process. 
5. 7.3  Products and Services in Interconnect 
If  interconnect charges are to be based on cost then it is important for TOsto be able 
to  understand what services  and network elements should be available  to  them 
through interconnect and which ones they would like to purchase.  It is clear from 
the  questionnaire  responses  and  interviews  that  European  incumbents  and 
interconnecting TOs  outside the UK  generally do not have a  detailed list of the 
specific types of unbundled products and services that they require. 
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Respondents indicated the general bundled products and services  that they seek 
from interconnecting operators and in all cases they were prepared to  offer those 
same services to the interconnecting TO.  This may, however, just imply that the 
products and services the respondent wishes for from interconnection are merely 
those products and services or bundled offerings that the respondent is prepared to 
supply. 
The respondents generally did not answer this question in the level of detail that 
would indicate a thorough understanding of the specific products and services that 
might be  individually provided, e.g.  switching services,  local  loop  transmission, 
trunk transmission, call terminations, directory enquiries, emergency numbers, etc. 
This is probably due to the bundling of services by the incumbents and the current 
inability for those services to be costed or tariffed separately. 
The only major barrier indicated by respondents to  the potential  unbundling of 
service offerings was raised by France Telecom in the form of "Technical feasibility, 
the security of the network operation and the accounting and billing complexity". 
5. 7.4  Interconnect Charges 
Without exception,  respondents indicated that the form of interconnect payment 
currently made, promoted by the regulator and preferred by the operators was that 
of rate per unit (the units more often than not relating to minutes of use).  This is 
generally regarded as  the simplest form to  utilise and the most transparent and 
easily verifiable method.  However, this use of customer tariff orientated methods of 
charging for interconnect ignores the cost basis of providing the service. 
The  incumbents  therefore  will  require  a  large  effort  to  move  from  the  current 
situation of tariff orientated costing to  the cost orientated tariffing of interconnect 
charging outlined above. 
5.8  Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
5.8.1  Definition 
Questionnaire respondents were aware of the concept of USO.  Most of the operators 
were unable to provide us with a sufficiently detailed definition from which it would 
be possible for them to quantify the magnitude of the cost of the USO.  A number of 
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respondents  did not differentiate  their definition  significantly from  our glossary 
definition or describe those differences. 
Most respondents understand the definition to  be to ensure that all basic  public 
telephony services are available to those that request them.  Four respondents extend 
the definition to ensuring the prices of those services  are affordable,  with others 
stating that prices have to be geographically uniform. 
These different definitions, and part of _the  reason for the differences in the detail 
provided, derive from the different wordings applied in the statutes of the countries 
and their interpretations of the European Commission definition as laid down in the 
Council Resolution of 7 December 1993.  In broad terms the operators may feel that 
the differences are minor, but the subtle inclusion and exclusion of different services 
may make more dramatic impacts on the magnitude of the usa. 
Most respondents provide emergency telephone services free of charge and special 
services for the deaf/blind or otherwise disabled and a number of operators provide 
preferential rates for low usage callers or other social groupings.  However, from 
there the similarities end.  A number of TOs mentioned particular USO or public 
service obligation costs which are specific to that Member State.  For example, two 
incumbents, France Telecom and Portugal Telecom, provide free services to public 
bodies and France Telecom often pay for unpaid Ministry telephone usage.  France 
Telecom  also  has  an  obligation  to·  provide  various  information  services.  The 
production and distribution of publications such as directories is another cost that is 
regarded as a USO cost in some Member States. 
The definition applied to USO can therefore be seen to be quite loose and not capable 
of rigorous application for determination of the costs associated with meeting USOs. 
5.8.2  Magnitude 
The size of the USO is an important issue to this study. 
Nearly  all  European  TOs  and  NRAs,  however,  are  unable  (or  unwilling)  to 
categorically  state  the  magnitude  of  the  USO.  Many  of  the  questionnaire 
respondents  attempt  to  measure  the  costs  associated  with  the usa,  but,  from 
discussions with the various operators it has become clear that such "measurement" 
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is more of a guestimate.  They were not prepared to disclose the calculations in most 
instances. 
Research carried out by Analysys for  the Bangemann committee has provided a 
more uniform approach to  the magnitude of the USO  and Access  Deficit in each 
country.  The results of their investigations and calculations are covered in section 
7.6 below  . 
Funding 
An analysis of the current methods for sharing the costs of the USO and canvassing 
current opinion in the Member States illustrates whether a policy of incorporating 
the costs of the USO into interconnect ch~rges would prove impractical. 
Currently with most European nations possessing only one fixed line operator, it is 
the monopoly provider who bears  the costs  of the  USO  and  social  obligations. 
Belgium and France are two exceptions where the costs  are spread amongst the 
operators.  In Belgium this is carried out on the basis of relative turnover.  In France 
the access deficit or local access loss, the USO and the other social obligations are all 
considered  as  a  whole  and  contributions  are  sought  through  the  interconnect 
agreements (e.g. France Telecom with SFR). 
5.8.4  Confusion with the Access Deficit 
A large number of the respondents, both TOs and, more importantly, NRAs do not 
differentiate  between  the  USO  and the  Access  Deficit.  Whilst  it is  true  that  a 
proportion  of  the  loss  on  providing  local  access  relates  to  the  connection  of 
customers who are uneconomic and might otherwise have not been connected, it is 
not true to say that all the costs associated with the local access loss are USO costs. 
Many customers with whom the incumbent has a  local  access  loss  may actually 
prove economic when call revenues and other externalities are taken into account. 
Such customers should not be considered a part of the USO as the operators would 
connect to these customers whether or not an obligation had been placed upon them 
to do so.  This distinction is expanded in section 6.3. 
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5.8.5  Concluding Comments on the USO 
The obligations most operators are concerned about recovering concern  the local 
access loss created by restrictions on tariff rebalancing.  If  these costs were eradicated 
through rebalancing  of tariffs  then the major element of the  USO  (according  to 
operator definitions) will have been eliminated. 
It has been estimated that the most major USO and local access losses are borne in 
the countries that are still to complete their networks.  This situation may not still be 
the case when the markets are finally  liberalised and the interconnect agreements 
have to be formulated.  With no local access loss and reduced USO costs there would 
be little cause for any shared funding. 
Where it is still considered that the costs of the USO are material enough to warrant 
sharing of the burden the definition of the USO needs to be  tightened to enable a 
more rigorous appraisal of the magnitude of the obligations before the funding is 
shared. 
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KEY POINTS: SECTION 5 
•  Cost Accounting systems have developed in national isolation, taking into account 
the idiosyncrasies of local demographics, geography, TO status and administrative 
regime. 
•  The costs of individual products and services has not historically been a significant 
issue  for  government  owned  monopoly  entities.  As  long  as  total  revenues 
exceeded total costs sufficiently to fund investment and provide a contribution to 
state  treasuries  no-one,  either  management  or  policy  makers,  focused  on  the 
relative profitability of different services. 
•  Many cost accounting systems are still tailored to support the external reporting 
requirements and do not possess the rigour or detail found in accounting systems 
in organisation in competitive industries. 
•  The  extent  and  detail  of  external  financial  reporting  requirements  varies 
considerably  across  the  Community.  Most  TOs  have  to  produce  financial 
statements.  Some TOs  are public and consequently have additional reporting 
requirements. 
•  Regulatory reporting requirements are particularly varied in their extent and detail 
across the Community from irregular and one-off ad hoc reporting to regular and 
detailed profitability by service analyses. 
•  Most TOs and NRAs anticipate dramatic changes to reporting requirements with 
consequent effects on the TOs cost accounting systems. 
•  FDC  is  currently  used  by  all  incumbent  operators.  There  is  only  limited 
appreciation and even less utilisation of other cost standards. 
•  TOs operating in more competitive environments tend not to hold FDC in as high 
regard  as  incumbent TOs  in non  competitive  environments.  Alternative  cost 
standards are also more well known and appreciated by these operators. 
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KEY POINTS: SECTION 5 CONTINUED  ..... 
•  NRAs  did not  demonstrate  as  much  awareness  of the  various  types  of  cost 
standard and the issues they raise though much of this may be due to a reluctance 
to  comment given  current consideration  of the cost standards  to  be  used  by 
operators. 
•  Few TOs indicated a willingness to change their current cost standard. 
•  Accounting systems vary widely across t1:'te Community in terms of: 
cost collection detail 
degree of cost analysis 
capitalisation V  s expense 
attribution and allocation methods used 
such  that given  the same network operation each TO would  derive  different 
service costs and even different firm costs. 
•  Cost  attribution  and  allocation  methods  are  generally  unsophisticated.  Only 
limited use is made of Activity-Based Costing techniques. 
•  Outside of the UK existing interconnect charges in Europe tend be either based on 
the existing retail  tariffs,  or  tariff orientated in their  calculation  and charging 
methods. 
•  The  USO  is  not  defined  in  detail,  nor  costed  rigorously  and  there  is  much 
confusion amongst TOs and NRAs between the USO and Access Deficit. 
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6.  FORMULATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERCONNECT 
CHARGES 
6.1  Introduction 
This section.assesses the way..s in which  .interconnect. charges should be established 
and formulated, and details the principles for determining interconnect charges on 
an ongoing basis.  It builds on work previously carried out in the Commission Study 
"Interconnection Agreements in Telecommunications", January 199328. 
Prior  to  this,  however,  it  presents  some  thoughts  on  the  factors  influencing 
interconnect charges from our review of worldwide interconnect regimes.  It also 
reviews  the  principal  cost  and  tariff  "anomalies"  existent  in  most  retail 
telecommunication  markets  that  need.  to  be  considered  for  inclusion  in  the 
interconnectre~e. 
6.2  Factors Influencing Interconnect Charge Formulation 
28 
Before  advocating  the  principles  for  establishing  and  formulating  European 
interconnect charges in the future it is perhaps sensible to review how interconnect 
charges have been set in practice historically. 
Work already carried out in the Commission study "Interconnect Agreements in 
Telecommunications" set out in considerable detail the approaches already taken to 
interconnection in the telecommunications industries of the USA,  Japan, Australia, 
the UK,  France and Germany.  Review of this study reveals that the interconnect 
charge regime has developed differently depending upon a number of factors. 
The most significant differentiating factor between different interconnect regimes can 
probably be attributed to  the structure of the industry at the time competition is 
introduced and, more importantly to the governments' objectives for the structural 
Wissenschaftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste GmbH (WIK).  (Neu, Werner and Karl-
Heinz Newmann).  Interconnection Agreements in Telecommunications.  Study prepared for 
The Commission of the European Communities DG XIII.  Bad Honnef, January 1993. 
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development  of  the  national  telecommunications  sector  in  the  future.  Some 
governments segment the local,  national and international long distance markets 
licensing operators to compete only in particular segments e.g. the USA.  Elsewhere, 
for example in the UK and Australia, governments do not draw this distinction and 
allow competition in all segments of the market  Not only do these policy initiatives 
affect  decisions  on how many interconnect points  are  required  and  where  they 
should  be, ... more  ..  importantly  . .they_.create._different ..  dy..namic ... pressures  on  the 
interconnecting  operators  depending  upon  whether  their  relationship  is 
complementary,  e.g.  one  operator reliant  on  another for  end  to  end service;  or 
whether they are competitive, fighting for revenues from the same customer. 
The view  taken by governments with respect to  the speed of liberalisation,  and 
therefore the willingness to  encourage market entry by making entry conditions 
favourable through subsidies or waivers of certain obligations, will also significantly 
affect the interconnect regime evolving, as will the choice between immediate open 
competition or a transitional period of duopoly as was the case in the UK and is the 
case in Australia.  Another significant factor influencing the interconnect regime is 
the historical rate structure of the industry and the degree of tariff imbalance existing 
in the retail market. 
Furthermore there are other factors to consider.  As Robert Alban29 has stated 
"Perhaps  naively,  it  is  assumed  that  the  sole  objective  [of  an  interconnect 
charge is to  determine an efficient charge for  the use of essential facilities]. 
Obviously actual determinations of interconnect prices involve factors  other 
than economic efficiency.  For example governments often seem to consider the 
political repercussions of the resulting price structure for services". 
ln  the  USA,  Australia,  the  UK  and,  tentatively  in  Germany,  the  approach  to 
interconnect charges has been to base the charges on cost.  However, the costs have 
been defined very differently.  In the USA they have been based on some measure of 
fully  distributed  cost  but  in  Australia  they  have  been  more  closely  aligned  to 
incremental costs. 
Alban, Robert.  "Interconnect Pricing".  Telecommunications Polley 199418(5) 414-420. 
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In New Zealand the interconnect charges have been left to the market to determine 
with little regulatory intervention.  Theoretically it is contended that they have their 
origins in the efficient component pricing rule advocated by Baumol. 
In Japan and France a  different approach to  interconnect charges has been taken, 
with interconnect charges determined based upon retail tariffs. 
In  the UK  the approach embodies much of the US  approach.  Some argue that 
through the implementation of access  deficit charges (ADC's)  the UK  regime also 
embodies an approximation of Baumel's efficient component pricing rule approach. 
Overall  there  are  a  range  of approaches  to  interconnect  charging,  many  of  the 
differences having their origins in the factors discussed above.  Most commentators 
would agree that the least satisfactory approach is the one based upon retail tariffs 
utilised in the Japanese and French approach. 
Any recommendations at a  Community level for  the formulation  of interconnect 
charges will need to be flexible enough to deal with these different factors and any 
other differences that are likely to arise between different Member States. 
6.3  Costs and Tariffs 
Given  the Commissions desire for  cost orientated  tariffs  and to  see  interconnect 
charges become cost orientated, it is instructive to review the existing relationships 
between  costs  and  retail  tariffs.  This  will  provide  valuable  insight  into  some 
regulatory imposed imperfections in the retail market that will need to be considered 
in the formulation of cost orientated interconnect charges to achieve efficient market 
outcomes. 
Monopolists'  Tariff Structures 
Most TOs  in the European Community are  at  present still operating as  at least 
dominant players in most of their businesses, and most have a monopoly over the 
provision of voice telephony services.  Their tariff structure, particularly for  voice 
services, has arisen to a  great extent as  a  result of their genesis in public sector 
monopolies.  They have historically  been  managed to  a  strategy  determined by 
regulatory and political policy with the aim of providing universal service, and have 
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cross subsidised markets to achieve this.  They have then been regulated on the total 
profitability of the regulated business.  The costs of individual products and services 
was not a significant issue for either managers or policy makers.  As long as total 
revenues were in excess of total costs by an amount sufficient to fund investment, 
and to  provide a  contribution to state treasuries no-one focused  on the relative 
profitability  of different  services.  The  resulting  tariffs  often  do  not  reflect  the 
_ underlying .  ..costs ..  of  ~-service -provision ._that_. one  ..  w.ould .. expect  .. under  normal 
competitive commercial conditions.  Further, the information that many of these 
organisations have with respect to service costs and profitability is rudimentary since 
there has historically been no reason to collect this information in a rigorous fashion. 
A number of the cost and tariff distortions are worth considering in further detail. 
The Universal Service Obligation 
The  USO  arises  where national practice  requires  the TO to  provide  services  to 
customers whom they may otherwise have insufficient economic incentive to serve 
(e.g. phones for the disabled, rural residential lines or low volume lines).  Apart from 
those subscriber groups receiving explicitly subsidised services they are uneconomic 
subscribers  primarily because averaged tariffs  means that the very high costs  of 
access provision to some customers is not covered by the averaged connection costs 
and line rentals together with the margin on call revenue.  The economic cost of 
meeting the USO, in monopoly situations, has been met by recovery through tariffs 
on more profitable services.  Hence the relationship between service costs and tariffs 
will reflect this redistribution effect between different subscriber groups and different 
service offerings. 
Tariff Imbalances and the Local Access Loss 
There are other reasons for cost and tariff imbalances for particular service groups  • 
beyond the USO.  Most TOs would argue that they make a loss on the provision of 
local access.  However, this "access deficit", as it is called in the UK and certain other  • 
Member States, is not the cost of providing universal service.  When viewed together 
with the margin made on call revenue, many subscribers included in the local access 
loss are economically profitable.  The tariff imbalance therefore gives rise to a local 
access loss recovered fully through call revenues, (albeit only partially in the case of 
USO customers). 
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This distortion in the cost-tariff profile is important to understand however, because 
if through the competitive process the incumbent TO still provides access but an 
interconnecting operator carries the call.traffic, the dominant operator will lose the 
ability  to  fund  the local  access  loss  arising on their subscriber base.  This is  the 
principle behind the system of Access Deficit Contributions (ADC's)  that BT  seek 
from interconnecting operators in the UK. 
Access Deficit 
There is  much confusion between the costs of providing universal service and the 
"access deficit", and hence our use of the term local access loss.  In reality the "access 
deficit"  is  made up  of two  components, part relates  to  the cost  to  operators  of 
meeting their USO and part to the local access loss as detailed above.  The two are 
linked, and the confusion arises,  because in many jurisdictions the USO requires 
geographically averaged tariffs at affordable prices.  The local access loss portion of 
the "access deficit" arises primarily from imbalanced tariffs and the USO portion of 
the access deficit arises primarily as a result of averaged tariffs and specific targeted 
subsidies where the costs of providing· access is  not offset by the margin on call 
revenue. 
Care must be taken not to confuse the two as the access deficit calculated by many 
TOs is far greater than the costs of meeting the USO.  From cost causal principles one 
might conclude that the USO and local access loss should be recovered in different 
ways and not via a single mechanism. 
The difference between the tariff imbalance driven local access loss and averaged 
tariff driven cost of USO can be shown graphically below.  Subscribers 1 and 2 are 
identical in every respect except calling patterns.  Subscriber 3 has identical calling 
patterns to Subscriber 2 but is  much more expensive to provide access to,  perhaps 
because he/  she is a rural subscriber in a mountainous region.  Therefore Subscribers 
1  and 2 both have an equal local  access  loss but Subscriber 1  is  an uneconomic 
subscriber and Subscriber 2 is economically profitable.  Similarly Subscriber 3 is an 
uneconomic subscriber despite being identical in calling patterns to Subscriber 2. 
127 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
ECU 
A 
• 
c 
D 
Costs and Revenues of Subscribers 
Subscriber 1  Subscriber  2 
•  It •• ..  ecoaemic caetoaer  •  h  aD ocoaoaic natoan 
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For  any  operator's  subscriber  base  the  relative  cost  of providing  access  to  the 
network  for  a  particular  subscriber  and  the  revenue  received  from  the  initial 
connection cost and line rentals will vary.  However, the number of subscribers that 
are very costly to connect because of their geographical location to the network is 
likely to be fairly small.  This can be represented graphically as follows: 
Cost per line V s 0/o of subscriber base 
Cost per line 
'II of Subsaibers 
When the costs of line provision is considered together with the margin earned on 
call revenue there are therefore different categories of subscriber.  For a typical TO's 
subscriber base this can be represented as follows: 
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Unfortunately, rigorous data on the relative costs and sizes of the subscriber groups 
is not available and the above analysis merely attempts to explain their relationship. 
<D  Access revenue exceeds access costs, total revenue exceeds total costs. 
~  Access cost exceeds access revenue but resulting local access loss is recovered 
from the margin on call revenue. 
Access cost exceeds access revenue and resulting access loss is not currently 
recovered from  the margin  on call  revenue.  However  these  subscribers 
would not leave the network if  tariffs were rebalanced. 
®  Access cost exceeds revenue and resulting access loss is not recovered from 
the margin on call revenue.  These subscribers would be at risk if  tariffs were 
rebalanced  and  might  leave  the  network.  (Therefore  these  are  USO 
customers). 
These are the USO customers where the cost of service is very high and will 
never  be  recovered  from  revenue,  either  because  of targeted  subsidy  or 
extreme expense of providing access. 
Interconnect Charges and Recovery of Cross  ~ubsidies 
For cost orientated interconnect charges it is therefore necessary to consider whether, 
and if  so how, the retail tariff and cost imbalances and averaging imbalances should 
be built into efficient interconnect charges. 
Although the local access loss and the costs of USO arise from analytically separable 
causes,  interconnect charges could in principle contain a  component based upon 
either a service based calculation of the deficit or a subscriber based definition of the 
deficit, or on both. 
For example consider a monopolist TO providing 3 services to 3 customers. 
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SERVICE 
Customer  A  B  c  Total Profit 
1  -10  -2  4  -8 
2  -4  2  8  6 
3  -1  3  10  12 
Total Profit  -15  3  22  10 
The  monopolist makes  a  profit  overall  of 10  and  therefore  can  afford  to  cross 
subsidise the loss making product A, and customer 1.  Obviously if a new entrant 
emerges and interconnects with the TO it might take over only service C  or serve 
only customer 3.  In practice formulae may be constructed to ensure that the cross 
subsidy lost by the incumbent due to  the new entrant taking over service C  or 
customer 3 is replaced by a cross subsidy built into the interconnect charge.  In all 
cases the system of charging is arbitrary and this  will alwavs give potential for 
disputes. 
The need for cross subsidy charges arising due to tariff imbalances could in theory be 
removed if tariffs  were rebalanced.  The cross subsidies to  share the funding of 
averaged tariffs are more difficult to deal with.  This is discussed in more detail in 
section 9.7. 
6.4  Formulation of Interconnect Charges 
The formulation  of cost orientated interconnect charges should be based upon a 
consideration of what the costs arising as a result of interconnection are likely to be. 
For the time being we will overlook the specific cost standard adopted, as this will be 
addressed in later sections. 
Many commentators and academics have tried to prescribe what charge elements 
should exist in interconnect regimes.  From a purely pragmatic position it is possible 
to suggest that interconnect regimes could have two subsets of charge elements.  The 
first relates to costs that arise as a result of one party buying interconnect services 
from another, the cost causative elements, and the second are charge elements added 
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to try and compensate for price distortions in the retail market that arise as a result 
of obligations and/  or tariff constraints imposed by regulatory authorities for political 
and/  or social policy objectives- the so called "access charge" elements. 
The charge element for interconnection s~rvices can be broken down into connection 
costs and conveyance costs.  The "access charge
11  element can be split into an element 
that takes account of. historical tariff imbalances and. current regulatory constraints 
on the speed of tariff rebalancing in the retail market (the most significant being the 
local access loss) and an element that results from regulatory obligation to provide 
socially desirable but uneconomic services (e.g. pay phones) or to serve groups of 
uneconomic  customers  e.g.  the  deaf,  socially  disadvantaged,  remote  rural 
subscribers etc.  The extent to which each is included in the final interconnect charge 
will  often  depend  upon  the  factors  mentioned  above,  the  degree  of  structural 
asymmetries arising from interconnect or particular political or social objectives. 
Therefore the interconnect charge, and the costs that need to be determined can be 
divided into 2 separate charges incorporating 4 principal elements. 
A.  Charge elements attributable to the interconnection services provided 
A  1.  Connection Charge 
A2.  Conveyance Charge 
B.  Charge  elements  resulting  from  obligation  and/or  tariff  constraints 
imposed by regulatory authorities-the so called "access charge•30 elements 
Bl.  Local Access Loss Charge (or tariff imbalance charge) 
B2.  Universal Service Obligation Charge 
To formulate these charges it is necessary to understand the underlying costs, and in 
each  case  they  should  be  the  costs  of  an  "efficient  operation",  otherwise  the 
This is a Commission term and should not be confused with the glossary of terms definition 
given in Appendix 1. 
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inefficiencies  of  one  organisation  will  be  passed  on  to  another  through  the 
interconnect arrangements. 
Connection Charge  - This charge recovers the one-off costs relating to the physical 
connection of one network to another,  including network adaptation  (e.g.  equal 
access, network integrity) and network redimensioning costs. 
Conveyance Charge  - This charge recovers a number of costs:  firstly  the costs 
arising from the use of the physical connection between the two networks to permit 
the transfer of calls from one network to. another; secondly the usage costs incurred 
where one operator utilises another operator's interconnected network to handle a 
call (e.g. call set up, signalling, switching, transmission, access to special services and 
capacity)  thirdly the supplementary and ancillary  costs  (such  as  monitoring and 
recording of network activity, billing); and fourthly, overhead costs (e.g. accounting, 
management). 
Local Access Loss Charge - As stated above most operators do not recover the fully 
distributed cost of providing exchange lines from initial connection charges and line 
rentals, and thus even for customers that are profitable when call revenues and costs 
are considered a 
11loss
11  is incurred in providing access. 
To  the extent that an interconnecting operator attracts the dominant operators call 
business,  the  incumbent's  contribution  to  its  local  access  loss  is  reduced.  The 
incumbent operator would argue that the interconnecting party should be required 
to pay a contribution to these losses on delivery of the call in addition to the cost 
orientated charges for connection and conveyance to ensure that the interconnecting 
party pays the full cost of local access. 
This element will be required only where such local access losses are material, and 
will only exist whilst there are political and social constraints on the rebalancing of 
tariffs  preventing  the  elimination  of  these  losses.  As  political  and  social 
circumstances  allow  rebalancing  of tariffs,  the  loss  on  local  access  as  currently 
defined might be expected to be eliminated.  However, this may take some time, and 
in the meantime, a mechanism for measurement and recovery of the local access loss 
may be required.  This matter will be addressed further in sections 8 and 9. 
Universal Service  Obligation Charge  - As  stated in section  6.3  the USO  arises 
because national legislation in a number of countries, either explicitly or implicitly 
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requires operators to provide service to customers whom they may otherwise have 
insufficient economic incentive to serve (e.g.  rural residential lines or low volume 
lines).  The so called cost of universal service results from the additional net expense 
incurred in  serving  such  customers  and  fulfilling  the usa.  The  public  service 
obligations in certain Member States may be included with these costs. 
In monopoly situations, such .costs. have. been..recovered through higher tariffs  on 
other more profitable services.  In moving to a competitive environment, it becomes 
necessary to calculate the cost to the operator of providing universal service, and to 
decide whether, and if yes, how and at what stage, new operators interconnecting 
with that operator should be required to share in the provision of these services 
and/  or their funding.  One method by which this contribution could be made is 
through the interconnect reglm.e.  The operator should not be entitled to include in 
this category subscribers which were originally expected to be profitable but are not, 
nor, in principle, those which are unprofitable solely because their market potential 
has not been exploited. 
Whilst not always separately identified in the final interconnect charges, each of the 
above  components  require  consideration.  Some  elements  may  be  excluded  or 
modified by the regulator to  encourage market development.  For example as  a 
result  of the lack  of equal access  in  Japan  and  other market imperfections  the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications required NTT,  the dominant operator, to 
incur the costs of installation, maintenance and operation of interconnect facilities 
and  rejected  NTis request to  recover  these  (and indeed its  USO  costs)  through 
interconnect charges.  In the same way the FCC, after initial divestiture, attempted to 
compensate new entrants for the lack of equal access by initially allowing rival long 
distance operators discounted interconnection charges on lines so affected. 
Oftel, the UK regulator, in an attempt to promote competition has waived the Access 
Deficit Charges, designed to recover the local access loss for new entrants, until their 
market shares exceed certain limits.  Similarly in Australia the interconnect charges 
of OPTUS, the second carrier, are based upon directly attributable incremental costs 
with no contribution to historical sunk or joint and common costs for the duopoly 
period. 
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We recommend that the "access charge"31 elements discussed above should not be 
included in the interconnect charge but may be  dealt with separately within the 
interconnect regime. 
6.5  Unbundling 
31 
In setting cost orientated interconnect charges it is necessary to ask two questions. 
Firstly,  what are  the  relevant  costs  that  prices  should  be  orientated  with,  and 
secondly, what are the interconnect products and services interconnecting operators 
want to purchase.  Put simply, "what cost" and "the cost of what". We will review the 
"what  cost"  question  in  section  9  but  firstly  we  should  examine  what  it  is 
interconnecting operators want to purchase from incumbent operators.  Until this is 
known it is not possible to be precise regarding the cost allocation methods and cost 
accounting practices that need to be developed. 
US  West stated in their submission  to  Oftel in the  UK,  that an  interconnecting 
operator essentially wants to purchase two broad categories of component.  The first 
are  components  that  the  operator  could  either  provide  itself  or  purchase  in  a 
competitive market (if one exists) and the second is any essential component of the 
service which is unique to the assets owned by the other operator.  A good example 
of the latter is call completion, as every operator may have exclusive access  to its 
customers. 
Depending upon the degree of infrastructure competition present in any particular 
market this split will require regulatory distinction between those transactions that 
are subject to market forces and that can be regulated through general competition 
policy rules, and those where an unavoidable and enduring element of monopoly 
creates  a  "bottleneck"  which  requires  specific  action by the regulator.  Therefore 
unbundling  requires  each  logically  discrete  physical  function  performed  in 
providing interconnection to be specifically identified and costed, separately priced, 
and offered on a stand-alone basis.  Thus for the interconnection of a competitive 
operator's node to  an incumbent's  sub~criber that operator would as a  minimum 
This is a Commission term and should not be confused with the glossary of terms definition 
given in Appendix 1. 
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expect to be able to see unbundled and individually cost orientated charges for the 
link between the node and the incumbent local switch, the physical interconnection 
of the facility at the local switch, the local switching performed and the conveyance 
of the call over the local line. 
It  is  impossible  for  interconnect  charges  to  be  cost  orientated  without  such 
unbundling because each unbundled interconnect service has different underlying 
economics.  To aggregate all of the elements into a  single undifferentiated charge 
would  not  reflect  the  very  different  cost  structures  of  each  of  the  functions. 
Accordingly unbundling is necessary to ensure that costs and therefore the charges 
of  each  unbundled  element  reflect  what  is  purchased,  i.e.  that  interconnecting 
operators only pay for what they want to receive. 
If correctly  structured such unbundling will  therefore restrain  abuses  of market 
power by creating a  transparent regime where the relationship between the costs 
incurred  and  prices  charged  is  more  easily  visible  to  those  purchasing  the 
interconnect services and also to the NRA. 
The  above  would  appear  to  indicate  that with  the  introduction  of  service  and 
infrastructure competition regulatory involvement will be predominantly focused on 
bottleneck  services,  such  as  call  completion,  leaving  market  forces  to  control 
potentially  competitive  services.  This  may  not  be  the  case  in  the  short  term. 
Dominant operators will remain dominant for  some time and therefore the terms 
and  conditions  for  interconnection  to  all  unbundled  services  will  remain 
fundamental to the promotion of efficient competition.  This will require continued 
regulatory involvement.  This is not to deny however that as competition develops 
for certain interconnect services the regulatory burden will be reduced. 
US West32 suggest that the starting point for interconnection is that operators should 
be able to choose from a 
11menu" those elements of interconnection that are most 
suitable for  their own business case.  They  state that these elements should be 
separately identified and casted and made available  on  an unbundled "building 
US West Inc.  Submission to OFfEL in response to "Interconnection and Accounting 
Separation." 19 June 1993. 
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block" approach.  US West claim that this process of isolating network cost elements 
is possible and that they are currently implementing this approach in the US. 
US West defined network building blocks as: 
"a  cost element or group of cost elements representing the smallest feasible 
level of unbundling capable.of being ta.riffed  ..  A  .The-assumptions underpinning 
the building blocks are that they: 
•  are practically tariffable; 
•  represent  generic  network  functions  i.e.  they  are  unrelated  to 
customer classifications or current service definitions; 
•  are designed based on actual network cost variables  - i.e.  density, 
distance, band width etc; 
•  have points of demarcation which fit  a  logical network design and 
reasonable expectations of points of interconnection in an unbundled 
environment; 
•  have costing methodologies which are reasonable and transparent; 
•  should  be  priced  so  as  to  reflect  the  avoidance  of  undue  cross 
subsidisation  and  the  difference  between  essential  monopoly 
(bottleneck) and non essential (competitive) building blocks." 
Recent  experience in  the  UK  has  shown  that the  identification  of what are  the 
unbundled  network  elements  that  should  be  made  available  to  interconnecting 
operators is not an easy task.  However one thing is clear, the identification of the 
unbundled  elements  should  not  be  left  to  the  incumbent  and  NRA  alone. 
Participation by existing and potential competitors is necessary to understand what  -
it is  they wish to buy.  Whilst Oftel's original consultation started in June 1993,  at 
March 1994 following a number of industry workshops the unbundled interconnect 
list was not complete.  However Oftel's March statement did include a preliminary 
list.  This is reproduced in Appendix 8. 
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6.6  Establishment of Interconnect Charges 
Having looked at the formulation of interconnect charges it is necessary to  analyse 
who should be responsible for their establishment and the framework in which they 
should be established. 
The interconnect charges that a competitive new entrant pays to .the dominant TO 
are likely to be a significant input cost, the variability of which is likely to make his 
economic business case either favourable or unfavourable. Section 8 discusses the 
implications of this on market efficiency.  Accordingly the market needs to know 
how interconnect charges will be determined, if not to know them explicitly, and to 
have confidence that there will be  no undue discrimination in the interconnection 
charges it faces  as compared with those faced by the incumbent operator or other 
competitors.  Without  this  minimum  knowledge  it  is  unlikely  that  efficient 
competition will develop as the returns required to reward investors for  exposing 
themselves to this level of risk are likely to be prohibitive. 
As a result potential new entrants need to have confidence in the interconnection 
regime and the regulation of it to ensure that the charges they face are known, or will 
be equitable, and that they are non discriminating.  This requires transparency of 
information regarding interconnect charges and in particular this may require the 
NRA's involvement in the establishment of interconnect charges. 
The principal objective of interconnection is to facilitate efficient competition.  For 
this objective to be attained there are a number of fundamental characteristics that 
interconnect regimes must exhibit.  These were enunciated by Oftel in their June 1993 
Consultative Document on Interconnection and Accounting Separation and received 
wide industry support. 
•  Transparent  Interconnection  charges.  Interconnect  charges  should  be 
published  together  with  suffic~ent  information  about  the  methodology 
employed to calculate them to allow competing operators to understand how 
they relate to the underlying costs.  This requires the dominant operator to 
produce a published price list for interconnect services together with details 
of the underlying cost data and cost allocation methodologies adopted in 
reaching the charges. 
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•  Charges should be efficient and sustainable.  This means that charges should 
encourage efficient resource allocation but also allow the operator to recover 
its costs and make a reasonable return on capital employed. 
•  No undue discrimination.  Interconnecting competitors should receive  the 
same  interconnect  terms  and  conditions  relating  to  price  and  non-price 
· factors··as· each other, and· as·the.·dominant TO. applies to itself.  Therefore  .. 
interconnect agreements should be in the public domain to allow comparison 
between the terms different operators obtained from individual carriers, and 
abatement of interconnect charges  should be  applied if competitive  new 
entrants receive asymmetrical interconnect services from the incumbent. 
•  Sufficient  Information.  There must be  adequate information  available  to 
competitors to  give  them confidence in the interconnect agreements  they 
reach. 
Independence  and  non  discrimination  can  be  achieved  if the  NRA  is  made 
responsible for the development of the rules to establish the cost structure, charges 
and terms and conditions for interconnection to incumbents.  The charges should be 
based on objectively  established principles and the process should allow  for  the 
identification of the various elements of-interconnect services that competitors may 
like to purchase and their individual costing and charging.  In this way competitive 
new entrants to the market will be able to predict the interconnect charges they will 
face, and therefore establish their business plans.  Without this process they will not 
have confidence that they are investing in a market which provides the incumbent 
operator with no cost advantages in the use of interconnect services.  Without these 
characteristics there is a risk that instead of facilitating competition, interconnection 
may serve as a barrier to market entry. 
In the European context it will be necessary for the Commission to establish a set of  · 
principles for interconnect that are flexible enough for  different Member States to 
achieve  their  own  political  and  social  objectives  whilst ensuring  the  benefits  of  • 
liberahsation are available to all European citizens without cross border distortions. 
Whilst we acknowledge the principles of subsidiarity it will be an opportunity lost if 
these  principles  are  not agreed in sufficient  detail  at a  Community level.  The 
Community may suffer if their establishment is left to Member State NRAs and the 
inevitable delays that would result 
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If interconnect charges are to be made cost orientated it is therefore necessary to 
determine what are the relevant costs and what are the interconnect services that 
need to be costed.  In order to  examine the cost allocation  and cost accounting 
methods,  compatible  with  national  practices,  which  would  be  necessary  for 
implementing an efficient scheme of interconnect charges it is first  necessary  to 
review in more detail the costs associated with meeting the USO  and how they 
should be  incorporated into interconnect charges and the way in which efficiency 
should be promoted through the setting of interconnect charges.  These topics are 
covered in sections 7 and 8 respectively. 
6.7  Accounting Separation 
When  establishing  a  cost  allocation  methodology  and  the  general  accounting 
principles to be used in setting interconnect charges, it is vital that the established 
·principles are not only implemented but are seen to be implemented.  In this regard, 
accounting separation has frequently been  cited as  a  means of providing greater 
transparency in the interconnect process. 
It is of great concern to new operators entering the telecommunications market, that 
the incumbent operator may use its  monopoly position in certain  areas  to  cross 
subsidise its activities in competitive areas in order to force the new operators out of 
the market.  The intention of accounting separation is to show the profitability and 
the returns achieved by the incumbent in different areas of its business and hence, to 
be able to identify where cross subsidies ~ay  be in place. 
When markets are liberalised a number of methods can be used to ensure that the 
incumbent TO does not abuse its monopoly power.  The most extreme step to ensure 
that the incumbent does not extend its monopoly advantages from the parts of its 
business enjoying monopoly status to those operating in liberalised and competitive 
markets is to structurally separate the incumbent into independent economic entities 
under separate ownership.  Structural separation was chosen in the US  with the 
divestiture of AT  & T. 
Many governments do not find structural separation attractive.  An alternative is 
Organisational Separation into separate entities  under common ownership.  Our 
experience  suggests  that  organisational  separation,  in the  absence  of  structural 
separation is not very effective. 
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Some NRAs,  OFfEL included, have decided against structural separation on the 
grounds that it would not solve the difficulties in defining terms and conditions of 
access  to  the monopoly assets, and may prevent the exploitation of economies of 
scope  by  companies  offering  integrated services.  Instead  they  have  suggested 
Accounting  Separation.  This  is  often  proposed  as  a  surrogate  for  structural 
separation on the basis that it will allow the key objectives to be met without the 
large costs associated with restructuring the incumbent operator. 
Whilst  many  benefits  may  accrue  from  accounting  separation,  maintaining  the 
incumbent TOs existing structure will not lead to the change of mind-set and culture 
that  might  be  expected  to  be  brought  about  by  structural  or  organisational 
separation.  In  the  short  run,  however,  if  the  only  objective  of  proponents  of 
accounting separation is  to  engender arms length trading on a  commercial basis 
between different parts of the incumbent's business, the results will be  somewhat 
arbitrary.  The independence of action between a customer which controls more than 
85%  of the market, and a supplier which controls a similar proportion of the network 
capacity will be questionable. 
It is  not our intention in this study to extensively debate the merits of accounting 
separation verses structural separation.  Suffice to  say if accounting separation is 
followed as an initial step this does not remove the possibility of further separation 
being placed upon the long term agenda.  The adoption of accounting separation 
supports the evolution of the industry.  Most major US  telephone companies and 
several PTOs in Europe and Asia have reorganised themselves into market facing 
businesses supported by a core network organisation together with other support 
services.  The changes in  organisation  are  said  to  improve customer  focus  and 
competitiveness  and  increase  the  accountability  for  company  resources  and 
profitability.  If companies are required to separately account upon this basis it will 
aid transparency of information and go some way to meeting the information needs 
of potential competitors. 
In addition, accounting separation has been effective in the US,  albeit separation 
between  different  business  units.  Over  the  past  several  years  the  FCC's 
requirements for separation of regulated and non regulated businesses together with 
external audit have been further refined.  Although there are critics  who say the 
process has become minutely detailed, it is generally regarded as more efficient and 
effective in serving customers than organisational separation might otherwise have 
been. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, if accounting separation is to  be  effective several 
control features will be needed.  Such control features may necessitate disclosure of 
competitive and sensitive information by the incumbent operator, and in time by 
other major operators.  The level of disclosure is likely to become significant and is 
likely  to  be regarded,  by  the incumbent at least,  as onerous.  Internal segment 
reporting systems, including transfer charge mechanisms will be required to support 
.the new  ..accounting structures. 
For there to be faith in the accounting separation a high level of disclosure will be 
necessary.  In the absence of such confidence the objective of reforms will not be 
achieved.  To  avoid  some  of  the  arguments  against  publishing  commercially 
sensitive  information  disclosures  may  be  differentiated  between  service  specific 
profitability  analyses  submitted to  the  NRA and aggregated service  profitability 
analyses for public disclosure. 
If accounting separation is to achieve transparency the level to which the incumbent 
is required to separately account is an issue which requires the balancing of sufficient 
information to give comfort to the industry with the commercial confidentiality of 
the incumbent.  In the UK, Oftel have suggested the separation of British Telecom 
into Retail,  Network and Access business segments.  There is scepticism amongst 
new entrants as to the availability of cost information of the level of detail required 
for  sufficient transparency.  An example from the US  in Appendix 9,  shows the 
levels of detail that can be achieved and comments on its usefulness in the provision 
of transparent information for interconnecting operators' comfort and confidentiality 
concerns. 
Given  that  accounting  separation  will  be  the  product  of  the  operator's  cost 
accounting system, it is subject to all  of the strengths and weaknesses of the cost 
allocation  methodology  used by  the operator and the cost accounting  principles 
employed.  The first issue with regard to  accounting separation, relates to  which 
items are to be accounted for separately.  Should ~ccounting separation reflect the 
different  business  segments  from  a  product/  service  perspective  or  from  an 
underlying  network  perspective,  and  from  which  ever  perspective  the  separate 
accounts are shown to what level of detail should information be provided.  Hence 
the nature of accounting separation is closely  linked to  the issue of unbundling. 
There will clearly be a trade-off between the expense involved and the level of detail 
required.  If particularly detailed accounts are required operators are also likely to 
raise concerns with regard to commercial confidentiality. 
141 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
For accounting separation to be effective, there should, as a minimum, be separation 
of those services which are deemed to be monopoly services from those which are 
thought to be competitive.  At the appropriate level of detail accounting separation 
will enable a new operator to have confidence that the interconnect tariffs are cost 
orientated. 
_Once the. appropriate.leveLoLdetaiLand_areas.  to .be. cos  ted .have .been .agreed upon, 
confidence in the results of the accounting separation process will only be as strong 
as the confidence in the accounting methodology and allocations used to arrive at the 
individual service  results.  Hence,  it is  vital  that if  the  purpose  of accounting 
separation is to provide confidence in the fairness of the interconnect charges being 
set, that details of the cost allocation methodology used are also made public. 
While  accounting separation may appear as an additional burden on incumbent 
operators,  we  are  aware  of  a  number  of operators  in  increasingly  competitive 
environments who  are  finding  it necessary  to  restructure  their  operations  into 
separate business units and to account for these separately.  Operators are doing this 
to align their processes and operations more closely to the needs of their customers. 
In the process, they are developing more sophisticated cost accounting techniques to 
enable them to understand service cost and profitability for both the services and for 
customer groups, and are developing transfer charge mechanisms to assist with their 
performance measurement. These are the same systems and techniques necessary to 
support accounting separation. 
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KEY POINTS:  SECTION 6 
•  The diversity of interconnect regimes around the world indicates that a number of 
factors can influence the formulation and establishment of interconnect charges. 
•  Interconnect charges  should be  ba~~d on  the  underlying  costs  of an  efficient 
operation and incorporate the following elements: 
Connection Charge 
Conveyance Charge 
•  The costs arising from obligations and/  or tariff constraints imposed by regulatory 
authorities should be recovered separately from the costs of interconnect services 
or  as  a  separate  part  of  the  interconnect  agreement.  This  incorporates  the 
following elements: 
Local Access Loss Charge 
USOCharge 
•  The Local Access Loss arises due to imbalanced tariffs and should be eradicated 
through removing the barriers to rebalancing costs and tariffs.  Where this is not 
possible consideration may be given to sharing these costs amongst TOs. 
•  The USO arises mainly due to  targeted subsidies and geographically averaged 
tariffs and may be reduced by de-averaging. 
•  Interconnect charges cannot be cost orientated without unbundling services since 
the unbundled services have different underlying economics. 
•  The objective of interconnect is to facilitate efficient competition.  This requires: 
transparency 
efficient and sustainable charges 
no undue discrimination 
sufficient information 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: SECTION 6 
•  Interconnect Charges should be  based ·on the  underlying costs  of  an  efficient 
operation, and in all cases contain two elements attributable to the interconnect 
services provided.  These are: 
The Connection Charge. 
The Conveyance Charge. 
•  Separate charges within each element should be developed to reflect the traffic 
sensitive and non traffic  sensitive costs and the distance and non distance 
related costs. 
•  Further Charge elements resulting from obligations and/  or tariff constraints 
imposed by regulatory authorities do not relate directly to interconnect.  As 
such  they  should  be  recovered  separately  from  the  costs  of  interconnect 
services, or, at a minimum as a separate part of the interconnect agreement. 
This incorporates the following elements: 
The Tariff Imbalance or Local Access Loss Charge. 
The Universal Service Obligation Charge. 
•  Interconnect Charges should be set to facilitate competition.  In order to achieve 
this objective,  NRAs in each Member State should ensure that the interconnect 
process is transparent giving rise to charges which are efficient and sustainable. 
Accounting separation under the review of the NRA is  one way transparency 
may be achieved.  In  addition,  NRAs should ensure that agreements are not 
unduly  discriminatory  and  that  confidence  in  the  agreements  is  promoted 
through the availability of sufficient information. 
•  Interconnect  charges  should  be  based  upon  the  cost  of  unbundled  network 
elements.  NRAs should liaise with TOs and potential operators to develop a list of 
the  unbundled  network  elements  w~ich  interconnecting  operators  wish  to 
purchase.  A  co-ordinated European approach would be an efficient means by 
which this process could be achieved and would ensure cross-border consistency. 
144 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG x:m 
7.  THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION AND INTERCONNECT 
CHARGES 
7.1  Introduction 
This section assesses the way_ in which universal service costs should be taken into 
account when establishing interconnect. charges.  This part of the study, without 
determining the current or expected cost of providing universal service,  discusses 
the  general magnitude of such costs  and provides an analysis  of the alternative 
charges.  This section builds upon the work carried out in a study for DG JV33 
In particular, this section discusses the nature of the usa obligation, its  definition 
and whose responsibility it should be.  Having discussed the responsibility for the 
usa it looks at the costs of meeting the obligation and the responsibility for funding 
it. 
7.2  Background 
33 
It is often said that the introduction of competition into the telecommunication sector 
endangers  the  fulfilment  of social  policy  goals  such  as  universal  service.  Our 
understanding of the Commission's underlying aim is to ensure that the economic 
benefits of competition within the European telecommunications sector are achieved 
without foregoing the social benefits which have traditionally been available through 
state controlled monopolies and their cross subsidisation of such obligations.  This 
section takes a broad look at how this aim may be achieved and suggests how such 
costs could be handled in a competitive environment. 
The field  work interviews for this study shed very little new light on this subject. 
European TOs and NRAs do not have a clear and precise definition of their USO. 
Generally an implicit approach has historically been taken to their funding which 
has not required TOs  to  rigorously  define  and cost the  USO.  Accordingly  this 
Cave, Martin, Claire Milne &. Mark Scanlan.  Meeting Universal Service Obhgations in a 
Competitive Telecommunications Sector, Report to DG IV, CEC, March 1994. 
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section sets out preliminary ideas, mainly derived from the existing expertise of the 
study team members, reviewed jointly in light of the other findings  of this study. 
Considerable further work could usefully be done to confirm and refine these ideas. 
7.3  Compatibility of Competition and Universal Service 
The argument that competition endangers universal service arises from the fact that 
traditionally  internal  cross  subsidies  (some  of  them  large)  have  flowed  from 
international and long distance call revenues to support local calls and the cost of 
local  access,  and  from  urban  to  rural  areas.  Critics  claim  that  the  advent  of 
competition logically calls for the ending of such cross subsidies, and that without 
them, the cost of basic service will inevitably rise to the detriment of many ordinary 
customers, some of whom may even be forced off the network. 
Whilst there is some strength in this argument, the contrary position is that to the 
extent that cross subsidies are indeed large (which is not always the case), regulatory 
oversight can ensure that: 
•  Price  rebalancing  takes  place  at a  reasonable  rate  and  only  to  a  clearly 
justified  extent,  which  avoids  "market  shock"  whilst  not  denying 
unnecessarily the benefits of competition; 
•  Vulnerable subscriber groups who could suffer from price rebalancing receive 
targeted attention and safeguards. 
A brief look at the actual experience in countries where competition has started and 
the consideration of typical usage patterns shows that with a reasonable rate of price 
rebalancing the vulnerable groups are a  minority.  With adequate planning, their 
interests  can  be  looked  after  and  all  groups  can  benefit  from  competition. 
Accordingly we believe that the objections to competition based upon the threat that 
it poses to  universal service are ill founded.  Rather,  there are some strong and 
compelling  arguments  why,  properly  regulated,  competition  can  in  fact  benefit 
universal service: 
•  It will improve efficiency and thereby lower prices, enabling more people to 
afford to join the network; 
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•  It will foster innovation, bringing.new technologies to market  Some of these 
may  well  be  of  special  benefit  to  disadvantaged  groups  (e.g.  radio 
technologies for rural distribution or for mobility impaired people etc.); 
•  The  combined  effects  will  generate  market  growth  making  previously 
unprofitable markets commercially attractive to one or more competitors; 
•  More revenues will be available to fund genuine social obligations; 
•  Properly  managed, operators may compete for  reputations as well as for 
markets, wanting to outdo each other in "good works",  (or at least in the 
appearance of good works). 
In future it seems likely that the question will no longer be whether competition and 
universal service are compatible, but whether competition should be part of the 
definition of universal service.  Certainly, equal access to alternative long distance 
competitors could become part of the definition of basic service.  The UK Director 
General ofT  elecommunication has spoken of a choice among 2 or 3 service providers 
as his aim for every customer. 
7.4  What is the Universal Service Obligation (USO)? 
34 
Definition 
Whilst all European operators recognise the EC definition of universal service there 
is widespread agreement that no national definitions were available that permitted 
detailed identification of the obligation, and therefore allowed the obligation to be 
casted. 
The Council Resolution of 7 February 199434 has pooled the relevant references in the 
European Commission literature and legislation which identify some elements to 
Council of the European Communities.  Council Resolution of 7 February 1994 on Universal 
Service Principles in the telecommunications sector, 94/C 48/01.  Official Journal of the 
European Communities No. C48 p1-2. 
147 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
serve as a basis for a definition of universal service.  A definition has been provided 
to the EC in the report to DG IV by Cave, Milne and Scanlan as: 
"services that are supplied to  customers or groups of customers at a  loss, 
even when the firm supplying .them is  operating efficiently  and its  past 
investments have been based upon sound business decisions". 
There are alternative definitions but all are fairly broad and do not permit reliable 
costing.  For clarity Appendix 4  contains some specific  examples of the types  of 
services included in the definition recognised in developed countries. 
The above report states that there are four different policy perspectives that relate to 
universal service, and these are as follows: 
•  The achievement of universal geographical coverage. 
•  The geographical averaging of tariffs. 
•  Low access charges for residential customers. 
•  Targeted subsidies which are typically directed at the poor, the elderly, the 
disabled, rural dwellers or low users of the telephone. 
The first  two elements  are normally present in every country,  supplemented by 
either or both of the second two. 
Stages of  Telecommunications Development 
The main aims of any universal service policy are likely to vary according to the state 
of economic and telecommunications development in a particular Member State.  As 
a result any definition of the USO needs to be flexible enough to take account of the 
fact that it may represent a  different obligation in different countries.  USOs  are 
imposed for political, social and economic aims, and these aims are likely to change 
as telecommunications sectors develop.  Cave et al have suggested "Four stages of 
Universal  Service"  in  which  the  aims· of  universal  service  policy  are  radically 
different  depending  upon  whether  the  network  is  being  established,  grown  to 
achieve wide geographical coverage or to ensure mass market take up, or practically 
is complete.  Their table is reproduced below. 
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Depending  upon  which  stage  network  development  has  reached  the  relative 
importance of the four policy perspectives outlined above will differ. 
In high  income  countries  household  penetration  typically  exceeds  90%  and  the 
universal service goals are largely accomplished for  basic services.  The principal 
universal service policy then becomes limited to  the fourth policy  perspective of 
·-prwiding targeted  _subsidies. to  .. preventsubscribers.leaving the network as a result 
of tariff rebalancing and to encourage non subscribers to subscribe.  In middle and 
low income countries, by contrast, accomplishing universal service goals involves 
network rollout, rather than the infilling described for high income countries, and 
hence the first three policy perspectives predominate. 
Of current Member States Spain, Portugal and Greece would probably be classified 
in the third development stage, Ireland ~  probably border line between the third and 
the fourth stage; and all other Member States would probably be in the fourth stage. 
Central and East European economies may better be characterised by the second 
stage. 
The current debate focuses on how technically advanced, and eventually broad band, 
services should be added to basic service definitions of the USO to ensure there is not 
an information underclass resulting from asymmetrical access  to  the "information 
superhighway".  Perhaps this could be seen as a fifth stage in telecommunications 
development.  In summary, USO must evolve to match current economic, ethical, 
and social needs and also technical progress.  This evolutionary aspect to the USO is 
recognised in the Council Resolution of 7 February 199435. 
In most European Member States it is possible to generalise that the primary goal of 
the universal service policy is now social, and we should therefore regard universal 
service  as  a  social  obligation  on the telecommunications industry.  Similarly  the 
rebalancing of the different revenue components to better reflect the underlying cost 
is  overall in the national interest of each  Member State and should therefore  be 
encouraged subject to suitable consumer safeguards e.g. constraints on the speed of 
such rebalancing and ensuring social tariffs are maintained for  vulnerable groups. 
Council of the European Communities.  Cound.l Resolution of 7 February 1994 on Universal 
Service Principles in the Telecommunications Sector, 94/C 48/01.  Official Journal of the 
European Communities No C48 p1-2. 
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However whilst the freedom to rebalance is restricted, incumbent TOs may continue 
to make losses on the provision of access under FDC rules.  The implications of this 
are addressed in section 8, but, as noted in section 6.3 above, most of this local access 
loss  is  not  part  of  the  cost  of  meeting  the  usa,  a  fact  often  misunderstood 
throughout Europe. 
Further, if permitted_  by _locaL legislation,._ in most Member States some degree of 
geographic  de-averaging of prices  to  better reflect  underlying cost  may  also  be 
economically desirable.  This would again be achievable without the risk of failing to 
meet universal service goals, provided safeguards such as those mentioned above 
are adequately addressed. 
Public Service Obligations 
A number of Member States have very strong public service obligations.  e.g. France 
and Belgium.  These should be separately considered as they are politically very 
sensitive but in the short term these can be dealt with in the framework suggested 
below for the sharing of USOs and their funding.  The long term objective should be 
to remove from the industry the burden of funding such obligations. 
Barriers to Joining and Using the Telephone Network 
In countries where telecommunications development has reached the fourth stage, 
the  mass  market  approach  to  network  growth  breaks  down  and  needs  to  be 
superseded  by  a  targeted  approach.  This  entails  understanding  why  various 
residual segments of the population have not joined the network.  Barriers  may 
include: 
•  Health factors, such as disability; these may be overcome by meeting special 
equipment and service requirements. 
•  Behavioural factors e.g. do not need, do not want, do not like or too difficult, 
to join the network; these may hE: overcome (in part) by meeting educational 
requirements. 
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•  Financial factors, these are multiple but could be: 
related to the cost of (one or more of)  the following:  gaining access, 
period rentals or call charges themselves 
the  consequences  of uncontrollable  total  outgoings,  this  could  be 
__ helped_ by_. credit limits 
related to methods of payment or frequency of payment. 
Each  of these may be overcome by more innovative service  offerings  and  tariff 
packages,  e.g.  predetermined credit limits,  automatic call  barring,  incoming calls 
only. 
Current understanding throughout Europe of why potential subscribers perceive 
such barriers to joining and using the telephone network is not good and the relative 
size and significance of the various barriers, and how to overcome them needs more 
research.  Only once there is an understanding of what creates the barriers to joining 
the network can one truly understand what needs to happen to ensure that universal 
service policy objectives are achieved and penetration increased. 
7.5  Responsibility for Universal Service 
Industry Responsibility Administered by the NRA 
It is important to establish who is responsible for ensuring universal service.  This 
will affect how broadly  the  obligation  is  defined  and how the relevant costs  of 
meeting the obligation are established.  This has obvious implications for the funding 
of  such  costs  by  the  telecommunications  industry  through  either  interconnect 
charges or some other means. 
Traditionally, the USO has been borne by the incumbent TO and has been funded 
through cross subsidy.  As markets liberalise we question whether this is  still the 
appropriate way of assigning responsibility for universal service goals.  To continue 
to interpret it in this way may provide incentives for  the TO either to incur more 
than economically efficient costs, or to claim they have been incurred, in meeting its 
obligations.  Whilst  in  the  short  term  such  obligations  may  be  asymmetrically 
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imposed upon the incumbent in order to promote new entrants into the sector, as the 
market is progressively liberalised the cost of meeting the usa should be  shared 
~ore equitably amongst competing operators.  It is at this point that a  common 
understanding  of  the  responsibility  and  definition  of  universal  service  becomes 
necessary, to avoid disagreements. 
Whilst  in  law  the  USO  has been ·the  responsibility  of the NRA,  the burden  of 
interpretation of the law, calculation of the magnitude and funding has effectively 
rested with the incumbent TO. 
The definition of USO and other social requirements in national telecommunications 
sectors,  and plans for  their fulfilment,  should be the responsibility  of  each  NRA. 
NRAs will be influenced by their national politics and international developments. 
They  will  need  to  acknowledge  the  national  benefits  from  meeting  basic 
telecommunications needs (e.g.  better functioning of the employment market and 
crime prevention). Any telecommunications company seeking a licence to operate in 
a country must expect that either immediately, or once it has become established, it 
will contribute to the fulfilment of the industry's social requirements either in cash or 
in kind. 
Traditionally these requirements have been regarded as a necessary but undesired 
burden.  A quite different view point is now becoming at least as valid, that social 
requirements of telecommunications operators present significant market and public 
relations opportunities.  The term social requirements has been used here instead of 
social obligations because a significant proportion of these may well be met by the 
industry voluntarily.  The opportunity to  fulfil  a  social requirement may actually 
have considerable commercial value,  bo~ through favourable public relations and 
through the capture of "safe"  (and maybe eventually profitable) market segments. 
New entrants should therefore have the chance to fulfil social requirements directly 
rather than just contributing in cash towards  the potentially  inflated  social  costs 
claimed by the incumbent. 
Assumptions 
In  the remainder  of this  section  we assume that by  the  time  their  markets  are 
liberalised Member States have reached the Fourth Stage and that tariffs have been 
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rebalanced so that the universal service policy is restricted to targeting subsidies to 
disadvantaged groups and to prevent pebple leaving the network36•  If  tariffs remain 
unbalanced then this will give rise to a local access loss (see sections 8 and 9 for its 
recovery). 
The provision of service to remote rural areas at nationally uniform, or near uniform, 
prices has_ been one  .of _the..mairLareas oLcontroversy  __ In.summary we take the view 
that in developed countries it is the exception rather than the rule that such activities 
would fall within the definition of universal service because: 
•  The cost differential attributed to rural operations is  often overestimated37• 
(Only a very small proportion of lines incur really high costs) 
•  The revenues resulting from rural operations are very worthwhile, especially 
over the long term and taking account of incoming as well as outgoing traffic. 
From limited evidence available for the UK, we believe that low levels of telephone 
connection  are  more  likely  to  prevail in  areas  of  deprived  inner-city/  suburban 
housing than in rural areas.  The challenges of achieving universal service are more 
likely to be associated with urban poverty and multiple deprivation than with the 
supposed high cost of rural provision. 
If  liberahsation occurs before a member state has reached the fourth stage, the cost of the USO 
is likely to be greater to ensure widespread geographical coverage.  Whilst we do not 
anticipate this will happen given the current liberalisation timetable, if  it does, the obligation 
for wider geographical coverage can be handled in the same way as other targeted subsidies 
via the "franchise" approach discussed below.  Indeed liberalisation in this way may speed up 
the universal service provision. 
Mercury One-2-0ne in its response to Oftel's Consultative Document on Interconnection and 
Accounting Separation claimed that urban services may actually cost more than rural services 
due to the number of switching units through which calls need to pass, and that in addition 
urban subscribers receive more value from the same service because of the greater number of 
other subscribers they can reach for a particular tariffed service compared to a rural subscriber. 
This may or may not significantly contradict received wisdom, but one thing is certain, 
geographically averaged prices and the respective costs are clearly misunderstood and the 
inherent cross subsidies promote market ineffidency.  Geographical deaveraging will 
overcome these and the unwelcome effects on universal service goals can be prevented 
through targeted subsidies. 
154 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
If no geographical de-averaging has occurred and particular operators still believe 
they incur an inequitable social cost in providing service to  certain  geographical 
subscriber groups that they are obliged to serve they could seek to share the funding 
of these costs in the way outlined in section 7.7 below.  However, we assume that 
some form of geographical de-averaging is likely to have taken place by the time 
liberalisation is effective in each Member  _State. 
Franchise Approach to USGs 
Establishing  and  maintaining  the  social  requirements  will  become  an  iterative 
process involving the following steps.  Firstly the NRA through wide consultation 
and debate should determine what 
11non commercial" services society requires of the 
telecommunications  industry  (this  can  include  both  USO  and  public  service 
obligations).  Each TO should then be invited to offer such services on a voluntary 
basis (e.g.  in the UK  BT's  text users rebate scheme and Vodafone's earphones for 
mobility  impaired  drivers).  Remaining  unfulfilled  requirements  should  where 
appropriate be made the subject of competitive bids, such that TOs could bid to fulfil 
all or part of a requirement and contracts would be awarded on the basis of a full 
evaluation including quality and continuity of service guarantees as well as the level 
of funding requested.  Requirements thought unsuitable for competitive bidding or 
for which no bid is received would then be imposed as an obligation on whichever 
TO,  or TOs,  appear to  be best placed to  fulfil them efficiently.  For example the 
provision of basic services in remote areas may be placed upon one mobile or PCN 
operator.  This means it will not always be the incumbent TO, although in the early 
stages of liberalisation this is more than likely.  This does not mean that in all cases 
there will not be a  significant cost burden on an operator, and where such social 
requirements are costly to provide, these would then become candidates for shared 
funding of these costs- see section 7.7 below. 
The above process would have to be regularly reviewed, with all commitments made 
for  the duration of the review period.  Matching these review periods with price 
controls and quality reviews may well be appropriate.  In this way each NRA could 
create  a  climate  in  which  TOs  see  useful  advantage  in  their  non  commercial 
achievements. 
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7.6  Cost of Universal Service 
Cave et al stated that "the cost of meeting the USO in any locality consists of the sum 
of losses incurred by operators in serving customers who they are obliged to serve 
under the USO, but who they would not otherwise have chosen to serve".  They also 
stated the calculation of this  cost should be made on the basis  of the cost of an 
efficient operation. 
This  requires  examination  of  the  cost  and  revenues  associated  with  particular 
customers or groups of customers. 
The "costs of USO" maybe variously interpreted as, for example: 
•  The net current annual costs for all lines where current annual costs exceed 
current annual revenues, or 
•  The net current annual costs for all lines where lifetime costs exceed lifetime 
revenues, or 
•  The net current annual cost for all lines which, once connected, the TO would 
choose not to serve i.e.  to disconnect on commercial grounds,  or prior to 
connection would choose not to connect, or 
•  The net current annual cost for all lines which, prior to  connection, the TO 
would choose, or have chosen, not to connect. 
Due to the current lack of a  rigorous definition  and the absence of incentives to 
provide one, most TOs themselves can only estimate total costs at best.  This is likely 
to  be on the first  basis  and  to  include components of what we have referred  to 
elsewhere as the local access loss and identifiable targeted subsidies. 
However, logically the most satisfactory definition is the fourth one above.  There is  • 
a  normal  commercial  strategy  to  cultivate  currently  unprofitable  or  marginally 
profitable customers for their future prospects (e.g. student bank accounts, bottom of 
the range car models)  and whilst future prospects are of course never certain it is 
usual to accept some risk.  Similarly it is normal commercial strategy to  serve all 
customers in a given area despite their different profitability without discrimination, 
thereby minimising administration cost and poor public  relations.  We therefore 
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suggest that the "cost of USO" should normally be limited to explicitly identified and 
required targeted subsidies, for example to disabled groups, the elderly, or remote 
communities.  It should not include customers that are uneconomic because the TO 
has been unable to exploit the full commercial potential. 
It is perhaps sensible to more closely examine what we mean by net current annual 
costs  ..  Since only a .minority of.customers..are likely to impose ·a net USO cost, it is 
reasonable to estimate the cost of provision to these "loss making customers" on an 
avoidable basis i.e.  to calculate what cost would be saved if these customers were 
either taken off the network or what cost would not be incurred if they were never 
connected. 
On the  revenue side it is  obviously important that all  revenues  paid by  a  USO 
customer are included  in  the calculation.  There is  also  a  strong argument  for 
attributing some or all of the revenue of incoming calls to that customer, on the 
grounds that at least some of that revenue would be  lost if that customer was 
removed from the network.  A  calculation of this kind is practical and has been 
carried out in Australia. 
The net cost of USO as defined above is likely to vary significantly depending upon 
the level of network development.  In high income European countries with well 
developed networks the avoidable cost of removing a subscriber from the network is 
likely to be very small.  However at an early stage of development when network 
infrastructure roll out is a high priority the avoidable cost of adding subscribers in 
new  areas  are  much  more significant,  and therefore in low  and middle income 
countries the net cost of USO is likely to be greater. 
A  recent report produced by Analysys for the Bangemann Group has attempted to 
estimate the cost of the USQ38.  Whilst only limited details have been made available 
to us we understand that these estimates are derived from a calculation of the net 
cost of serving those customers whom it is uneconomic for the TO to serve.  The net 
cost (revenue less cost) in this case takes into account the call revenues generated by 
users in addition to connection and rental revenues.  In the absence of information to 
Analysys.  Provision of Quantitative Data as Background Material for the Bangemann Group. 
Final Report, 18 May 1994. 
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the contrary, we assume that the costs in question are fully distributed costs.  We are 
not in a position to comment on the quantitative and analytical techniques used to 
calculate these costs. 
The Analysys research calculated the costs of USO as a percentage of turnover for 
each European country with the following results: 
Graph 7.6A 
Estimated USC cost as a 0/o of turnover (based on 1992 data) 
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Analysys then projected the effect on the cost of USO  of rebalancing tariffs  in 10 
Member States. 
Graph 7.6B 
USC costs and access deficit before and after rebalancing 
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Excluding Greece and Portugal, where networks are less well developed, the USO 
cost estimates ranged from 0.5%  to 5%  of revenue prior to rebalancing and 0.25%  to 
3.7%  after rebalancing.  In each case the highest figure is for Spain.  These figures 
would obviously be  dramatically further reduced if the avoidable cost rather than 
FDC were used  . 
Having  examined  the  available  data39  on  the  cost  of  USO  and  other  social 
requirements in advanced economies we conclude that any method based upon TOs 
cost and revenue records can produce a number of different answers.  If, however, 
avoidable costs are used and incoming call revenues are taken into account, such 
costs shrink dramatically.  It is probably more reliable to instead formulate the cost 
of USO  by working from  the  opposite  direction  i.e.  to  calculate  the  number  of 
subscribers requiring subsidy to connect to the network and multiply by the average 
subsidy required for each.  The total sums expended are in any case typically well 
under 5%  and often under 1%  of revenues and would be expected to be much lower 
where calculated on an avoidable basis. 
7.7  Funding of the Universal Service Obligation 
39 
In the past the cost of meeting USO has been met by implicit cross subsidies from 
other  monopolist  services.  As  telecommunications  markets  are  liberalised 
incumbent  operators  will  demand  that  such  costs  are  more  equitably  shared 
amongst  competing  operators.  Whilst  the  sharing  of  these  costs  may  not  be 
introduced automatically in an attempt to reduce barriers to entry and compensate 
for other asymmetries in the market in order to facilitate competitive market entry, it 
is likely that in the longer term, where such costs are material, they will need to be 
funded in a way that does not put an undue burden upon any operator. 
One possibility for  funding the costs of USOs  is that they should be met out of 
general taxation, or taxation of the telecommunication sector specifically.  Indeed 
there may be arguments strongly in favour of financing special service provisions 
such as phones for the elderly or handicapped from general taxation or as part of the 
See Appendix 5 for Cost data on the USO. 
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social security system e.g.  in Ireland phones for  the elderly are paid for  by  the 
government. 
For those costs not met in this way that are of such magnitude that their asymmetric 
imposition  on  the  incumbent  or  franchise  holder  described  above  would  be 
inequitable there are some basic principles that should be followed for sharing them. 
These should include: 
•  It is more important to put in place a mechanism for sharing the costs in a 
way that all operators accept as equitable than to establish the exact costs 
themselves. 
•  Any  system  should  not  be  allowed  to  become  so  complex  that  the 
administrative costs are large relative to the actual costs involved. 
•  There  is  much  to  be  said  for  a  "rough  justice"  approach  whereby  each 
operator carries out some social requirements and bears the corresponding 
costs. 
•  Finally any mechanism by which operators are reimbursed for  costs  they 
have incurred should be devised so as to create a desirable set of incentives 
for  all  concerned.  For  example,  all  cost  could  be  reduced  by  a  certain 
percentage before reimbursement so as to provide an incentive to improve 
efficiency. 
If the approach suggested in section 7.5  were adopted,  then each TO would be 
responsible for identifying the avoidable net cost of "social" activities that it has been 
awarded,  either  through  the  competitive  bidding  (which  process  itself  would 
identify any additional cost),  or involuntarily.  These costs could be vetted by the 
NRA for reasonableness, perhaps with industry participation.  This should be done 
following the avoidable cost principle set out in section 7.6 ":bove.  Only then if  a TO 
was  bearing  a  total  social  cost  that  was  disproportionate  in  the  light  of  its 
competitive position and the goals of competition policy, would any cost sharing be 
invoked by the NRA. 
It may be convenient to  use interconnect agreements  as  the vehicle  for  income 
transfers which help to fund social obligations.  However the relevant cost will not 
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generally vary in proportion to any dimension of interconnect, be it either capacity or 
call minutes, so it is not clear that they should be added onto any existing element of 
interconnect charges.  Generally they may be better relegated to a separate item in 
the interconnect agreement in their own right, and therefore become more akin to a 
USO  levy  on  the  industry  perhaps based  upon  revenue.  These  proposals  are 
consistent with current work being done in the USA  on a  so-called  "Net-Trans" 
system  for universal service support4~. 
Noam, Eli M.  NetTrans Accounts:  Reforming the Financial Support System for Universal 
Service in Telecommunications (discussion draft) Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, 
November 1993. 
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KEY POINTS: SECfiON 7 
•  Competition will not endanger USO if  regulatory oversight ensures 
price rebalancing is carried out at a reasonable rate 
vulnerable subscribers receive targeted support. 
•  Competition will improve universal service because it will: 
improve efficiency and reduce prices 
foster innovation 
generate market growth 
create more revenue with which to fund genuine USO 
encourage operators to compete for the provision of social  services. 
•  The  definition  of  USO  evolves  with  development  of  the  network.  In  most 
European countries the primary aim of the USO is now social. 
•  In developed countries, it is the exception rather than the rule that remote rural 
areas fall within the USO definition as the cost differential is often overstated and 
the revenues are very worthwhile (especially when incoming and outgoing calls 
are considered in the long run). 
•  USO and local access loss must be considered separately. 
•  The USO should be calculated on an avoidable cost basis and incorporate the net 
current annual cost for all lines which, prior to connection, the TO would choose, 
or have chosen, not to connect. 
•  The USO should be the responsibility of the NRA.  Historically, the USO has been 
borne  by  the  incumbent  TO  who  has  been  responsible  for  interpreting  the 
definition and assessing the costs. 
•  Social requirements of telecommunications operators present significant market 
and public relations opportunities.  New entrants should have the opportunity to 
contribute to universal service policy in kind not in cash. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: SECTION 7 
•  The NRAs  in each  Member State  should be  responsible  for  defining  and 
identifying universal service  obligation  services  and  costing  the  universal 
service obligation. 
•  The following principles for sharing the provision and/  or funding of universal 
service obligations should be used by the Member States: 
the cost of universal service obligations should be calculated on an avoidable 
cost basis and incorporate the net current annual cost for  all  lines which, 
prior to connection, the TO would choose, or have chosen, not to connect. 
the provision of universal service and/  or the funding of the cost of universal 
service  obligations  should  be  encouraged  to  conform  to  the  following 
framework: 
i.  TOs should be encouraged to provide "USO"  services on a  voluntary 
basis. 
ii.  Unfulfilled obligations should be offered for competitive tender by TOs. 
m.  Residual obligations should be imposed by the NRAs upon those TOs 
best placed to meet them. 
iv.  Where an operator believes the unilateral imposition of universal 
service obligations upon it is unfair because the avoidable cost is 
incompatible with its  status and competition policy  objectives  it 
could appeal to the NRA for s!'ared funding. 
v.  After the NRA has vetted the avoidable cost calculated by the TOs 
they may agree to shared funding of the cost 
vi.  Shared funding of universal service obligation costs should be by 
way of a levy on the industry in a  competitively neutral manner 
and not included as part of the interconnect charge. 
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8.  PROMOTING EFFIOENCY THROUGH INTERCONNECf CHARGES 
8.1  Summary 
This section discusses the way efficiency should be promoted in the determination of 
interconnect charges.  In particular it deals with the evolution ofinterconnect charges 
over time.  It examines the question of how best to encourage efficiency and looks at 
the links with other means to encourage efficiency  and control costs  and prices, 
including price-cap controls. 
8.2  Types of Efficiency 
There are many different and often overlapping definitions of economic efficiency. 
But, for the purposes of analysing the efficiency of interconnect charges, we consider 
the following three aspects to provide a complete and mutually exclusive set 
Static  technical  efficiency.  This  means  that  the  operators  which  make  up  the 
telecommunications  industry  should,  in  combination,  use network  resources  as 
efficiently  as  possible  to  provide  any  given  volume  of  traffic.  In  particular, 
interconnect  agreements  should  encourage  efficient  investment  in  network 
resources.  They  should  discourage  both  inefficient  entry  into  the  market  and 
unnecessary duplication of resources.  Interconnect charges which are set too low 
will encourage inefficient entry by operators who will be able to make money, not 
because they are more efficient than the incumbent, but because they are subsidised 
through low interconnect charges.  Interconnect charges which are set too high will 
discourage entry or lead to unnecessary duplication of resources.  The new entrant 
will build its own facilities and the country will lose the economies of scale which 
could  be  achieved  through  the  incumbent  providing  the  same  facilities  and 
providing them to the new entrant. 
Static allocative  efficiency.  This means that the telecommunications industry should 
act in such a way that the economy as a whole uses resources efficiently, not just in 
creating services but also in consuming them.  Specifically this means that end-user 
prices should reflect costs of provision so that end-users will act in an economically 
efficient manner.  This in tum means that interconnect charges should reflect the 
relative cost of providing the different interconnect services.  The new entrant's cost 
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structure  (of  which  interconnect charges  are  a  major  part)  will then  reflect  the 
incumbent's cost of provision and the new entrant will have a strong incentive to 
reflect its costs in its end-user prices. 
Dynamic  efficiency.  This  means  the  industry  increases  its  level  of productivity 
(through  use  of  new  technologies  an4  management  procedures)  and  responds 
rapidly .. to  market .needs.  .As far  as interconnect is .concerned .it involves  setting 
interconnect conditions which do not constrain technical and market innovation and 
setting interconnect charges which give incentives to the incumbent to improve its 
efficiency. 
8.3  Efficiency of the Incumbent TO 
There is  a strong body of evidence suggesting that many of Europe's TOs are not 
particularly efficient in their operations and that differing levels  of efficiency  are 
achieved  across  the  Community.  It  is  largely  because  of  these  perceived 
inefficiencies that Member States are considering the liberalisation and privatisation 
of their telecommunications sectors. There are three main reasons why liberalisation, 
and privatisation might help to improve TO efficiency. 
•  Competition can establish new levels of operational best practice leading to 
the provision of higher quality service at lower cost.  This can put pressure on 
the incumbent TO to reduce its costs by modernising its network and support 
systems,  re-engineering  its  business  processes  and  streamlining  work 
practices and employee numbers.  Accordingly the technical efficiency of the 
incumbent will increase, and dynamic efficiency will be improved. 
•  Price rebalancing can help to remove historical discrepancies between tariffs 
and costs.  This will improve allocative efficiency. 
•  Privatisation can ensure that the TO needs to account to its shareholders for 
the profitability which it achieves.  Particularly if coupled with price control 
regulation, the effect of privatisation is  to create further pressure within the 
TO to drive costs down and increase dynamic efficiency. 
Compared with these measures, there is little scope for using interconnect charges 
directly to fuel improvements in TO efficiency.  Interconnection with other operators 
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will have only a marginal impact on the incumbent's business for several years after 
liberalisation.  The level and structure of interconnect charges will not therefore 
materially impact the TO's efficiency, at least in the short term. 
However, if the interconnect charges are set so as to enable competition, then they 
will  have  a  major  inclliect  influence  on  the  efficiency  of  the  incumbent  TO. 
Conversely,  if -interconnect  charges  are  set  in  a  __ .manner  which ..  discourages 
competition, then they will inclliectly have contributed to  the continuation of TO 
inefficiency.  The vital point is that interconnect charges should be set to facilitate 
competition.  In section 4.4.6 we concluded that marginal or incremental concepts of 
cost are the relevant starting point for pricing decisions. 
8.4  Efficient Market Entry 
If interconnection charges are set to facilitate competition there is a  risk that  this 
could lead to inefficient market entry.  By  this we mean entry into the market that 
will lead to higher overall costs in the long term, for example, where new entrants 
are subsidised in order to  enter a  market which does not offer  an economically 
sustainable business.  If  they are,  there will be a  loss of static technical efficiency 
which, if prolonged and taken to an extreme, could outweigh the benefits achieved 
from liberalisation. 
This is certainly a danger when the interconnect charge is set equal to any marginal 
or incremental concept of cost (such as '?ne based upon LRIC) to encourage market 
entry, particularly for telecommunications networks where: 
•  There is  a  large component of residual common costs,  i.e.  costs which are 
incurred to support a  number of different functions.  This means that the 
incremental cost to  support one activity may be greatly reduced (and may 
even be zero) because some of the costs have already been incurred to support 
another activity.  For example, incremental long distance calls  require the 
existence of local loops, but the capital cost of those loops are likely to have 
been  incurred  already  (to  support  network  access),  and  are  not  truly 
incremental to the provision of additional long distance calls. 
•  There is a large component of fixed costs, i.e. costs which do not vary with the 
number of calls on the network.  Indeed, most networks could handle a 20-
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30%  increase in traffic without any noticeable degradation of service.  Does 
this mean that the incremental cost of these additional calls is zero?  It all 
depends on the size of the increment, and how long is "long run". 
As documented in section 4.4.6 above, to encourage only "efficient
11  market entry, 
interconnect  charges  should  account  for  more  than  the  directly  attributable 
incremental costs of interconnect calls. . They. should .contribute ·a  proportion to all 
residual joint and common costs, even where those costs are already sunk; and they 
should be calculated over a reasonably large increment and long time-frame.  On the 
other hand, regulators could well argue that the dangers of inefficient market entry 
are small compared with the benefits of enhancing the efficiency of the incumbent 
TO through competition.  In this argument, it is  desirable to  use another form of 
incremental  costing,  as  indeed  was  done  in  Australia  when  Austel  based 
interconnect charges on directly attributable incremental costs. 
Inefficient  market  entry  could  also  result  from  cross  subsidies  within  existing 
telephone tariffs.  As discussed in section 5.6 in virtually every Member State there is 
a cross subsidy where usage (particularly long distance and international calls) funds 
access. We have called this the local access loss.  If this loss is not factored into the 
interconnect charges, there is a danger of encouraging market entry for long distance 
services which is merely arbitrage (i.e. it is an artificial business, viable only because 
of the cross subsidy to support the local access loss). 
The most efficient means of dealing with this situation is for tariffs to be rebalanced 
to remove the local access loss.  This would enable prices to reflect the real costs of 
provision, and thus encourage use of the telephone network only where it is cost 
effective to do so.  The only economic argument against this cost orientated tariff, is 
that high access prices might discourage new network subscriptions and thus reduce 
the  number  of people  any  individual  telephone  user  is  able  to  contact.  This 
effectively reduces the overall economic benefit of the telephone service.  The balance  ... 
between these two arguments depends on  th~ level of penetration of the national 
telephone network.  As discussed in section 7 in most Member States penetration is  ~ 
already high, and it would seem likely that the local access loss is not serving any 
useful economic or social purpose.  It would be much more preferable to allow tariff 
rebalancing,  with safeguards to ensure that there is no ''market shock''  and that 
vulnerable subscriber groups receive targeted attention and safeguards. 
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If, however, tariff rebalancing to eliminate the local access loss is not possible,  or 
where it is possible only over a  protracted period, it will be necessary to build a 
contribution to local access loss into the interconnect charge.  We will examine this 
further in section 9. 
8.5  Charging Method 
There are three principal methods of charging for  interconnect services.  Prices may 
be based on: 
•  retail tariffs; 
•  the costs per call minute; 
•  the cost of interconnect capacity. 
If  the prices are based on retail tariffs, economic efficiency will be possible only to the 
extent that retail tariffs  reflect  the underlying costs  of provision.  Even if this  is 
achieved, there is likely to be an inefficiency created by the tie created between the 
tariffing  schemes  of the incumbent and  the  new  entrant.  Because  interconnect 
charges represent a large proportion of  the new entrant's cost base then, if they are 
based on the incumbent's tariffs, the new entrant is severely restricted in its ability to 
offer innovative tariffing schemes, and "me too"  pricing and service offerings will 
result  This will create some dynamic inefficiency in the market. 
If the prices are based on costs, the "pure" charging method would be to relate the 
interconnect price to  the network capacity  used,  since  this  reflects  the  real  cost 
causation.  However, the use of capacity charging tends to work against the new 
entrant, since it has to pay a fixed charge in advance of usage.  Most new entrants 
would prefer an interconnect price based on calling levels, which will allow them to 
pay for interconnect only after calls have been made and paid for by its customers. 
Perhaps the most economically efficient _arrangement is to give the new entrant the 
choice of either a capacity or a per-call minute cost-related interconnect charge. 
Capacity based charging is not currently adopted in any European TO, although the 
time  of day  gradients in retail  tariffs  and interconnect charges  are developed in 
recognition of the different values placed upon capacity at different times of the day. 
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In  the  UK  Mercury  Communications  Limited  has  applied  to  get  the  courts  to 
reinterpret BT's  licence condition as encompassing capacity based charging.  The 
practicality of charges based on capacity is not yet certain but a number of countries 
are investigating the approach. 
8.6  . Unbundling 
For  the  new  entrant  there  are  a  number  of trade-offs  to  be  considered  when 
considering an interconnect arrangement  For example,  they have to  determine 
whether to operate a few large points of interconnect (and thus cut down on their 
own costs) or to run many smaller ones nearer to end users (and thus cut down on 
interconnect payments).  Under these many different arrangements  they may be 
required to  pay for  many different cost items.  The question then arises to  what 
extent  is  it  worth  separately  identifying  and  charging  for  each  alternative 
interconnect arrangement? 
As discussed in section 6 above it is fundamental to unbundle interconnect services if 
charges are to be cost orientated due to the different economics of network elements 
deployed in the provision of various interconnect services. 
To facilitate interconnect in the UK, Oftel. has instructed BT to unbundle its costs and 
produce a comprehensive list of possible interconnect charges, depending on where 
and how interconnect is made to the BT network.  This certainly increases the choice 
of new entrants, but it has resulted in considerable work for BT and Oftel, which will 
have to be regularly updated.  Whether all this effort has actually been worthwhile 
will  only  be  apparent  in  a  few  years  time.  The  problem  is  that,  even  with 
comprehensive  audit  mechanisms  in  place,  it  is  difficult  to  prevent  operators 
allocating costs in a "supportable" but anti-competitive manner.  Intuitively it only 
requires the smallest of percentage improvements in the competitive situation to 
outweigh the expenses  of designing and operating the system.  Cost accounting 
systems  are  expensive;  but these  costs  are negligible  when  compared with  the 
benefits of creating an efficient telecommunications industry. 
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8.7  Ensuring Efficiency in The Future 
We have argued that efficient interconnect prices need to balance the need to increase 
the  efficiency  of  the  incumbent  TO  with  the  requirement  only  to  encourage 
sustainable market entry.  This balance needs to change over time, and it will do so 
differently  depending  on  the  costing  approach  used  in  determining  the  initial 
interconnect prices. 
The use of marginal or incremental cost based interconnect charging tends to achieve 
efficiency  in  the incumbent but may  result in inefficient  market entry.  It may 
provide a good starting point for  interc~nnect prices, but if this approach is  to be 
adopted it is  important that an increasing component of the common (overhead) 
costs (i.e.  the common cost contribution) is added to the incremental costs each year 
to ensure that the new entrants are adding to the overall efficiency of the market. 
The use of FDC will help to guard against inefficient market entry, but it may well 
prevent competitive market entry and will tend to reduce the competitive pressure 
on the incumbent and thus may not encourage improvements in its efficiency.  In 
this case it is important that there is downward pressure on FDC based interconnect 
prices and thus on the incumbent's cost base.  It  seems likely that some form of price-
cap should be used, particularly if  it is being used also on retail tariffs. 
8.8  Efficient Interconnect Charges and Structural Asymmetries 
The dominant TO in all countries will have certain structural advantages in their 
own countries.  As a result of this, competitive new entrants will be burdened with 
severe disadvantages within the market place which require them to incur extra cost, 
and provide extra incentives to attract customers.  These structural asymmetries may 
not persist in the long term, but in the short term efficient interconnect charges will 
only be achieved if  they take account of such factors. 
During the consultative process on interconnection in the UK throughout 1993 and 
early 1994 a number of structural advantages were highlighted that BT enjoyed over 
competing opera  tors.  These covered such issues as: 
•  The lack of free ownership of numbers 
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•  The lack of number portability 
•  The  dominant  provider's  preferential  access  to  valuable  commercial 
information about telecommunication users 
•  Preferential customer switch access to the incumbents network 
•  Incumbents control over changes to technical interconnect 
If interconnect charges  are then to  be based upon the cost of service  provided 
inherent in the incumbent's organisation, efficiency will only be attained if the NAA 
ensures that the services which competing new entrants are buying are the same as 
those enjoyed by the incumbent.  To this end, where the incumbent enjoys some of 
the structural advantages outlined above it is clear that the interconnect services they 
receive are of more value than those which are made available to the new entrants. 
One practical way to offset such structural advantages is to give the competing new 
entrants  temporary  abatements  of interconnect charges,  expressed in  terms  of  a 
percentage of the charges paid by the incumbent for the interconnect capabilities it 
receives.  This was the approach adopted in the US  after the initial divestiture of 
AT&T. 
Through time the abatement should be reduced to reflect the symmetry between the 
interconnection services enjoyed both by the incumbent and new entrants.  Only in 
this way would the incumbent operators in each Member State be encouraged to 
make available symmetrical interconnection services.  However the "relief''  of new 
entrants for such structural asymmetries through the interconnect charge does not 
ensure  economically  efficient  outcomes.  This  will  only  be  attained  if  the 
asymmetries are removed. 
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KEY POINTS: SECTION 8 
•  There are 3 types of efficiency to consider: 
Static technical efficiency - i.e. efficiency in the use of network resources; 
Static allocative efficiency- i.e. efficiency of resource use by the economy as 
a whole; 
Dynamic efficiency - i.e. the efficiency with which the industry responds to 
market needs. 
•  Liberalisation will improve efficiency through: 
competition encouraging use of best practices and pressuring costs; 
rebalancing improving allocative efficiency; 
accounting to shareholders. 
•  No one charging method provides the ideal solution.  There is a trade-off between 
low charges that encourage efficiency in the incumbent operator and ensuring that 
there is no inefficient market entry based upon short term arbitrage opportunities. 
•  Where a marginal concept of cost is used this will ensure TO efficiency but may 
result in inefficient market entry.  Therefore charges should be set at MC/IC plus a 
contribution to the residual joint and common costs. 
•  Where FDC is  used to set prices, downward pressure should be exerted on the 
interconnect charge to encourage TO efficiency (e.g. through the application of a 
price-cap). 
•  The  structural  advantages  inherent  in  the  incumbent  should  be  offset  by 
abatement  of  interconnect charges  expressed  in  terms  of  a  percentage  of  the 
charges paid by the incumbent for the interconnect capabilities it receives.  This 
should then be reduced through time to reflect increasing symmetry between the 
new entrant and the incumbent. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: SECTION 8 
•  Interconnect charges should be set so as to facilitate competition which will 
then encourage efficiency. 
•  Where Incremental Cost concepts are used in interconnect pricing,  charges 
should be set  above  the  incremental cost to  ensure  a  contribution  to  the 
residual joint and common costs of the interconnected operator. 
•  Where  Fully  Distributed  Costing  is  used  to  set  interconnect  charges, 
downward  pressure  should  be  exerted  on  the  interconnect  charge  to 
encourage TO efficiency.  For example, through the application of a price-cap. 
•  Interconnect charges should be based upon the cost of unbundled network 
elements. 
•  The structural advantages  enjoyed by  the incumbent should be  offset  by 
abatement of interconnect charges.  Abatements may then be reduced through 
time to  reflect the increasing symmetry between the new entrant and  the 
incumbent. 
•  The industry needs to  investigate the practicality of implementing charges 
based on capacity. 
•  New entrants should then be offered the choice of either a capacity or a per-
call minute cost related interconnect charge. 
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9.  COST ACCOUNTING PRACTICES TO SUPPORT AN EFFIOENT 
SCHEME OF INTERCONNECT CHARGES 
9.1  Introduction 
In this section we draw on the analysis and findings of the p~evious sections in order 
to  identify  the cost  accounting  practices  that should be  adopted  to  support  an 
efficient scheme of interconnect charges.  In doing this we focus on the Commission's 
requirement that such a scheme should be practical, implementable and consistent 
with existing national practices.  This section seeks to highlight the key issues and 
provide broad guidelines and principles to form the basis for future development 
and progress. 
9.2  Background 
41 
From  the  analysis  produced  in  section  6  it  should  be  clear  that  there  is  no 
interconnect  regime  in  existence  that  provides  the  right  way  to  formulate  and 
establish  interconnect  charges.  Different  interconnect  regimes  reflect  different 
industry structures and the political and social objectives of these jurisdictions. 
Interconnect regimes  develop as  the market develops.  This  can be seen from  a 
review of the interconnection framework adopted in the US both prior to and since 
divestiture  of  AT  & T  in  1984  to  the current  date.  Similarly  in the  UK  "Issues 
concerning  interconnection  have  been  brought  sharply  into  focus  by  the 
Government's decision in 1991  to end the duopoly in wirelines and to open the UK 
telecommunications market to greater competition"41.  This however does not deny 
the existence of an interconnect requirement for  Mercury Communication Ltd and 
BT  in  the UK  for  the  preceding seven  years,  but one can  only  presume it was 
achieved without such a "sharp focus". 
Oftel.  Consultative Document issued by the Director General of Telecommunications. 
Interconnection and Accounting Separation.  The Office of Telecommunications, June 1993. 
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Interconnect  regimes  will  never  achieve  the  economically  optimal  solution,  but 
instead should be constructed to facilita~e competitive market entry and thus obtain 
the  benefits  of  liberalisation  in  a  way  that  meets  national  political  and  social 
objectives, whilst striking a  balance between the interests of incumbents and new 
entrants, to the benefit of consumers.  Therefore whilst it is possible to evaluate the 
different  approaches  theoretically,  approaches  adopted  in  practice  will  be  sub-
..  optimaL  .but w_orkable compromises. 
At a European level what we can hope to achieve is to suggest principles that should 
be followed in establishing cost orientated interconnect charges that benefit from the 
experience of countries which have already been  through this  process and avoid 
some  of  the  pitfalls  they  experienced.  Furthermore,  we  can  hope  to  promote 
principles that are broad enough to have application across all the Member States 
despite their diverse industrial organisations, political and social objectives.  It is 
however important to re-emphasise that this is a complex area, and one without an 
easy solution, as Oftel in the UK have experienced over the last 18 months. 
9.3  Appropriate Costs for Setting Interconnect Charges 
Section 4.4 examined different cost standards.  The cost standard that should be 
adopted for  all pricing decisions  in all organisations is  one based upon long run 
costs.  If this is not the case the organisation will not recover all of its costs and will 
not be  financially  viable,  and  hence  will  be  forced  to  exit  the  market.  Whilst 
conceptually attractive, long run costs are difficult to use in the real world because 
they are extremely difficult to identify, particularly in network industries such as 
telecommunications.  The  cost  accounting  systems  usually  adopted  by  these 
organisations  are based  on  variants  of the FDC  standard  and as  a  result rarely 
provide all the necessary information. 
The  calculation  of  long  run  costs  for  some  business  activities  is  relatively 
straightforward, but in TOs it is  depend~nt upon a number of complex factors such 
as the physical environment and technology chosen.  Furthermore, it depends upon 
the  accounting  policies,  particularly  projected  asset  lives  adopted  by  TO 
management.  This is a particular problem in TOs given the high capital intensity 
and level of technical change in the industry.  Since one of the primary regulatory 
tools is ensuring a cost justification for tariffs and interconnect charges, there is  an 
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incentive for management to choose conservative accounting policies to reduce risk, 
particularly of network investment 
Theory suggest that this is not a problem in competitive markets in which vigorous 
competition ensures the right kinds of decisions  are taken regarding accounting 
policies, depreciation policies and fixed asset investments.  However this is not true 
in monopoly markets .where the regulatot, .aruleven IO  management, often do not 
know the "real" underlying costs of service provision, and one can see why the latter 
may not want to know. 
As discussed in section 4 if  a regulator wants to determine costs to ensure that prices 
reflect them he essentially has two methods.  The first is to perform independent cost 
studies, which can either be based upon historical cost accounts, or alternatively can 
use an engineering cost study approach.  The second is to prescribe to the regulated 
firm what cost accounting standards should be adopted and to ensure that these are 
designed to reveal the elusive "real" underlying costs - or approximate them as close 
as possible. 
The latter approach of endogenous cost based regulation was originally adopted in 
the USA by the FCC but elsewhere regulators have adopted an exogenous, index 
based price-cap approach.  However, this still requires that at the time of setting  or 
resetting price-caps regulators need to understand the "real'' costs. 
The information asymmetry between regulator and TO, therefore presents some real 
problems in setting the principles for determining the appropriate costs for pricing 
any telecommunication service, including interconnect 
Setting the accounting principles for  cost orientated interconnect charges is not a 
straightforward matter and the regulator needs to put them in the context of broader 
social and political objectives. 
9.4  Historical or Forward Looking Costs 
As noted in 9.3  the only cost standard relevant for pricing decisions is one based 
upon the long run, and theory suggests ~at  economic efficiency is achieved if  prices 
are set based upon a marginal or incremental concept of cost.  Following economic 
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theory would lead one to adopt a forward looking concept of incremental cost as 
historical sunk costs are irrelevant for achieving conditions of economic efficiency. 
One can therefore suggest that unbundled interconnect costs should be calculated 
using forward looking long run costs.  Prices could then be set to provide a margin 
over the forward looking long run costs such that across all services this margin is 
·- ~adequate for.  the  IDs~- to  ..  remain~financially.~viable.  ___ In  competitive. commercial 
organisations prices are not set based on cost alone but based on market forces. 
However,  in  considering  costs  the  relevant  costs  are  forward  looking,  but 
approximations of varying accuracy  to  the forward looking costs  are often  made 
employing historical cost information.  Whilst not always the case this is because the 
cost  of  obtaining  reliable  forward  looking  cost  information  often  outweighs  the 
resulting benefits.  In any case many pricing decisions do take account of historical 
costs to ensure that product and service prices recover the organisation's legitimate 
historical expenditure to achieve profitable reported results. 
Competitive  markets  stimulate  the  development  of  new  management  tools  for 
success in the competitive arena.  As competition becomes more intense the costs of 
not understanding forward looking costs will outweigh the costs saved by using 
"rough historical approximations".  It is only the forces of competition that will drive 
TO management to develop the myriad of management tools they need to survive, 
such as a more sophisticated understanding of their customers and the segment and 
service line contributions achieved.  It is the requirement to have these tools that will 
drive organisations to understand and manage their costs in a way that gets closer to 
the economically efficient ideals.  It is our belief that regulatory demands will never 
be able to deliver these responses in the Way that a competitive marketplace can. 
From the results of our field interviews summarised in section 5 it can be seen that it 
is in the more competitive market places, such as the UK, where the incumbent and 
new entrants are developing a much better understanding of their cost bases, and 
employing activity-based management techniques and incremental concepts of costs 
in pricing and management decisions.  This can also be seen in the liberalised US 
market  place.  Even  in  relatively  unliberalised  environments  many  dominant 
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European TOs have seen the competition arriving and are acknowledging the need 
for different cost information systems to manage their business42. 
It is interesting to examine why regulators invariably do not enforce interconnect 
charges based upon fonvard looking cost standards.  Firstly most of the European 
TOs  do not have cost systems that allow  them to  produce this information in  a 
robust  manner.  As. competition. develops . they .will  be. forced  to  ascertain  this 
information, but if  it was purely a regulatory requirement their incentives to produce 
robust forward looking cost estimates without any distortion would be uncertain. 
The  only  remaining  solution  would  be  for  the  NRA  to  produce  independent 
engineering cost studies of the forward looking cost of interconnect services.  This 
would probably be impossible to achieve because of the asymmetry of information 
between the TO and the NRA, and would likely still result in a sub-optimal result 
Further,  even if forward looking costs  were developed they would undoubtedly 
meet with  criticisms  from  unconvince~ competitors.  The  lack  of  transparency 
between  the  underlying  costs  and charges  would  make  the  regime  difficult  to 
defend.  Further they are subjective and therefore incapable of audit  Obviously this 
would be different if  incremental cost based interconnect charges were set before the 
introduction of the competitors - as was the case in Australia. 
The conclusion that we can draw from the above is that in the interests of expediency 
interconnect charges in a practical setting should be  set by the NRA based upon 
historical rather than forward looking costs.  Whilst the latter undoubtedly have a 
sounder theoretical basis i.e. interconnect charges like all prices should be set based 
upon LRIC plus a margin, the use of historical costs has two advantages - they are 
available  more easily  than forward  looking costs,  and they can  be  reconciled  to 
audited  accounts  which  ensures  the  recovery  of legitimate expenditure  actually 
incurred.  Whilst not theoretically pure in the short term this will allow interconnect 
terms to be set in advance in a transparent manner which will be an 
11enabler
11  for 
market entry and therefore competition  ..  Following liberahsation, as the interconnect 
market becomes competitive interconnect charges will of commercial necessity be 
Meeting the challenges of competitive market places requires more than simply acknowledging 
them.  It requires alterations in  business strategies, methods and management perspective.  As 
European TOs restructure their business agendas away from government direction and 
regulatory commands towards the economic forces of supply and demand and creating real 
customer value, they will face a new business agenda.  This new agenda requires new 
management tools. 
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driven to reflect the forward looking costs.  However, safeguards are necessary.  If 
the historical cost base includes costs that arise from inefficient operation these need 
to be carefully dealt with to ensure that the regime does not allow or facilitate their 
continuance (see below)43. 
9.5  Incremental Vs-Fully Distributed Costs 
43 
Having discussed whether forward looking or historical costs should be used it is 
now  necessary  to  determine  whether  an  incremental  or  fully  distributed  cost 
approach should be taken. 
Whilst not an economically pure substitute for forward looking incremental costs an 
Embedded  Direct  Cost  approach  can  be  used  as  a  rough  approximation  of 
incremental costs.  Whilst this does not overcome criticisms relating to changing 
technologies  and  inefficient  operations,  the  application  of  rigorous  cost  causal 
principles including Activity-Based Costing techniques for cost attribution can be 
adopted to get a workable substitute for incremental cost  This is often employed in 
incremental cost studies when the difficulties of gathering true forward looking cost 
information are prohibitive. 
Efficient resource allocation is achieved if prices are based upon incremental cost. 
However, it is clear that in industries where economies of scope and scale are present 
incremental costs will always be below the fully distributed cost.  Therefore prices 
need to be set above the incremental cost for an organisation to achieve a margin that 
makes  a  contribution  to  residual joint and common costs  and hence  allows  the 
organisation to remain financially viable in the long term.  For a regulator trying to 
set principles for the cost basis of interconnect charges this gives rise to a "a trade-
off".  If  charges are set based upon incremental cost the incumbent will complain that 
this does not permit them to recover all their costs and encourages inefficient market 
entry  based  upon  arbitrage  opportunities. .  If  charges  are  based  upon  fully 
distributed costs this may provide barriers to entry to competitors and not encourage 
efficient resource allocation. 
This is not to deny that in understanding the relative contributions which services and 
customers make to the organisation it is imperative for management to develop an 
understanding of forward looking costs. 
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From the arguments presented in section 8 it is  clear that in the early  stages of 
liberalisation the contribution to total revenue from interconnect services is likely to 
be small for the incumbent TO, but their cost to competitive new entrants is likely to 
be the single most important determinant to their viability.  A workable compromise 
that encourages  market entry  and competition  and  also  puts  incentives  on  the 
incumbent to reduce costs through increased efficiency may be to set interconnect 
charges based on .costs below fully..mstrlbuted costs.  .Thus .there is a .theoretical basis 
for setting interconnect charges based upon incremental costs when first introducing 
competition and then migrating towards charges based on fully  allocated costs as 
competition develops.  Ultimately, in a competitive market the difference between 
the FDC and LRIC plus premium/  margin will be small.  A rough approximation to 
the incremental cost can be found using an embedded direct cost approach.  Because 
this  uses  the historical  information  from  the incumbent  operators  audited  FDC 
costing system it will allow interconnect charges to be determined in advance and 
provide transparency in the relationship between costs and charges.  Whilst not the 
most theoretically  sound basis  this  will facilitate  efficiency  in  the long  term by 
permitting market entry and therefore put pressure on costs such that in the long 
term  charges  reflect  the  true  underlying  costs  of  service  provision.  Initial 
interconnection at below fully  distributed cost will put pressure on incumbents to 
become more efficient  and redress  any  structural imbalances  in the  interconnect 
regime such as unequal access etc. 
Costs 
Development of charges over time 
Incremental Cost 
(rou~hly approximated 
by Embedded Direct Costs) 
Market 
Entry 
Time 
Reduced dominance 
of Incumbent 
Source: Ovum.  Interconnect: the key to effective competition. October 1994 
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The margin above EDC to be applied in the early stages of liberalisation should be 
established through negotiation between the interconnecting parties.  Where  this 
does not give rise to agreement the NRA should determine the appropriate margin. 
9.6  Formulation of Interconnect Charges 
Having established the cost standards to be utilised it is now necessary to turn our 
attention to the formulation of interconnect charges.  As mentioned in section 6.4 
interconnect charges can be divided into four distinct elements.  Two relating to the 
provision  of interconnect  services,  the  Connection  Charge  and  the  Conveyance 
Charge, and two that arise from the policy decision to use interconnect charges as the 
mechanism for compensating for regulatory imposed distortion in the retail market, 
the Local Access Loss Charge and the USO Charge.  We discuss these further below. 
Another aspect which needs to be considered in the formulation  of interconnect 
charges is the level of unbundling of network elements.  As discussed in section 6.5, 
operators  would  like  to  be  able  to  choose  from  a  "menu"  those  elements  of 
interconnection which are most suitable for their own business case. 
9.6.1  Connection Charge 
Of the four interconnect charge components this is perhaps the most straightforward 
to deal with.  This is because they are likely to be the most easily identified and 
agreed costs by the interconnecting parties, and are primarily capital costs that can 
be easily identified in a causal manner to the act of interconnection.  They are also 
perhaps the least significant costs. 
The costs that should be recovered through the charge should reflect the directly 
attributable costs  of connecting the two systems.  Most of these are likely  to  be 
incremental in nature and thus have a  sound economic justification for  their use. 
Some element of the total cost claimed may however arise from an allocation of costs 
previously incurred by one of the existing operators e.g. costs of co-location space, 
and these should be attributed to the two operators in a manner which is equitable 
and  agreed by negotiation.  Particularly  in relation  to  these historical costs  one 
should ensure that they reflect efficient provision of service.  The total connection 
costs should be shared between the interconnecting operators as the existence of the 
interconnect will by definition benefit both parties, with call traffic passing in both 
directions.  It would seem equitable that the split is negotiated in a manner which 
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reflects the relative volumes of traffic passing in each direction through the point of 
interconnection. 
The charges should be "one-off" reflecting the non traffic sensitive nature of the costs, 
although a mixture of up front payments and periodic fixed rentals may be agreed. 
9. 6.2  Conveyance Charge 
Of the four components of interconnect charges the conveyance costs are likely to 
dominate almost exclusively.  The costs should be calculated for unbundled network 
elements, because to do otherwise would not permit cost orientated charges for the 
reasons explained in 6.5 above.  Conveyance costs cover: 
•  the use of the physical connection between the two networks to permit the 
transfer of calls from one network to another; 
•  the  usage  cost  incurred  where  one  operator  utilises  another  operator's 
interconnected  network  to  handle  a  call  e.g.  the  provision  of  sufficient 
capacity for switching, transmission and other network components; 
•  the  variable  supplementary  and  ancillary  costs,  such  as  call  set  up, 
monitoring and recording network activity, billing etc; 
•  the overhead costs associated with the provision of interconnect services. 
The costs  and therefore the charges will have a  number of elements reflecting  a 
combination of fixed Non Traffic Sensitive (NTS) costs and variable Traffic Sensitive 
(TS)  costs and also distance and non distance sensitive costs.  The costs should be 
separately calculated for each unbundled network element, and should be split into 
those that are NTS and those that are TS. 
9.6.3  Local Access Loss Charge 
The  local  access  loss  arising  from  tariff  imbalances  is  one  component  of  the 
interconnect  regime  which  has  given  rise  to  problems  in  all  jurisdictions  with 
wireline interconnection. 
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There is widespread agreement that for an economically efficient outcome and a less 
problematic interconnect regime the local access loss is best dealt with by removing 
any restrictions upon operators from rebalancing their tariffs provided USO goals are 
met by targeted subsidies  (see  section 9.6.4  below).  Given  the current stage of 
network development and that anticipated  at the  time  of liberahsation  in  each 
Member State, NRAs should consider allowing operators to rebalance their tariffs to 
eliminate the local. access loss. 
It is understandable that with the potential threat that infrastructure competition in 
the local loop from cable TV  companies and wireless based operators may pose, 
many incumbent TOs do not find it attractive to lobby NRAs to lift the restrictions on 
rebalancing.  This  would lead  to  price increases  in markets where  the  threat of 
competition  from  lower  priced  providers  is  becoming  a  real  possibility. 
Understandably  they  seek  to  fund  below  cost  residential  access  prices  through 
shared funding of the local access loss. 
Accordingly,  one  could  suggest  that  the  "book"  cost  of  the  incumbent  TO's 
investments in their local  loops  are stated above their economic  value,  and that 
therefore they should be written down to allow a reasonable return to be made on 
providing access without rebalancing44 45. 
Whilst either rebalancing or the write-down of local loop investments would allow 
cost orientated residential access  prices in the local loop and therefore an efficient 
economic outcome, there is a risk that this will not be achieved in each Member State 
prior to liberahsation.  If  this is the case the incumbent operator will argue that they 
are at a cost disadvantage to new entrants, and will seek to share the local access loss 
with competitors, usually by adding an extra component to the interconnect charge. 
Such  is  the logic  of the UK  Access  Deficit Charge regime and similar principles 
employed in Australia and the USA.  We will examine the cost principles that should 
be followed in calculating these charges between operators designed to  share the 
local access loss. 
Warburg S.G "From Pots to Pans"- The Experience of Real Competition in UK Telecoms. 
March 1994. 
US West and AT&T have both recently made significant write downs of their equipment as a 
result of outdated technology etc  ... Tiris is also true in other privatised and liberalised US 
utility companies. 
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One of the most significant problems is agreeing the size of the local access  loss. 
New entrants perceive a risk that the incumbent operator will claim more costs are 
incurred in the provision of local access  than is  in fact  the case.  It is  therefore 
necessary  for  the  NRA  together  with  the  industry  to  expose  the  incumbents 
calculation and quantification of the local access loss to scrutiny to establish its size. 
Incumbents presumably would be unable to object that this  breaches commercial 
confidentiality if the problem only arises because these are monopoly  assets.  It 
should be calculated on the cost principles established above.  New entrants should 
then contribute in a competitively neutral manner, but a number of principles could 
be followed: 
•  There  should be  only  partial  funding  of  the  local  access  loss.  This  will 
incentivise  the  incumbent  to  improve  efficiency  in  the  provision  of  local 
access. 
•  There should be a fixed contribution for use of the local access network based 
on the principle of cost causality.  Contributions based upon traffic destination 
result  in  higher  contributions  for  long  distance  traffic  which  reduces 
competition  in  the  long  distance  market  and  penalises  certain  subscriber 
groups unfairly. 
•  Unless local access loss charges are to be waived to encourage competitive 
market entry until access  prices are brought into line with costs by either 
rebalancing or asset write downs, they should be introduced immediately. 
Suspending  payments  initially,  as  Oftel  have  done  in  the  UK,  makes 
transition arrangements more difficult particularly after any duopoly period 
and will stifle the development of competition in local access. 
Recovery of local access losses should not be added onto any existing elements of 
interconnect charges as the relevant costs will not vary in proportion to interconnect 
call minutes or capacity.  They would be better rel~gated to a separate item in the 
interconnect agreement, and recovered in a competitively neutral manner, perhaps a 
levy based on usage of the local access network. 
9.6.4  Universal Service Obligation Charge 
As explained in section 7 the most satisfactory result may be achieved if USOs are 
allocated  to  those  organisations  best placed  to  achieve  them  once  voluntary  or 
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competitive applications for  the provision of such services have been taken into 
account  Only if a TO can then demonstrate that the avoidable cost is inequitable 
given its size should the NRA consider the TO's request to share its funding by way 
of a levy on other operators. 
In the rare circumstance that funding is shared the costs should not, however, be 
added onto any existing  .elementaf.interconnect charges  .as. the relevant costs will not 
generally vary in proportion to any dimension of interconnect, be it either capacity or 
call minutes.  Generally they may also be better relegated to a separate item in the 
interconnect agreement in their own right, and therefore become more akin to a USO 
levy on the industry. 
9.7  The Isolation of Inefficiency 
As  noted  in  section  4.4  even  where  the  arbitrariness  of  cost  allocations  and 
attributions are reduced with the rigorou·s employment of cost causal attribution and 
allocation methodologies such as Activity-Based Costing techniques there is still one 
unresolved potential problem with historical cost approaches such as FDC and EDC 
based prices.  They are both historical approaches that attribute cost based upon the 
actual  historical  network engineering capacity  together with  the  actual  business 
processes of the organisation, and therefore the resulting costs reflect historical traffic 
patterns and performance of the organisation. 
If there are inefficiencies reflected in the historical analysis there is a danger these 
will be encouraged to continue.  For example, many of Europe TOs are descended 
from state controlled organisations and at the time of becoming independent their 
employees were given protected employment and pension rights in line with their 
former government employee colleagues.  Now and in the future, this is  likely to 
place a  burden on the TOs  as  more costs  are incurred to  support a  higher than 
optimal employee base,  often at less  than efficient costs.  The same inefficiencies 
result if the TO employs more expensive; outdated technology in its network design. 
A strict application of FDC principles would see these costs allocated to  services, 
including  interconnect  services.  Whilst  the higher  prices  and  charges  resulting 
would be a recovery of legitimate past expenditure they clearly do not promote an 
efficient economic outcome. 
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Through the strict application of Activity-Based Costing such costs should become 
more readily highlighted and benchmarking between European TOs  will greatly 
assist in their identification.  For example, Activity-Based Costing will not therefore 
allocate them to services but they will remain as residual joint costs.  Once identified 
and costed they should be grouped as part of the residual common costs.  As with all 
other residual joint and common costs they will be recovered from the contribution 
each service makes above its EDC.  Ifinterconnect  .. charges. arejni.tially set at below 
FDC, this will provide incentives for the TO together with the NRA to remove these 
inefficiencies, even if it includes amendment to employment contracts, the law, and 
reorganisation costs or the write-off of overvalued network plant as has been seen in 
the USA. 
One  thing  is  clear  however,  until work  is  done  to  highlight  the  costs  of  such 
inefficiencies,  the incentive  to  reduce them will be  negligible.  Sensible network 
planning which has resulted in efficient surplus capacity to ensure the resilience of 
the  network  should  not  be  confused  with  inefficiency.  Only  where  it  is  felt 
appropriate by the NRA should the costs of inefficiencies be shared. 
There are a  number of other potential inefficiencies  that arise  from  an historical 
approach but TOs will be incentivised to reduce them because of the competitive 
entry of other organisations. 
9.8  Consistency and Comparability 
The service costs arising from any FDC or EDC approach will obviously be affected 
by the accounting policies and their detailed application by Community operators. 
The results of the empirical research outlined in section 5 above suggests that despite 
the attempts at harmonisation of accounting policies within the Community, there is 
still  significant  cross-border  difference  between  the  accounting  treatment  and 
practices adopted across the Member States. 
Each of these differences would therefore result in the determination of potentially 
very different service costs from the same original cost data.  Accordingly, if prices 
are cost orientated the selection of accounting policies and practices could influence 
prices dramatically.  This is  relevant because different operators may compete on 
cost  orientated  prices  that  are  very  different  despite  the  same,  or  very  similar 
underlying costs. 
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Just as a Community wide solution to the range of possible outcomes that can result 
from differing cost attribution and allocation bases would be advisable, the same can 
be said of the need to limit variability arising from accounting policy selection and 
application. 
9.9  ... _ Cost Allocation Methodologies 
Cost allocation  methodologies  are  most familiar  in  manufacturing  organisations 
which need to fully allocate or "absorb". the costs of an organisation on a  per unit 
basis  for  stock  valuation  and  financial  reporting.·.  In  a  classical  example  an 
organisation will have a number of direct productive input costs, e.g.  direct labour 
costs, direct material costs as well as joint and common costs, such as indirect labour, 
factory overhead costs etc. 
Early attempts to allocate these overheads to production units sought to allocate the 
joint and common costs on a cost causative basis, and in the example above this may 
have been achieved on the basis of machine hours, direct labour costs, direct labour 
hours  etc.,  depending  upon  what data  was  available  and  which  measure  was 
thought to be the main driver that gave rise to the consumption of these and other 
resources.  This was acceptable at the time and was probably performed to a level of 
detail for which the benefits exceeded the costs of analysis.  This does not mean that 
other, equally justifiable allocations could not have been made, each of which may 
have produced a materially different answer. 
Unfortunately, not until the last 10-20 years has management accounting theory kept 
pace with the changing requirements of the more  sophisticated  production  and 
service provisioning practices of today's organisations. This is  particularly true of 
TOs.  In  manufacturing organisations  the direct costs  of production  might be in 
excess of 80%, requiring less than 20%  of costs to be allocated. In a TO however the 
position is reversed, with frequently less than 20%  of costs being capable of direct 
identification with a  service. The majority of a  TOs costs are joint or common in 
nature, hence the issue of cost attribution and allocation for TOs in developing the 
cost of individual network elements and services is fundamental.  This has started to 
be addressed with the introduction of Activity-Based Costing (ABC).  This requires 
the accountant to better understand the processes that drive costs in an organisation, 
and the activities that "consume" such costs.  This concept is explained more fully in 
section 9.10. 
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Many commentators, think of cost allocation as it relates to the "arbitrary" allocation 
of joint and residual common costs.  However it is worth noting that while the 
majority of costs in a TO are common costs, many of these can be causally attributed 
to different services either directly or indirectly.  Given the extent of these costs and 
the subjectivity that can be exercised in their "causal attribution" it is important to 
understand the range of different attribution or allocation methods that could be 
.employed. 
It is first beneficial to understand the process of calculating the cost of individual 
network elements and services  before examining the methods  of  cost  allocation 
utilised. 
There are two main stages to  this process, the first is the capture of cost data and 
collection into cost pools and the second.  the attribution and allocation of those costs 
into service costs.  The following commentary demonstrates this two stage process of 
getting from cost categories through to service cost statements in an  FDC based 
accounting system. 
A similar process would apply to accounting systems based on other cost standards 
but the source of the cost information may not then be the general ledger, but could 
alternatively be derived from forward looking cost estimates. 
Stage I 
The first  step  in  any  costing  system is  to  capture the cost data.  In  traditional 
financial reporting systems this will be via the general ledger.  Other costing systems 
for financial planning may have other sources.  However regardless of the source, a 
key factor which will influence the ultimate usefulness of the costing information is 
the level of detail at which costs are initially captured.  If  information is collected at a 
very  high  level,  then  the  amount of  cost  which  is  subject  to  direct  or  indirect 
attribution or arbitrary allocation is likely to be significantly higher.  For example, if 
the cost of network maintenance is collected as one amount, then it may be necessary 
to allocate it on some arbitrary basis such as the cost of the plant being maintained. 
However, if maintenance staff are required to complete timesheets detailing where 
their time has been spent, then their payroll cost can be directly allocated to  the 
services or network elements on which their maintenance time was spent. 
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The costs collected in the chart of accounts or general ledger will then be identified as 
either revenue or capital costs.  Revenue costs are those which relate solely to the 
period covered by the cost statement  Capital costs  are  those which pertain  to 
network plant,  other fixed  asset categories and other costs  for  which  the cost  is 
spread over several years.  The cost recorded in the service cost statement will be in 
respect of the depreciation charge.  There are two key judgements with regard to 
... capitalcosts- .First.is..the.j.udgement.of .what.is  .. a.capitalcost.  ...  Organisations differ in 
their capitalisation policy with regard to costs such as research and development, 
software and interest expense on construction.  Second, depreciation is determined 
by the asset's estimated useful economic life.  Since depreciation forms one of the 
largest  items  of  annual  cost,  careful  consideration  should  be  given  to  the 
appropriateness of the depreciation lives used. 
Once  the  revenue  costs  and  depreciation  and  amortisation  charges  have  been 
identified they will be grouped into one of the four cost pools shown: 
GENERAL 
LEDGER 
~----------~- COST~LS  ~------------~ 
SERVICES  NE1WORK 
ELEMENIS 
190 
RELATED 
FUNCTIONS 46 
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Services - This pool contains costs which can be directly identified with a particular 
service, examples of services and directly assignable costs are: 
Service  Direct Cost 
Directory Enquiries  Wages of Directory Enquiries staff 
Mobile Service  Cost of Cell Stations 
International Service  Depreciation of International Gateway Switch 
Network Elements- This pool contains the costs relating to the various components 
of transmission, switching and other network plant and systems. The costs will be in 
respect of network components which cannot be allocated directly to  a  particular 
service as they are utilised in the provision of a number of services. 
Related  Functions  - This  pool contains  the  costs  of functions  necessary  for  the 
provision of service to the customer such as billing, maintenance, customer service. 
Other Functions- This pool contains the costs of functions which are not related to 
the provision of service but are an important part of the operations of the company. 
Such costs include planning, personnel ~d  general finance. 
The cost pools thus created are the starting point for Stage II which allocates the cost 
pools to services. 
Stage II 
General rules for  the process of cost attribution and allocation can be established 
such as those contained in Article 10.2 of the Leased Line Directive46. 
Council of the European Communities.  Council Directive 92/  44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the 
application of open network provision to leased lines.  Official Journal of the European 
Communities No. L165 p27-35. 
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a.  the costs of leased lines shall in particular include the direct costs incurred by 
the  telecommunications  organisations  for  setting  up,  operating  and 
maintaining leased lines, and for marketing and billing of leased lines; 
b.  common costs, that is costs which can neither be directly assigned to leased 
lines nor to other activities, are allocated as follows: 
i.  whenever possible, common cost categories shall be allocated based 
upon direct analysis of the origin of the costs themselves; 
ii.  when direct analysis is not possible, common cost categories shall be 
allocated based upon an indirect linkage to another cost category or 
group of cost categories for which a direct assignment or allocation is 
possible.  The indirect linkage shall be based on  comparable cost 
structures; 
iii.  when neither direct nor indirect measures of cost allocation can be 
found,  the  cost  category  shall be  allocated  based  upon  a  general 
allocator computed by using the ratio of all expenses directly assigned 
or allocated to on the one hand, services which are provided under 
special or exclusive rights and, on the other hand, to other services. 
Whilst these general rules are based on sound principles of causation, transparency 
and consistency of application, they only provide general rules and greater detail is 
required in breaking out the process of attribution and allocation, both to achieve 
greater consistency and potentially great~r precision. 
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Many cost allocation models in other industries attempt ~o move directly from cost 
pools  to  a  service  cost  report.  However,  a  number  of  cost  allocation  models 
developed  by  TOs  use  a  cascade  or  building  block  approach  where  costs  are 
allocated in a  series of steps rather than one.  This is illustrated by the Stage II 
diagram.  At Step 1, Other Function costs are allocated to either Services, Network 
Elements or Related Functions.  At Step 2 the accumulated Related Functions costs 
are  allocated  to  either  Services  or  Network  Elements.  Finally  in  Step  3,  the 
accumulated Network Element costs are allocated to Services to arrive at individual 
Service Costs. 
This  cascade approach to  attributing and allocating costs  means that rather than 
attempting to  assign the cost of maintenance vehicles directly  to  services,  which 
would probably only be possible by some arbitrary means, the cost can be indirectly 
assigned to the costs of network elements maintained (e.g. perhaps in relation to the 
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payroll cost of maintenance engineers that use the vehicles) and then the network 
elements are allocated  to  services.  Each  of the allocation steps illustrated above 
could involve a number of sub-steps.  Where it is possible to perform an allocation 
via  a  number of  direct  or  indirect  attributions  this  is  clearly  preferable  from  a 
precision point of view to allocation through just one arbitrary step. 
There .  is  .. considerable .flexibility  .... in  .. developing  ..  cost  .. attribution  ~.and  ... allocation 
principles.  Having  decided  upon  the  principles  there  is  considerable  further 
flexibility in their detailed application.  Accordingly it is possible to support a wide 
range of cost attributions and allocations, each of which will fall within the bounds of 
acceptable practice, which will clearly enable different conclusions to be drawn with 
regard to the calculation of service costs. 
As a simple example consider a 2M Bit dedicated Broadband circuit carrying both 
voice and data.  If  costs are allocated based on call minutes the voice traffic would be 
allocated  most  of  the  costs.  If instead  costs  are  allocated  on  channel capacity 
utilisation, the data traffic might be allocated substantially all of the costs. 
Appendix 7 contains information extracted from a US  study that demonstrates the 
effects on service cost estimates of changes in attribution and allocation principles 
(e.g.  treatment of spare capacity, peak hour Vs  any time usage, etc.).  Whilst this 
study  provides  estimates  of  incremental costs,  as  opposed  to  fully  allocated  or 
embedded direct costs  it illustrates clearly the potential range of "right"  answers 
depending upon the use to be made of the information. 
More detailed information can also result in improved allocations.  For example the 
total cost of provisioning a local switch 20  years ago may have been  allocated to 
different call types based simply upon the call minutes of each call type passing 
through that switch.  The main reasons for  this is that only an approximate cost 
allocation  was  required  due  to  no  competitive  commercial  threat,  and  more 
importantly  call  minutes  was  information  known  and  collected.  In  today's 
environment it is possible to break down the costs of the switch into a number of 
component costs based upon identified cost drivers. 
A digital local exchange (DLE)  performs the two functions of permitting customer 
access to the network and the handling of different types of calls.  The cost drivers 
for the DLE expenditure are therefore those features responsible for the quantities of 
specific elements of equipment within the exchange, and are 
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•  connection capacity 
•  traffic capacity 
•  call attempt capacity 
The first  stage of the cost attributiqn process could identify the division  of total 
exchange costs between these cost driver factors and the second employs utilisation 
data for the apportionment of costs to services.  This allows a causal attribution of 
costs to access and to call revenues. 
Just as this more fundamental approach can be adopted with plant related costs so 
can it be applied to "overhead" costs.  A more thorough understanding of the cost 
drivers connected with overhead costs and the activities exhausting these costs will 
lead to a more appropriate cost attribution. 
The complexity  of the  process  described  above  however  should  not be  under-
estimated.  Whilst greater detail and analysis is likely to give more 'accurate' results 
the  effort  required  to  produce it will  be  significant.  The  process  will  require 
agreement on the detail of the cost allocation methodology - i.e.  agreeing at what 
level costs are to be captured, how frequently etc., determining cost drivers and line 
by  line  cost  allocations.  This  will require  detailed  collection  of costs,  possibly 
requiring new procedures and reporting mechanisms for capturing data at a more 
detailed  level  - for  example  requiring  new  groups  of  employees  to  complete 
timesheets.  TOs may need to perform engineering and other operational reports or 
studies to provide data on which to base cost attributions.  Most importantly, there 
must be agreement on the unbundled services that require costing. 
This  process  clearly  generates  a  large  database  of  information  and  significant 
processing requirements.  If the system implemented to handle this process is to be 
valuable to  a  TO as it enters the competitive arena it will need to be  capable of 
adapting to new and potentially more complex demands, for instance rather than 
just measuring the profitability of a service TOs may wish to assess the profitability 
of particular customer groups or geographical regions. 
The problem for  the organisation and for  the regulator is to decide whether the 
environment warrants this more detailed understanding of the organisation's cost 
base.  In a competitive market it will be .a necessity, but it will occur only when the 
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competitive market drives it  For the liberalising monopolists the question of when 
to invest in this greater understanding is not so easily answered. 
Given  the  broad  range  of  acceptable  apportionment  and  allocation  methods 
achievable within the general rules, and acknowledging the potentially disparate 
views  and  agendas  of the  different  TOs  emerging in  a  liberalised  market  it  is 
_ .inappropriate. for  NRAs  .. to .leave_ the_.choice_.af...methoaology  to. the  dominant 
operator.  NRAs  should  be  actively  involved  in  the  process  of  defining  and 
documenting the detailed costing methodologies.  Given their level of resources it is 
likely that this will be facilitated by wide industry debate on the identification of the 
relevant costs, the cost drivers and the attribution and allocation methodologies that 
should result from  causality  driven  Activity-Based  Costing.  This  is  the  process 
currently being followed by Oftel in the UK and has received widespread industry 
support.  As such, we have provided an introduction to the concept of Activity-
Based Costing and the principal steps required to set up an ABC process in section 
9.10below. 
It is likely that this will be the only practical way to proceed, as simultaneously the 
industry will need to be involved in setting the list of interconnect services operators 
wish to purchase.  If this process is not followed at a Community level a significant 
opportunity to avoid delays may well be lost.  If  the experience of the UK is repeated 
fully in each Member State the process of liberalisation will be obfuscated. 
In  this way it should be possible to  achieve a  situation where there are publicly 
available interconnect charges where interconnecting operators can understand the 
costs underlying the charges and the relationship between cost and charges.  It is this 
level of transparency that is required for potential new entrants to make efficient 
business planning decisions. 
9.10  Activity-Based Costing (ABC) 
ABC is a philosophy that provides a more accurate picture of the cost of producing, 
marketing, and delivering products or services to identified market segments.  It 
differs  from  traditional  costing  approaches  in  that  it  focuses  primarily  on  the 
underlying activities required to produce products and services, rather than on the 
products  and  services  themselves.  While  traditional  costing  approaches  work 
reasonably well in meeting financial reporting requirements, they are generally not 
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capable of meeting (nor were they designed to  meet)  management's information 
needs for operating and strategic decisions. 
ABC attributes costs to products and services based on an analysis of the causes of 
those costs (the so-called cost drivers).  It accomplishes this by tracing and allocating 
costs through the activities performed to the products and services produced.  In so 
doing,  it  establishes  .a  __ clear  ..  cause-.ancl-effect .. relationship  between  activities 
performed,  their  associated costs,  and the resulting output from those  activities. 
Furthermore, since ABC  is not constrained by artificial functional or organisation 
boundaries,  it accounts  for  all relevant costs associated with a  business  process, 
product or service regardless of where the activity which supports this  business 
process, product or service is located within the organisation.  As such, it improves 
the manager's understanding of the true cost of providing products and services to 
customers,  which  activities  consume  resources,  and  why  costs  are  incurred. 
Activity-based management can then help to better manage, control, and understand 
the costs incurred in the conduct of activities and the underlying cost drivers. 
The Decision Framework 
Effective implementation of ABC requires a clear understanding of the products and 
services which are offered to customers in various market segments and the business 
processes and related activities which are required to provide those products and 
services.  Once the business is  understood in these terms,  the key  to  successful 
application of ABC is to develop an adequate decision framework.  This framework 
must be guided by the answers to the following questions: 
•  What kinds of decisions must the users make? 
•  What decision rules or decision tools are needed to make them? 
•  What  kind  of  cost  and  other  information  is  needed  to  support  those 
decisions? 
With such a framework guiding the effort, decisions can be made regarding whether 
to consider an ABC-type approach, what kind of ABC system to adopt, the level of 
activity detail to employ, and the kinds of cost information to track. 
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The Steps of the ABC Process 
The step-by-step approach to ABC is  relatively straightforward once the decision 
framework has been developed. The essential steps are as follows: 
1.  Identify the products and services of the company or business unit 
2.  Perform activity analysis to define the set of activities required to produce, 
market, and deliver the product or service. 
3.  Identify the cost drivers which determine the level of costs incurred for the 
level of activities performed. 
4.  Trace direct costs and allocate indirect costs to the activities performed based 
on the consumption of these cost drivers. 
5.  Link  activities  performed  to  products  and  services  produced  and  trace 
resources consumed and associated costs through activities to products and 
services. 
6.  Manage and control the business  process  activities  which are required  to 
produce the products and services. 
Step 1  involves defining the products and services produced by the company or 
business unit.  Although the task appears straightforward, an understanding of the 
actual products and services  produced and delivered to  customers is  sometimes 
missed in practice, particularly when thinking is limited to organisational functions 
and budgets. 
Step 2  defines  the set of  activities  required  to  produce the products or services 
defined in Step 1.  In Step 2,  activity analysis is used to define these linkages.  Since 
the set of activities often crosses functional lines, this is a critical step which yields 
important insights into the flow of resources. 
Step 3 identifies the determinants of cost, that is, the cost drivers.  Whereas activity 
analysis  helps  explain  what  activities·  are  performed  and  what  resources  are 
consumed,  cost  drivers  explain  why  costs  are  incurred.  They  are  the  critical 
ingredient in the development of activity-based cost allocations. 
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In Step 4,  costs  are  attributed to  activities  based upon  their relationship  to  the 
relevant  cost  drivers.  This  provides  the  mechanism  by  which  business  unit 
managers  can  understand  and  thereby  control  their  costs  and  manage  the 
performance of the activities. 
In steps 5 and 6, the link is made between activities and products and, based on this 
link,  the  activities  and  their . underlying  cost  drivers  are  closely  managed  and 
controlled. 
The result of applying the ABC approach is the ability to answer critical questions 
related  to  the  costing  of  processes  and  activities  and  associated  products  and 
services. 
In Member State TOs direct costs have declined as a fraction of the total costs while 
indirect costs and overheads have increased.  The treatment of indirect and overhead 
costs remains a large issue in the telecommunications industry.  ABC can help in this 
regard  and  assist  telecommunications  managers  to  understand  the  true  cost  of 
performing activities and providing products and services so that informed decisions 
can be made regarding which products and services to produce, and how best to 
produce  them.  A  more  rigorous  costing  will  also  facilitate  a  more  informed 
interconnect charging decision. 
9.11  Conclusions and Recommendations 
In view of the challenging and complex issues involved in liberalisation across  a 
diverse Community, the purpose of this study was to highlight the key issues and 
provide  some  broad  guidelines  and  principles  to  form  the  basis  for  future 
development and progress.  The views expressed in this report are clearly our own, 
and are based upon the interviews  that we have performed with operators  and 
regulators  throughout  Europe  and  the  secondary  research  of  the  considerable 
literature which has been published on this subject. 
There is currently a unique opportunity for the European Commission to ensure a 
harmonised approach to the cost accounting methods used in the establishment of 
costs on which to base interconnect charges.  This will ensure that consistent and 
efficient  charges  are  developed  across  the  Community.  With  the  onset  of 
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competition in voice telephony in most European countries timetabled for 1998, this 
process will be increasingly difficult to implement if delayed. 
Any  guidance  that  the  Commission  develops  on  this  subject  should  take  into 
consideration the business requirements of the Telecommunications Operators (TOs) 
themselves, and as such should be practical, implementable and congruent with the 
business practices of these operatois  ... The  .Commissions~  .goal should be to develop a 
general framework for  interconnect;  establishing  the broad principles  which will 
form the basis for future development and progress, and hence enable a harmonised 
approach to interconnect. 
Existing Cost Accounting Practices and Cost Allocation Methods of Community Operators 
The cost accounting practices and cost allocation methods of Community operators 
generally meet the information needs of current users.  However, the competitive 
market place will require the development of more rigorous  approaches  to  cost 
accounting in many Member State TOs.  Early development should be encouraged. 
In addition, the importance of a  comprehensive and harmonised cost accounting 
approach to interconnect in the EU has been recognised. 
To date, with few exceptions National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) have generally 
not been required to have a  detailed understanding of the cost accounting issues 
associated with interconnect.  However, with the onset of a liberalised market NRAs 
will need to develop a more detailed understanding of costing issues to be able to 
provide effective  regulatory  oversight in  developing cost  orientated  interconnect 
charges, and cost orientated tariffs. 
Formulation of  Interconnect Charges 
The diversity of interconnect regimes around the world indicates that a number of 
factors influence the formulation and establishment of interconnect regimes.  As such 
the Commission should suggest broa~ principles for interconnect to be agreed at an 
EU level.  The responsibility for implementation should rest with the Member States. 
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The principles which we recommend the Commission endorse are as follows:-
•  Interconnect Charges should be based on the underlying costs of an efficient 
operation,  and  in  all  cases  contain  two  elements  attributable  to  the 
interconnect services provided. These are: 
The Connection Charge. 
The Conveyance Charge. 
•  Separate charges  within each element should be developed  to  reflect  the 
traffic  sensitive  and non  traffic  sensitive costs  and  the  distance  and  non 
distance related costs. 
•  Further Charge elements resulting from obligations and/  or tariff constraints 
imposed by regulatory authorities do not relate directly to interconnect.  As 
such  they  should be  recovered  separately  from  the  costs  of interconnect 
services, or, at a minimum as a separate part of the interconnect agreement. 
This incorporates the following elements: 
The Tariff Imbalance or Local Access Loss Charge. 
The Universal Service Obligation Charge. 
Consideration of these elements are given in separate sections below. 
•  Interconnect Charges should be set to  facilitate  competition.  In order to 
achieve this  objective,  NRAs in each Member State should ensure that the 
interconnect process is  transparent giving rise to charges which are efficient 
and sustainable.  Accounting separation under the review of the NRA is one 
way transparency may be achieved.  In addition, NRAs should ensure that 
agreements  are  not  unduly  discriminatory  and  that  confidence  in  the 
agreements is promoted through the availability of sufficient information. 
•  Interconnect charges should be based upon the cost of unbundled network 
elements.  NRAs should liaise with TOs and potential operators to develop a 
list of the unbundled network elements which interconnecting operators wish 
to purchase.  A co-ordinated European approach would be an efficient means 
by which  this  process  could be  achieved  and would  ensure cross-border 
consistency. 
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The Local Access Loss 
The local access loss arises out of service cost and tariff imbalances.  We believe that 
the local access loss should be eradicated, where justifiable, by ensuring that any 
constraints on the rebalancing of tariffs are removed. 
We recommend that the Commission should: 
•  Encourage Member States to remove all barriers to tariff rebalancing.  The 
speed  of  rebalancing  and  safeguards  for  vulnerable  consumer  groups 
should be determined by the NRA to take account of the national situation. 
•  Until such time as the service tariffs are rebalanced, consideration may be 
given by the NRA to sharing these "losses" amongst competing TOs.  Such 
costs of the local access loss should be recovered over the use of the local 
access network in a competitively neutral manner. 
•  Recovery  of the local  access  loss  should  only  be partial,  to  encourage 
efficiency in the incumbent operator.  Local access loss charge waivers may 
be considered by NRAs to encourage competitive market entry Wltil full 
rebalancing  has  occurred,  but  such  initial  waivers,  if of  only  limited 
duration, make transition arrangements more difficult and will stifle  the 
development of competition in the local access market 
The Universal Service Obligation 
The  definition  of  the  Universal  Service  Obligation  (USO)  evolves  with  the 
development of a country's telecommunications infrastructure.  Such evolution will 
continue in the competitive market.  We believe that competition will not endanger 
the provision of universal service, but that, with regulatory oversight to ensure price 
rebalancing is  carried  out at a  reasonable rate ~  vulnerable subscriber groups 
receive targeted support, competition will improve the provision of universal service 
by:-
improving efficiency and reducing prices 
fostering innovation 
generating market growth 
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creating increased  revenue with which  to  fund  genuine universal service 
obligation costs 
encouraging operators to compete for the provision of social services 
We recommend that 
•  The  NRAs  in  each  Member. State should be  responsible  for  defining  and 
identifying  universal  service  obligation  services  and  costing  the  universal 
service obligation. 
•  The following principles for sharing the provision and/  or funding of universal 
service obligations should be used by the Member States: 
the cost of universal service obligations  should be calculated  on an 
avoidable cost basis and incorporate the net current annual cost for all 
lines which, prior to connection, the TO would choose, or have chosen, 
not to connect. 
the provision of universal service and/  or the funding of the cost of 
universal service obligations should be encouraged to conform to  the 
following framework: 
i.  TOs  should  be  encouraged  to  provide  "USO"  services  on  a 
voluntary basis. 
ii.  Unfulfilled obligations should be offered for competitive tender 
byTOs. 
iii.  Residual  obligatio~s should be imposed by  the  NRAs  upon 
those TOs best placed to meet them. 
iv.  Where  an  operator  believes  the  unilateral  imposition  of 
universal  service  obligations  upon  it  is  unfair  because  the 
avoidable cost is incompatible with its status and competition 
policy objectives it could appeal to the NRA for shared funding. 
v.  After the NRA has vetted the avoidable cost calculated by the 
TOs they may agree to shared funding of the cost. 
vi.  Shared funding of universal service obligation costs should be 
by way of a  levy on the industry in a  competitively neutral 
manner and not included as part of the interconnect charge. 
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Promoting Efficiency 
The most effective  mechanism  for  improving efficiency  is  through  liberahsation 
which will: 
encourage use of best practices and apply downward pressure to costs 
bring about rebalancing and hence improve allocative efficiency 
For  interconnect  no  one  charging  method  will  provide  the  ideal  solution  for 
promoting efficiency.  Low charges may encourage efficiency of the incumbent but 
may also lead to inefficient market entry. 
The promotion of efficiency,  incorporating the principles agreed at a  Community 
level, should be conducted by the NRAs who are best able to tailor the interconnect 
charge regime to the national situation. 
In this respect we recommend the following principles: 
•  Interconnect charges should be set so as to facilitate competition which will 
then encourage efficiency. 
•  Where Incremental Cost concepts are used in interconnect pricing, charges 
should be set above the incremental cost to ensure a  contribution to  the 
residual joint and common costs of the interconnected operator. 
•  Where  Fully  Distributed  Costing  is  used  to  set  interconnect  charges, 
downward  pressure  should  be  exerted  on  the  interconnect  charge  to 
encourage TO efficiency.  For example, through the application of a price-
cap. 
•  Interconnect charges should be based upon the cost of unbundled network 
elements. 
•  The structural advantages enjoyed by the incumbent should be  offset by 
abatement  of  interconnect charges.  Abatements  may  then  be  reduced 
through time to reflect the increasing symmetry between the new entrant 
and the incumbent. 
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Our recommended principles continued  ..... 
•  The industry needs to investigate the practicality of implementing charges 
based on capacity. 
•  New entrants should then be. offered the choice of either a capacity or a 
per-call minute cost related interconnect charge. 
Cost Accounting Practices 
There is  currently a  diversity of cost accounting practices across the Community 
which need to be harmonised for equity in interconnect 
Investment in more detailed and more rigorous cost allocation and attribution 
methodologies will arise through competition in time. 
The Commission should take this opportunity to harmonise accounting policies and 
practices  as  far  as  is  practicable.  A  framework  for  such harmonisation  should 
incorporate  the  factors  listed  below.  This  is  not intended  to  be  a  complete  or 
definitive list,  and indeed excludes elements previously directed  for  Community 
action elsewhere in our conclusions. 
We recommend that: 
•  European TOs should be encouraged to adopt a uniform approach to cost 
attribution and allocation  methods,  and accounting principles to  ensure 
cross-border consistency in cost measurement. 
•  Cost allocation and attribution methods employed by TOs should be based 
on cost causal principles.  Such principles may require joint and common 
costs to  be  attributed and allocated  in  a  more cost causal manner than 
currently  employed.  Such  increases  in  the  levels  of  attribution  and 
allocation  should be encouraged so long as  the benefits  of greater cost 
causality are not outweighed by excessive expense. 
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Our recommendations continued  .... 
•  Activity-Based Costing principles should be encouraged for use by TOs as 
a method for understanding the underlying costs and cost drivers where 
Fully Distributed Cost or Embedded Direct Cost standards are used.  The 
industry should agree the cost drivers and cost allocation and attribution 
methodologies to be applied. 
•  TOs  should  be  encouraged  to  develop  long  run  incremental  cost 
information for pricing decisions. 
•  Until such time as long run incremental costs are practicable, interconnect 
charges  should  be  based  on  Embedded  Direct  Cost  plus  a  margin  to 
contribute to the joint and common costs of the interconnected operator. 
•  The  size  of  the  margin  above  the  Embedded  Direct  Cost  should  be 
determined by negotiation between the parties to interconnect.  Only when 
there is a dispute should the Member State NRA become involved. 
•  A  process  for  eliminating inefficiencies  should be  agreed  between  the 
NRAs and incumbent operators.  The costs of inefficiencies in incumbent 
operators  should  be  calculated  where  a  Fully  Distributed  Cost  or 
Embedded Direct Cost approach is used for interconnect charges.  Such 
calculations should either be scrutinised by the NRAs or carried out by 
them.  The  cost  of  such  inefficiencies  should  not  be  passed  on  to 
interconnecting operators in the interconnect charge and should only be 
shared where this is felt appropriate by the NRA 
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APPENDIXl 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN ARTHUR ANDERSEN QUESTIONNAIRE 
Activity Based Costing (ABC) 
A process whereby costs are allocated based on the demand each product and/  or service 
makes on all  the company resources.  Specific  cost allocation  is based upon studies of 
organisational cost drivers and activities. 
Access charge 
See interconnect charge below.  The term "access charge" has at least two meanings (the usage 
implied in the interconnect  charge  definition below and the narrow meaning of the local 
access charge).  This term has therefore been replaced with "interconnect charge" for clarity 
of meaning. 
Access Deficit Charge 
In the UK,  BT seeks to make an Access Deficit Charge (ADC) to interconnecting operators. 
Where it is not waived the ADC is included as a component of the total interconnect charge. 
The ADC seeks to recover a share of the total local access  loss,  including an element (to date 
unquantified) relating to the universal service obligation. 
Capacity based charging 
An emergent system for interconnect charging where the purchaser rents "capacity" (e.g. 
switching or transmission capacity in discrete units)  from an established operator.  The 
purchaser  pays  a  fixed  price for  access  to  the network regardless  of the  actual  traffic 
utilisation, (up to  a maximum of the capacity rented).  There may be a separate variable 
charge for call set up, signalling etc.  This contrasts with "cost per unit" charging where a 
user pays for actual calls conveyed, often on a "minute of use" basis. 
Capacity Cost Approach (CCA) 
An approach used in incremental costing to account for the costs of fixed assets expansion in 
discounted cash flow terms.  The change in present value of projected capital expenditure as 
a consequence of fixed assets expansion is spread across the consequent additional capacity 
of the fixed assets (not across the units of capacity in use); thus the present value per unit of 
incremental  capacity  associated  with  the  advancement  or  postponement of investment 
expenditure is derived. 
Cost categories 
Specific classes of costs differentiated according to their relationship with changes in output. 
Examples include fixed, variable, common and sunk. 
Cost items 
These are specific  costs incurred by the firm and classified by management.  Examples 
include, administrative expenses, maintenance, finance etc. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XID 
Cost orientation 
This term is usually used in the context that tariffs and interconnect charges should be cost 
orientated.  Cost orientation implies  a  relationship with underlying cost of service  but 
without specifying what that relationship is. 
Cost of  service/service costs 
The cost of providing a particular service, or family of services, to customers determined 
using an appropriate cost standard.  The cost is distinguished from interconnect charges made 
to other operators for use of the network, and from retail tariffs  to end users, both of which  -
determine the revenue of the firm. 
Cost standard 
In EC legislation this term is synonymous with cost accounting system.  For the purposes of 
this questionnaire, however, a cost standard is the principle by which the pool of costs are 
allocated to individual services to determine service costs as a basis for financial reporting, or 
regulatory or commercial decision making.  Examples include fully distributed costing (FDC), 
marginal costing (MC) and long run incremental costing (LRIC). 
Custom calling features 
Value added voice services, e.g. call waiting, call  forward, conference calling, etc. 
Efficient Component Pricing (ECP) 
A pricing proposal developed by Baumel and Willig which sets the interconnect charge as the 
incremental cost of production plus the opportunity costs (OC) associated with providing the 
service to competitors.  OCs may be calculated by reference to: 
•  resources used in acquiring an asset 
•  alternative asset uses 
•  unavailable capacity or revenue foregone. 
(Some commentators argue that this has recently been implemented to account for access 
deficits in the UK and New Zealand Telecommunications industries) 
Embedded direct costs 
A cost standard which attributes the historical costs of the existing network and organisation  " 
to individual services in a  'contribution' based analysis calculating the direct costs of that 
service.  This is made possible by establishing a causal linkage between individual historical 
costs and the provision of a  service.  Joint  and. common  costs  are not allocated to services; 
rather they form part of the pool of costs which need to be recovered from tariffs along with 
the direct costs of service. 
Engineering cost study 
A cost study prepared using forward looking costs and an engineering approach to network 
expansion and modernisation. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
Fully Distributed Costing (FDCYFully Allocated Costs (FAC) 
A cost standard which allocates all of an organisation's costs to services.  Fully allocated costs 
generally include the costs directly attributable to the service, plus a share of indirect costs 
and general overheads.  The rules  for  determining the shares of the indirect costs  and 
overheads are usually causally related but no entirely non-arbitrary set of rules exist. 
Incr~talCosnng 
A cost standard which measures the change in the total costs of the firm that arises from an 
increase or decrease in output by a  discrete increment.  In the particular case where the 
increment under consideration is a single unit, incremental costs and marginal  costs  will be 
the same.  In the "short run", this is limited by the existing fixed assets capacity. 
Long run incremental costing (LRIQ incorporates the capital costs associated with changes 
in fixed assets capacity, often using a Capacity Cost Approach. 
Incumbent 
This is the TO,  or combination of regionally and functionally divided TOs, which evolved 
out  of  the  historic  state-owned  organisation(s)  holding  the  dominant  position  in 
telecommunications markets. 
Interconnection 
This is the term often used where one network operator (or service provider) connects its 
net\vork, or equipment, to a second operators' network, to allow transfer of traffic between 
net\vorks.  The  terms  of  interconnection  would  be  expected  to  be  covered  by  an 
"interconnect  agreement"  which  sets  out  the  commercial  and  technical  terms  of 
interconnection.  Similar arrangements would be necessary to cover interconnection between 
a service provider and a TO. 
Interconnect charge 
This is the charge that one operator makes to another network operator for the conveyance 
of  traffic  over  the  first  operator's  network.  Any  such  interconnect  charge  for  the 
interconnection of two operators' networks should be considered to have two components: 
•  An initial connection charge- reflecting the up-front cost of physical connection of 
one network to another and any consequent costs arising. 
•  A conveyance charge- reflecting the transmission cost of traffic conveyed through 
one operators' network on behalf of another. 
Two further charge elements, which do not relate directly to interconnect, are oft~n 
incorporated into interconnect agreements: 
•  A tariff imbalance charge - to recover the subsidies of profit making services to loss 
making services where such profits and losses arise out of cost and tariff imbalances. 
Without this charge element competitors would select "overpriced" services without 
contributing to the "underpriced" services. 
•  A charge for the USO and social obligations required of the TO. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
]  oint and common costs 
The strict economic definition for joint cost is where the incurrance of cost on a productive 
input by necessity produces more than one good or service (eg.  the cost of producing 
mutton  and wool).  The  economic  definition  for  common  cost  is  where  the  cost  of  a 
productive input is  used  to  produce several  different outputs but possibly  in  different 
proportions (e.g.  the cost of purchasing a  piece of land which can be used for  growing 
various crops or grazing animals) 
The definitions for joint and common costs as applied generally to telecommunications are 
more liberal than the true economic definitions.  Joint costs arise where the incurrance of 
cost on a productive input is shared between a family of services (e.g. the cost of investment 
in a switching system).  Common costs arise, where the cost of a productive input is shared 
across all services of the firm (e.g. executive salaries, fixed licence costs). 
Liberalisation 
The process by which the telecommunications industry is opened to competition. 
Local access loss 
In most countries, the costs attributed to the provision and maintenance of the local loop 
exceed the revenues earned from tariffs charged for local retail access.  Conventionally, the 
revenues considered in this calculation include only the initial connection and line rental 
charges; they exclude revenues earned from calls conveyed.  In this study, part of this loss 
relates to and can be included as part of the cost of universal service. 
The local access loss arises for four reasons: 
•  inefficiencies 
•  tariff imbalances 
•  losses incurred by operators to serve uneconomic customers (because of the USO) 
•  losses incurred by operators to serve customers which they would serve without a 
USO  because  they  are  profitable  once incoming and  outgoing call  revenues  are 
included. 
Marginal Costing (MC) 
A cost standard which measures the cost of producing one more unit of output or the cost 
saved by producing one less unit of output holding constant the production levels of all 
other products and services of the firm. 
Modem Equivalent Asset Value (MEA V) 
A  current costing methodology where values take account not only of general inflation but 
also  specific  price changes, e.g.  rising fuel costs and the impact of technical progress in 
reducing real costs.  The value is what it would be worth paying to bring replacement assets 
into use now in the normal course of business, taking account of practical constraints, e.g. 
on the rate at which the latest equipment could be introduced. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
The regulatory body responsible for controlling telecommunication regulation in a country. 
Opportunity Cost 
The cost when producing a product or service of contributions foregone from alternative 
applications of the resources applied to that production. 
Penetration 
This term has two commonly used definitions.  The meaning applied in this questionnaire is 
the total number of residential and business lines per head of population.  The alternative 
definition, not implied here, is that of household penetration the number of residential lines 
per household. 
Rebalancing 
The process by which some prices may rise relative to the average while others fall relative 
to  the average so that all prices  relate  more closely  to  their respective costs  of service. 
Rebalancing  is  normally  accomplished  within  an  overall  constraint  on  the  average 
movement of prices but may also occur when the overall price level is changed. 
Retail tariff 
The tariff charged to the subscriber for access to a telecommunications network.  Normally it 
will consist of an initial connection charge and a recurrent (for example monthly) line rental 
charge (together forming the retail access charge) plus call charges based upon minutes of 
use, time of day and call distance. 
Service element 
See 'unbundling'.  In this questionnaire the term "service element" describes each individual, 
separately  defined,  service  feature  offered  to  an  interconnecting  TO,  either  available 
separately or as part of a bundled seroice offering. 
Service offering 
A  separately  tariffed  and  separately  available  telecommunications  service  which  may 
comprise one or more seroice elements. 
Settlement rates 
"International settlement rates" describe the payment made by one operator to another for 
the termination  of an international telephone call,  usually expressed as  an  amount per 
minute.  Similar  terminology  could  be  adopted  to  describe  the  payment  for  delivery 
between domestic operators. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
Social obligations 
Obligations imposed upon the TO to provide such services as public telephones, provision 
of special equipment for disabled people, emergency service numbers, etc., that would not 
be provided under strictly commercial circumstances. 
Stand alone cost 
A  cost  standard which measures the cost of supplying a product or providing a service in 
isolation from the rest of the business. 
Sunk costs 
These are costs which an organisation is either committed to paying or has paid. 
Switched telephone network 
The ordinary telephone network (sometimes called the Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN)). The main elements are exchange lines, switches and inter-switch links. 
Telecommunications revenues 
In  this  study the  magnitude of telecommunications  revenues  relates  to  revenues  from 
network operations and value added services; turnover of retail equipment suppliers, etc. is 
excluded. 
Telecommunications Operator (TO) 
A  provider  of  licensed  telecommunications  services  (e.g.  voice  telephony,  payphones, 
mobile, paging etc.). 
Unbundling 
Interconnecting operators want access  to  particular parts of the network and want to  be 
charged only for  the network components which they use.  Typically,  the dominant TO 
wants to presume symmetry between it's wholesale and retail tariffs and prefers to mirror its 
retail tariff structure in its interconnection charges.  Competitive forces in the USA and the UK 
have led to pressure to  "unbundle" the interconnect service offering into individual service 
elements  demanded; (e.g.  separate charges for  local,  junction or trunk switching or local, 
junction or long-distance transmission). 
"Unbundling" is the process of disaggregation of network charges into separate charges to 
individual service elements. 
Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
The Council resolution of 7 December 1993 on the development of universal service in the 
telecommunications  sector,  defined  a  Universal  Service  Obligation  as  an  obligation  to 
provide a defined minimum service to all users at an affordable price.  By  definition, this 
would provide an obligation on the TO to provide voice telephony services at a "loss"  or 
under conditions falling outside normal commercial conditions to some subscribers. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
APPENDIX2 
COUNTRY BACKGROUNDS 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XID 
Background: 
Population ('COOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Subscribers {1994 ales} 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines 
Penetration (AA Questionnaire 1994) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati  sed 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD, 1993) 
Turnover £UKm (1 994 ales) 
Ownership 
Employee numbers- thousands (1994 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Name 
Turnover 
Ownership 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
Subscribers (1994 ales) 
Date commenced operation 
Name 
Ownership 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD, 1993) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Laws 
domestic 
international 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
UNITED KINGDOM 
57660 
94,475 
610 
26,640,000 exchange-line connections 
23598 
25595 
50 lines per 100 inhabitants 
British Telecom 
1969 (split from post in 1981 ) 
1984 
23364 
13675 
1% government 99% private 
156 
Mercury Communications Ltd 
£1.2 bn 
Kingston Communications Ltd 
C&W - 80%, Bell Canada - 20%  Private 
128,000 lines 
Licenced in 82 - expanded in '84  historic regional company 
400,000 public tel' customers  375k population capture 
Cell net 
60% - British Telecom 
40% - Securicor 
Licenced in  1985 
1  019000 subscribers 
1985 
Orange (PCN) 
Hutchinson Microtel 
1994 
Yes 
Yes 
Interconnection at both ends 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Vodafone 
No major shareholders 
licenced in 1985 
1,174,000 subscribers 
1985 
Mercury one-2-one (PCN) 
50%- Mercury (C & W) 
50% - US West 
1993 
Department of Trade and Industry, Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel) 
independent 
Telecommunications Act 1984 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities" DG XIn 
Background: 
Population ('COOs,  1992) 
Area - square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Ssubscribers- thousands (1993 ales) 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Access lines (T  eleDanmark, 1994) 
Penetration (93 ales) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised  (OECD, 1993} 
Privatised  {OECD, 1993} 
Turnover -'90 US$m  (OECO,  1993) 
Turnover OKm,  1993 (a/cs} 
Ownership 
Employee numbers- thousands {1993 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Turnover 
Ownership 
Subscribers 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD,  1993} 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Laws 
Forms of Regulation 
Interconnection: 
Right to interconnect? 
domestic 
internatinal 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
Laws governing interconnection 
DENMARK 
5210 
16,625 
313 
3060 
2379 
3060 
58.7 subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
Tele Oanmark A/S- formed in 1991  by combining the regional 
companies Ktas, JT, FT & TS) and the international operator 
(Telecom A/S) 
90 
92 
2356 
16293 
94% Government owned (listed corporate body) 
due to be 51% owned shortly 
16.845 
None- Tele Danmark has an exclusive licence until1-3-97 
Tele Danmark Mobil A/S 
1300 DKm- 1993 
T  ele Oanmark 
323,000 subscribers (93 ales) 
1992 
No voice telephony licence 
Leased lines available 
Interconnection at both ends 
Yes 
DMT Oansk Mobil Telefon liS 
"SONOFON" 
Not available 
GN Store Nord - 51% 
Nordic PCN AB - 20% 
Bellsouth Corporation - 29% 
30,000 subscibers- 1993 
1992 
Yes- but only as VAS (Value added Service) 
No 
National Telecom Agency (Telestyrelsen) 
under the P&  T General Directorate of the Minister for Comm' 
Part of Government Department - Ministry of Communications 
Telecommunications Act 1897- amended in '90,'92,'94 
mostly deals with empowerment rather than strict rules 
Licencing and sundry accounting and financial requirements 
Mobile only until 1997 
Regulation of Telecommunications Act- "Bekentgorelse 
af lov visse fol't1old pa telekommunikationsomredef' 
covers licencing and conditions for licencing Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG x:m 
Interconnect charging 
PTO cost accounting system 
Other 
DENMARK 
interconnect agreement was approved by the Minister of 
Communications.  The agreement is not publically available 
Fully Distributed Costing 
Cost based tariff structure achieved early through 
regionalised origins (WIK '94) 
Lowest call charges in Europe 
90% of residential phones have sophisticated terminal features. 
Tariffs reflect costs - no rebalancing necessary 
From 1-1-95 a price cap of RPI-x% for domestic international 
and leased lines telephony 
About to issue 37m 8 shares 
• • 
Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XID 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Country Turnover- 1990 US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines - 1991  (ITU, 1992) 
Penetration (AA Questionnaire, 1994) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati  sed 
Turnover - OECD - '90 US$m 
Ownership 
Employee numbers -thousands, '90 (OECD, '93) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
Subscribers 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD,  1993) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Interconnection: 
Rtght to interconnect? 
domestic 
international 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
Laws governing interconnection 
FRANCE 
57460 
209,970 
274 
20592 
29100 
54 lines per 100 inhabitants 
France Telecom 
1990 
No 
18913 
Government administrative entity 
156.6 
None - no competition allowed yet 
Monopoly given to FT on infrastructure provision, voice 
telephony and telex 
However, 97 small "independenf' networks are connected to 
the public network (1994) 
Radiocom 2000 (93 - GSM) 
France Telecom 
300,000 (approx.- 1993) 
1983 
SFR (ana+ GSM from 93) Societe 
Francaise de Radiotelephonie 
45.3%- Generale des Eaux 
Vodafone & Bellsouth 
100,000 (approx.- 1994) 
1987 
A third mobile licence has recently been awarded 
No 
InDependent networks authorised for closed user groups 
Bearer services on  leased lines or cable TV networks 
- Transpac: Sprint International: BT France:  CGE 
Interconnection at both ends 
Yes 
Yes- but only as Value added Service 
Yes - but only as Value added Service 
Direction Generale des Pastes et Telecommunications (formerly 
DRG- Direction de Ia Reglementation Generate) under Ministry 
of Industry, Post, Telecommunication & foreign trade 
Directorate of the government ministry 
Between licenced mobile networks and public network 
Between independent networks and the public network (restricted) 
Law no 90-117 of 30/12/90 
"Defining the new regulatory framework of the French 
telecommunication policy" Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
Interconnect charging 
Universal Service/Social Obligations: 
PTO cost accounting system 
FRANCE 
SFR- equivalent to large customer - higher subscription 
and lower usage price (no payment from FT to SFR) 
GSM interconnect unpublished, but commercially agreed 
and subsequently vetted by the regulator 
Here includes:contributions to research and education 
leased lines for public safety agencies, vouchers to MPs, 
non payment by ministries, holding public stocks, etc 
Fully Distributed Costing Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles {Times Atlas) 
Density {population per sq mile) 
Subscribers (1992 ales) 
Country Turnover- 1990 US$m {ITU 1992) 
Mainlines- 1990 (ITU, 1992) 
Penetration (AA Questionnaire, 1994) 
Historic PIT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati sed 
Turnover- 1990 US$m (OECD,  1993) 
Turnover- DMk (1992 ales) 
Ownership 
Employee numbers - thousands (  1992 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
Subscribers 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD, 1993) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Interconnection: 
Right to interconnect? 
domestic 
international 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
PTO cost accounting system 
GERMANY 
79750 
137,740 
579 
35.3m 
25122 
31887 
47 lines per 100 inhabitants 
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom 
1990 
Under disscussion 
25117 
53957282 
Separate company owned by the government 
231 
Second wireline operator is currently under consideration 
De Te Mobil GmbH  Mannesmann 
Mobilfunk GmbH 
DBP Telekom  Mannesmann AG 
-51% 
Others- 49% 
E-Pius Mobilfunk 
GmbH 
VEBA-28% 
Thyssen - 28% 
Bellsouth - 21% 
Vodaphone - 10% 
771.9k sub (92 ales) information is unavailable 
{  +80k on GSM service) 
1986  1991  1994 
No voice telephony licence 
Yes 
Interconnection at both ends 
Yes 
Yes - except  for 3rd party voice traffic 
Yes - except  for 3rd party voice traffic 
Federal Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
Government Department 
Not until 2000 
Fully Distributed Costing Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
Background: 
Population ('COOs,  1992) 
Area - square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines 
Penetration (  1993 ales) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privatised (WIK, 1994) 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD, 1993) 
Telecoms Turnover DRm ('93 ales) 
Ownership 
Subscribers (1993 ales) 
Employee numbers - thousands ( 1993 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Leased Lines Competition (OECD) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Forms of Regulation 
Interconnection: 
Right to interconnect? 
Laws governing interconnection 
Interconnect charging 
PTO cost accounting system 
other 
GREECE 
10270 
50,945 
202 
1308 
4190 
46 subscriberS per 100 inhabitants 
·+ieHenic 'fetecommunication Or-ganisation (OTE) 
1948 
1949 (OTE incorporated as a Societe Anonyme (S.A.)) 
1293 
365754 
Separate entity owned by the government 
4744016 
26 
None - OTE granted monopoly:  10 years - fixed local telephony 
10 years - fixed long distance 
8 years - international services 
Stet Hellas 
(  GSM Mobile) 
Stet (Italy) - 75% 
Nynex- 20% 
lnteramerican- 5% 
(covers 70% pop'n) 
1993 
No 
None 
Panafone 
(GSM Mobile) 
Vodafone 
France Telecom 
lntracom 
Data Bank 
1993 
National Telecommunications Committee (NTC) 
Ministry of Transport and Communications 
Government Department 
TBA 
Mobile - 8 year duopoly for Panafon and Stet 
Both under re-evaluation- Telecommunication Act (1992) 
2167/93- Organisation of the public network operator 
Interconnect agreed on basis of arbitration/mediation in 
cases of non-agreement of interconnect terms 
OTE can choose either 5% of revenue of traffic between OTE & 
the operator or 3. 33% of mobile operator's service revenues 
(OTE-STET HELLAS interconnect- WIK- 1994) 
STET-Panafoh: each co.  'keeps what he gets'= no IC charges 
Fully Distributed Costing 
Greece is exempt from the EC deadline for voice telephony 
competition 2003 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Subscriber lines (  1993 ales) 
Country Turnover- 1990 US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines 
Penetration (  1994 ales) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati  sed 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD,'93) 
Turnover IR£m (1994 ales) 
Ownership 
Employee numbers- thousands (1994 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
Sundry information 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD, 1993) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Forms of Regulation 
domestic 
internatinal 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
Laws governing interconnection 
PTO cost accounting system 
Key future events and other 
information 
IRELAND 
3520 
26,595 
132 
1113000 telephone lines 
1250 
1024 
33 lines per 100 inhabitants 
Telecom Eireann 
1984 
No 
1293 
871 
Corporatised and government owned 
13 
TE given exclusive rights over: 
Mobile radiotelephony 
Paging 
Satellite services 
Fixed infrastructure 
Voice telephony 
Telex services 
Telecom Eireann (Eircell) -analogue 
Telecom Eireann 
Covers 95% of population (  1993 ales) 
Introduced  GSM in 199211993 
44000 subs (1993 accounts) 
1985 
No voice telephony licences 
Only outside of the confines of the TE granted monopolies 
On the same terms as ordinary customers 
Only a few at present 
No 
No 
Yes,  but only as share added services 
No 
Department of Transport, Energy and Communication 
Government Department 
Price regulation 
Postal and Telecommunications Services Act,  1983 
Fully Distributed Costing 
Ireland is exempt from EC deadline for competition until 2003 
Tariffs are undergoing partial rebalancing (1993 ales) 
2nd GSM licence to be given shortly Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area - square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Subscribers- thousands (1993 ales) 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines (ITU, 1992) 
Penetration (1993 ales) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati  sed 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD, 1993) 
Turnover- ILb (1993 ales) 
Employee numbers- thousands (1993 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN: 
Name 
Ownership 
subscribers- thousands (1993 ales) 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Leased Lines Competition (OECD) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Forms of Regulation 
PTO cost accounting system 
Other points 
ITALY 
57100 
116280 
491 
24167 
15681 
23071 
42 per 100 inhabitants 
STET (Holding company- 64% state owned) 
Telecom ltalia (56%- STET owned)- formed in 1994 from the 
merger of SIP, ltalcable, lritei,Telespazio and Sirm. 
Yes (e.g. 1932-SIP, 1933-STET)) 
Yes (e.g. 1936-SIP and STET) 
16666 (SIP) 
27167 (STET), 26797 (proforma Telecom ltalia) 
88 {SIP), 101  (proforma Telecom ltalia) 
None 
ltalpac (GSM) 
SIP 
1207 
1990 
No voice telephony licence 
No 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
Licence issue, tariffs (governed by law) 
Fully Distributed Costing 
Merger of SIP with lritel, ltalcable, Societa ltaliana Radio 
Maritima (SIRM) and Telespazio to form Telecom ltalia 
Pronto ltalia- Omnitel (a consortium formed in 1994) have been 
awarded a licences to operate a mobile service. 
Operations are anticipated to commence in 1995. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xni 
Background: 
Population ('ODDs,  1992} 
Area- square miles (T1mes Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines - 1991  (ITU, 1992) 
Penetration (AA Questionnaire, 1994) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati sed 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD, 1993) 
Telecommunications Turnover LUFm (1993 ales) 
OWnership 
Employee numbers- thousands (OECD- 1990) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
OWnership 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Leased Lines 
Regulator: 
Name 
Interconnection: 
Right to tnterconnect? 
PTO cost accounting system 
LUXEMBOURG 
390 
998 
391 
203 
192 
55 lines per 100 inhabitants 
·Enterprise des Pastes et Telecommunications (Pet T) 
1992 
No 
158 
7792 
Separate company 100% government owned 
0.7 
(2.517 in post & telecoms (1993 ales) 
None - P et T granted monopoly till 1998 
MOBILUX 
50% Millicom lnt' Cellular S.A. 
1985 
No voice telephony licence 
None 
Government - Ministry of Communications 
No 
Fully Distributed Costing 
Luxembourg has an extra two years {i.e. 2005) to comply 
with the EC liberalisation of voice telephony Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile} 
Subscribers (WIK, 1994) 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines 
Penetration (1993 ales) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati  sed 
Turnover '90 US$m (OECD, '93) 
Turnover- NLGm (1993- KPN Jaarverslag} 
NETHERLANDS 
15130 
15,890 
952 
50.1  per 100 inhabitants 
5193 
7630 
50 lines per 100 inhabitants 
PTITelecom B.V. 
1989 
1994 
5480 
11831 
Ownership  KPN - government majority owned company 
(Koninklijke PTI Nederland NV) 
Employee numbers- 1990 thousands (1993 ales)  31.9 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
subscribers -thousands 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD, 1993) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Laws 
Forms of Regulation 
Interconnection: 
Right to interconnect? 
Interconnect charging 
domestic 
intematinal 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
PTO cost accounting system 
None ti111998 
PTI concession given in 1989 for following services: 
Public telephony services  provision of leased lines 
Telex  public infrastructure 
PTITelecom B.V. 
{including GSM) 
PTI Telecom Netherlands 
RAM Mobile Data 
public packet switched mobile 
Analogue- 216k (KPN Jaarverslag '93) 
Digital- 22.5k (KPN Jaarverslag '93) 
1989 
No voice telephony licence 
Interconnection at both ends 
Yes 
Yes,  but only as Value Added Service 
No 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works - Department for 
Telecoms and Post (HDTP) 
Government Department 
T~ecommunications  Act 1988 
Tariff reasonableness, cross subsidisation policing (between 
regulated and non regulated units)  Compliance with EC rules 
Government currently deciding on when to offer licences 
No special agreement with RAM - merely standard terms for 
utilisation of the network + provision of leased lines. 
Fully Distributed Costing Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
Key future events 
NETHERLANDS 
30% of KPN shares to be floated in 1994 
New TO to compete with PTI {except voice) from 1995 
Voice telephony expected to be open to competition by 1998 
Major rebalancing underway effectively 100% increase in costs 
of trunk calls and 5.8% increase in fixed charges within 1 year 
Major fixed network competitors likely to come from 
electricity, railway and CATV sectors 
2nd GSM licence to be tendered for shortly. Main contenders: 
lNG (dutch bank) and Vodafone (foreign network operator) 
RABO (dutch bank) and Bellsouth (foreign network operator) 
ABN-AMRO(dutch bank) & PacTel{foreign network operator) Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area - square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Country Turnover- 1990 US$m (ITU 1992} 
Mainlines 1991  (ITU,  1992) 
Penetration - 1990 (  OECD, 1993) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati sed 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD, 1993) 
Telecom Turnover PTEm (1993 Consol' ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Natne 
Ownership 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
leased Lines Competition 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Laws 
Forms of Regulation 
Interconnection: 
Right to interconnect? 
Laws governing interconnection 
Interconnect charging 
PORTUGAL 
10420 
35370 
295 
1581 
2693 
24 
Portugal Telecom-- Cable·&·Wireline (public) 
CPRM - Companhia Portugue Sa Radio Marconi, SA- submarine 
cable and satellite (public- government 51%) 
Telepac- Services de Telecomunicacoes, SA- wireline 
(100%- Telecom) 
Portugal Telecom, SA.- June 1994 
CPRM -1925 
T  elepac - May 1992 
Portugal Telecom, SA- 100% state owned 
CPRM- 51% state owned 
1480 
394552 
None- until1998 
"Fundamental service monopoly'' reserved 
TMN - Telecomunicacoes 
M6veis Nacionais, SA 
66.6%- Telecom 
33.3%- CPRM 
1989 
No voice telephony licence 
Telecel SA 
Private 
1991 
Open to competition - several currently operating 
No 
Ministerio dos Transportes e Comunicacoes 
Ministry for Public works, transport and Communications, 
Institute for Communications in Portugal {ICP) 
Government Department 
Telecommunications Act:  Law No.  88/89 
Decree Law No. 283/89 established the ICP in 1989 
Regulation and licencing of operators 
International communication affairs 
Spectrum management  Postal service overseer 
Technical standard approval  Broadcast overseer 
"Complimentary'' &"VAS" services given right of access 
Telecommunications Act: Law No. 88/89 
Various • 
Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European CommUDities, DG XIII 
PTO cost accounting system 
Key future events 
Other points 
PORTUGAL 
Fully Distributed Costing  Rudimentary in all TOs 
Government has announced plans to merge TP, TLP and 
Marconi and later to privatise the combined company 
ICP requiring new accounts from '95 from all TOs which detail 
the separate lines of business 
Reserved numbering prefixes for cellular, telecel. TMN & paging 
Portugal is exempt from the EC deadline for voice telephony 
competition _until 2003 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
Background: 
Population ('OOOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Country Turnover - 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines- 1991  {ITU,  1992) 
Penetration (AA Questionnaire, 1994) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised (OECD, 1993) 
Privatised (OECD,  1993) 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD,1993) 
Turnover PTm(1993 ales) 
Ownership 
Employee numbers -thousands '90 (OECD, 1993) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Leased Lines Competition 
Regulator: 
Name 
PTO cost accounting system 
Other 
SPAIN 
39950 
194885 
205 
10682 
13264 
36 lines per 1  00 inhabitants 
:retef6nica de Espana, S.A 
1924 
1924 
8363 
1220084 
67% Public, 33% government (Madrid and NY SE) 
75.4 
None 
Telef6nica 
1984 
No voice telephony licences 
a new GSM licence is to be issued in 
November 1994.  Telef6nica will also 
operate a GSM licence 
No - The government plan to introduce competition in 1995 
Directorate Generate de Telecomunicacions (DGTel) 
Fully Distributed Costing 
Spain does not have to comply with the European Resolution 
for the liberalisation of voice telephony until 2003 due to a less 
developed network than the European average.  However, the 
government are planning to liberalise voice telephony by 1998 
• Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlll 
Background: 
Population ('COOs,  1992) 
Area- square miles (Times Atlas) 
Density (population per sq mile) 
Subscribers (1994 ales) 
Country Turnover- 1991  US$m (ITU 1992) 
Mainlines 
Penetration (AA Questionnaire 1994) 
Historic PTT 
Name 
Corporatised 
Privati  sed 
Turnover 1990 US$m (OECD, 1993} 
Turnover £UKm (1994 ales} 
Ownership 
Employee numbers- thousands (1994 ales) 
Fixed wire competitors: 
Name 
Turnover 
Ownership 
Mobile/PCN competitors: 
Name 
Ownership 
Subscribers (1994 ales) 
Date commenced operation 
Name 
Ownership 
Date commenced operation 
Cable (Telephony capability) 
Service Providers 
Leased Lines 
Competition 
(OECD, 1993) 
Regulator: 
Name 
Status 
Laws 
domestic 
internationa  I 
3rd Party 
Capacity resale 
UNITED KINGDOM 
57660 
94,475 
610 
26,640,000 exchange-line connections 
23598 
25595 
50 lines per 1  ~0 inhabitants 
British Telecom 
1969 (split from post in 1981) 
1984 
23364 
13675 
1% government 99% private 
156 
Mercury Communications Ltd 
£1.2 bn 
Kingston Communications Ltd 
C&W - 80%, Bell Canada - 20%  Private 
128,000 lines 
Licenced in 82 - expanded in '84  historic regional company 
400,000 public tel' customers  375k population capture 
Cell net 
60% - British Telecom 
40% - Securicor 
Licenced in 1985 
1  019000 subscribers 
1985 
Orange (PCN) 
Hutchinson Microtel 
1994 
Yes 
Yes 
Interconnection at both ends 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Vodafone 
No major shareholders 
licenced in 1985 
1,17  4, 000 subscribers 
1985 
Mercury one-2-one (PCN) 
50%- Mercury (C & W) 
50%- US West 
1993 
Department of Trade and Industry, Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel) 
independent 
Telecommunications Act 1984 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
Interconnection: 
Right to interconnect? 
Laws governing interconnection 
Interconnect charging 
Universal Service/Social Obligations: 
PTO cost accounting system 
Key future events 
Other 
UNITED KINGDOM 
All PTOs have a right to interconnect with all other PTOs 
referred to in BT's licence sections 13, 15, 19 and 46 
13 - duty of BT to interconnect with any other PTO 
To cover BT's FAC of conveyance on historic cost basis 
including full contribution to overheads calculated from FRBS 
+ the applicable rate of return to the capital employed 
+ contribution to BT's Access Deficit (Waiver concessions) 
Regulator reviewed if not previously agreed by the parties 
(BT looking to standardise the interconnection agreements) 
Borne by BT {price regulation on 64% of it's service - RPI-x) 
FDC into cost codes published as the FRBS 
(Financial Results By Service) 
Cellnet and Vodafone shortly to be given freedom to build their 
own fixed links 
Access Deficit waiver regime and price capping to cease in '97 
Oftel intends to proceed with accounting separation of BT into 
BT-Retail, BT-Network and BT-Access 
Other TO's: 
Energis Communications Ltd  subsidiary of the national grid 
Colt  City network 
MFS Communications Ltd  City network - fibre optic 
and many more licenced operators 
Rebalancing restricted through RPI+2% on connection & line rental 
low-user discounts obligation and RPI+S limit on multi-line 
business rentals Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
APPENDIX3 
THE DEATH SPIRAL 
The term "Death Spiral" describes the catastrophic result of basing production decisions on 
simplistic FOC based profitability analysis. 
This is best illustrated by way  ·of  -a-simple  .. example: 
A company sells four product lines.  The company incurs several costs in providing these 
products: 
•  Direct costs which are only incurred with production of that specific product. 
•  Family costs which are costs incurred with production of that family of products. 
These costs are allocated to the specific products on the basis of revenue. 
•  Firm costs which are costs incurred with running the firm as a whole (e.g. 
C..nairman's salary).  These costs are also allocated to the specific products on the 
basis of revenue. 
The profitability analysis of the four products of the firm are as follows (all figures have 
been rounded): 
A 
Product 
family 1 
B  c 
Product 
family 2 
D 
Revenue  CJ CJ CJ CJ  Direct costs  0 
Allocated family costs (on basis of revenue)  11  9  I I  15  5 
Allocated firm costs (on basis of revenue)  3  3  3  1 
Fully Allocated Cost  54  52  58  16 
Product Profit  6  -4  1  2 
Corporate profit  5 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
From the above analysis it would appear that product B is not "profitable".  Removing 
product B from production would then give rise to the following profitability analysis: 
A 
Product 
family 1 
B  c 
Product 
family 2 
D 
Revenue  c:J CJ CJ c:=  Direct costs  0  cr 
Allocated family costs (on basis of revenue)  0  0  15 
Allocated firm costs (on basis of revenue)  5  0  4 
Fully Allocated Cost  65  0  59 
Product Profit  -5  0  0 
Corporate profit  -3 
Now, Product A has borne the total of the alloca~d  family costs (which are now therefore 
recategorised as direct costs).  This has led to Product A also now appearing unprofitable. 
Removing product A as well as B would now give rise to the following profitability 
analysis:-
Product 
family 1 
Product 
family 2 
5 
1 
16 
2 
A  B  C  D 
Revenue  CJ CJ CJ c=  Direct costs  0  0 
Allocated family costs (on basis of revenue)  0  0  15  5. 
Allocated firm costs (on basis of revenue)  0  0  7  3  .. 
Fully Allocated Cost  0  0  62  18 
Product Profit  0  0  -3  0 
Corporate profit  -3 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
Product Family 2 now bear the cost of all the firm's common costs.  The allocation of these 
costs has resulted in the apparent unprofitability of product C.  Removing product C, 
leaving just product D in production gives rise to the following profitability analysis:-
Product  Product 
familyl  family 2 
A  B  c  D 
CJCJCJ c:J  0 
Revenue 
Direct costs 
Allocated family costs (on basis of revenue)  0  0  I I  0 
Allocated firm costs (on basis of revenue)  0  0  0 
Fully Allocated Cost  0  0  0 
Product Profit  0  0  0 
Corporate profit  -22 
Product D now bears all the remaining firm costs and gives rise to a large loss. 
By basing decisions on the FDC of the products the company has transformed from a 
profitable organisation to a heavy loss making one. 
0 
10 
40 
-22 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XID 
APPENDIX4 
MEANING OF USO AND SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
"Universal Service Obligation" (USO) and "social obligations'' are closely related terms, both 
poorly defined.  We use them to cover the obligations placed on TOs to behave in a non-
commercial  way by  providing  outputs  (i.e.  products  or  services)  on  certain  terms  for 
vulnerable market segments.  This  is  best illustrated by examples  of the products  and 
services which are included in the definition and those which are excluded:-
Included are: 
relay  services  for  profoundly deaf people (with  users  paying only  "normal"  call 
charges) 
special telephones for people with various disabilities 
payphones with very low takings (e.g. in isolated areas) 
reduced rentals for pensioners 
Excluded because they are not outputs (although undoubtedly of public concern) are: 
employment (e.g. requirement to maintain a certain size of workforce in the TOs) 
training given to TO workforce 
R&D 
sourcing (e.g. requirements to place supply contracts by open competitive tender) 
environmental controls e.g. on placing of radio masts 
overall  price  control,  e.g.  by  broad  price  caps  - these  are  designed  to  improve 
efficiency rather than benefit particular customer groups Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
Excluded because the market segment is not vulnerable are: 
constraints  on speed of rebalancing  (normally non-traffic  sensitive  (NTS)  versus 
traffic sensitive (TS), local vs long-distance) 
emergency callout service (cost is proper to the emergency services and small in 
relation to their total costs) 
providing adequate network capacity for overflows from competition ("network of 
last resort") 
defence requirements 
A controversial area not included in the examples above is the provision of service to remote 
rural areas at nationally uniform (or near-uniform) prices.  This is discussed in more detail 
in section 7.  In summary we take the view that in developed countries it is the exception 
rather than the rule that such activities would fall within our definition, because: 
the cost differential attributed to rural operations is often overestimated 
the revenues resulting from rural operations are very worthwhile, especially long-
term and taking accounting of incoming as well as outgoing traffic. 
From  limited  evidence  available  for  the  UK,  we  believe  that  low  levels  of  telephone 
connection are more likely to prevail in areas of deprived inner-city/  suburban housing than 
in rural areas.  The challenges of achieving universal service are more likely to be associated 
with urban poverty and multiple deprivation than with the supposed high cost of rural 
provision.  These observations seem to be confirmed by the Swiss Bakom report. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
APPENDIX5 
COST DATA REGARDING THE USO 
A  number of studies  have been  performed  around  the world  that have  attempted  to 
quantify the cost of the Universal Service Obligation and various social obligations.  Whilst 
this is not the place to reproduce these in full a number of such studies are worthy of further 
review.  These are as follows: 
Analysys.  Provision of Quantitive Data as Background Material for the Bangemann Group. 
Final Report, 18 May 1994. 
INFRAS.  Unterstudie Grundversorgung - Schlussbericht.  INFRAS  report for  BAKOM. 
Zurich, March 1994. 
Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics.  The Cost of Telecom's Community 
Service Obligations.  BTCE Report 64, Canberra 1989.  ISSN 0814 - 9097. 
Commission of the European Communities: Federal Telecommunication Subsidies in the 
USA.  Report prepared for C&C DGXIII, November 1991. 
Borrows, John D,  Phyllis A.  Berntt and Raymond W.  Lawton.  Universal Service in the 
United  States:  Discussions  of  the  Debate.  Wissenschaftliches  lnstitut  Fiir 
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APPENDIX6 
EFFECI'S OF DIFFERING COSTING METHODS ON SERVICE COST 
ESTIMATES 
In Section 7.4 above, we commented that a wide range of cost allocation bases are available 
which can result in very different allocation of costs between services.  In this appendix, we 
demonstrate the· marked difference in  ·estimates ·of-service-costs-resulting from "reasonable" 
methodological alternatives. 
The cost of local service consists of three parts - access from the customer's premises to a 
serving  end  office  (switching  system),  the  end  office  usage  and  interoffice  transport 
(transmission).  Interoffice transport consists of the outside plant (metallic or fibre cables) 
and  circuit  equipment  (digital  cross  connects,  multiplexers  and  lightwave  equipment) 
shared by local and long distance traffic, as well as private lines.  The amount of interoffice 
plant and its costs are driven by the amount of bandwidth required at the busy hour (BH)  of 
use1• 
A  1990 study by the Rand Corporation computed the costs of local telephone service in 
Califomia2•  The study provided estimates of the costs  of access  and local usage.  Rand's 
study assumed that changes in local calling would cause additional investment in only 
portions of the interoffice facilities,  primarily the multiplexing equipment. Other facilities, 
such as fibre lines and digital cross connects, were considered one-time, fixed  costs. The 
resulting average capital costs per line were: 
$0.80 - $1.20 per year 
These represent the average annual depreciation, cost of money and income taxes per local 
telephone line assuming average usage of 2.0 BH CCS per line. 
Allocation of Fixed Costs 
When  the  fixed  or  non-volume  sensitive  costs  associated  with  the  fibre,  digital  cross 
connects and lightwave equipment are included in the incremental costs, the average capital 
costs per line increase by a factor of four: 
2 
The unit of capacity for bandwidth is bits of data.  A voicegrade channel requires 64Kbits.  When 
transmission is over digital fibre, a voicegrade channel is called a DSO channel.  Twenty-four channels 
combine to form a DSI circuit with 1.566 megabits of capacity. 
Mitchell; "Incremental Cost of  Telephone Access and Local Use", Rand Corporation, June, 1990. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XITI 
$3.24 - $4.24 per year 
This calculation implicitly assumes that growth in the number of local service customers 
cause additional investment and capital costs in fibre, cross connects, etc. in spite of the fact 
that facilities initially placed between switching systems may be adequate to handle growth 
in demand. 
lnveshnentLoading 
Telephone company service cost analyses often add additional investment loading to cable, 
switching and circuit investment for  structures (poles and conduit), land, buildings and 
other secondary, support plant.  The argument is that support plant is required to house or 
otherwise support primary plant and should, therefore, be attributed to services.  Others 
will argue that for most practical situations, the investment in land, buildings and structures 
would be the same whether a service is added or not. 
Investment loading factors for central office eq~pment  may range from 15-50%. When the 
loadings  are added to  the previous estimates,  the annual costs  for  interoffice  transport 
increase even further: 
$3.73 - $6.36 per year 
Other Methodological Differences 
These are just three examples of differences in costing methods and the significant impact 
they have upon service cost estimates.  There still are others: 
Embedded versus Forward-Looking Costs- The previous estimates were based upon 
incremental costing, thus they reflected the current or future costs of plant which 
would have to be added with increased demand for local telephone service.  Often 
cost  studies  are  performed  to  determine  the  costs  of  existing  telephone  plant 
attributable to services.  These are embedded costs. 
Since  the  cost  per  unit of  capacity  of some  types  of  telephone  equipment  are 
dropping  due  to  lower  material  prices  or  higher  vendor  discounts,  embedded 
material prices may be higher than incremental material prices.  This difference in 
method would further increase service cost estimates. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
Peak versus Off-Peak Costing- Studies are often based on usage anytime- anyday. 
This implicitly assumes that all service usage contributes to plant costs.  If, however, 
a service utilises plant during off peak periods, it does not contribute to  additional 
capacity requirements or plant investment  This tends to lower service costs. 
Other  Cost Drivers  - In our previous  example,  local  telephone  service  utilises 
interoffice trunks (a DSO equivalent) for a period of time (BH CCS).  Some services, 
such a private lines, have a dedicated interoffice channel.  In this case, the driver is a 
DSO,  DSI  or higher bandwidth circuit  Expressing costs on this basis produces a 
very  different  figure.  For  example,  using  the  data  from  the  Rand  study,  the 
interoffice plant capital costs for a DSO would be: 
Conclusion 
$10.35 - $13.34 per year (without fixed costs) 
$33.50 - 5191.75 per year (with fixed costs) 
There is considerable flexibility  in developing cost allocation  principles.  Having decided 
upon  the  principles  there  is  considerable  further  flexibility  in  their  detailed  bases  of 
application. Accordingly, it is possible to support a wide range of cost allocations, each of 
which will fall within the bounds of acceptable practice, which will clearly enable different 
conclusions to be drawn with regard to the calculation of service costs. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
APPENDIX7 
DEPRECIATION POLICIES 
The following tables report the depreciation policies applied by the incumbent operators in 
each member state.  In all cases, unless otherwise indicated, the depreciation policy is 
straight-line over the useful economic life of the asset and expressed in years. 
This serves to illustrate how the incumbent operators in each member state not only 
categorise their fixed assets into different groupings but also depreciate those similar fixed 
assets at different rates. 
For example, buildings are depreciated over 60 years by Telecom Eireann, 25-33 years by 
SIP, 20 years by Tele Danmark and up to 10 years by PIT Telecom BV. 
Thus, given identical networks, each incumbent operator would derive a different 
depreciation charge and hence a different "cost" to the business of utilising those fixed 
assets. 
Belgium 
Fixed asset category 
Land 
Built-up land 
Construction equipment in operation 
Other real rights on buildings 
Plant, machinery and equipment 
Furniture and office equipment 
Computers and accessories 
Vehicles 
Refurbishment work on rented buildings 
Non-built up land used by third parties 
Buildings used by third parties 
Building equipment used by third parties 
Accommodation 
Equipment in accommodation 
Disused buildings 
Disused building equipment 
Tangible fixed assets under construction 
and advance payments 
Source: Belgacom annual report 1993 
Useful life 
not depreciated 
33 
22 
33. 
3-25 
10 
3 
5 
5 
not depreciated 
33 
22 
33 
22 
not depreciated 
not depreciated 
depreciated in the same way as the fixed 
assets to which they relate Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
Denmark 
Fixed asset categorv 
Buildings, etc. 
Cable installations 
Telephone exchange installations, etc. 
Equipment on customers' premises 
Fixtures and fittings, motor vehicles, etc. 
Source: Tele Danmark annual report 1993 
France 
Useful life 
20 
10-14 
10 
5 
3-5 
France Telecom does not publicly disclose information concerning depreciation pracitices. 
Gennany 
Fixed asset category 
Intangible assets 
Buildings 
Telephone equipment and terminal 
equipment 
Data transmission equipment, telephone 
network and ISDN switching equipment, 
transmission equipment, radio equipment, 
and equipment for broadband distribution 
networks 
Broadband distribution networks, line 
networks and cable conduit lines 
Telecommunications equipment, supplies, 
etc. 
Other plant and machinery 
Other fixtures and fittings, tools and 
machinery 
Useful life* 
4 
10-60 
5-10 
10 
20 
3-12 
15 
4-15 
*  Depreciation rates in Germany are determined to a large extent by the tax  authority 
tables 
Source: Deutsche Bundespost Telekom annual financial statements 1992 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
Greece 
Fixed asset categorv 
Land 
Buildings 
Telephone exchanges 
Telegraph exchanges 
Radio relay stations 
Local airline network 
Network piping 
Underground network 
Underwater network 
Connection 
Secondary installation 
Tools and equipment 
Printing Machinery 
Tools and equipment at 3rd parties 
Others 
Useful life 
not depreciated 
20. 
12.5 
10 
8 
12.5 
25 
25 
20 
10 
8 
5.5 
8.3 
5 
5-8 
Source: Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. 
Ireland 
Fixed asset category 
Buildings 
Transmission equipment - duct 
Transmission equipment- cable 
Radio and repeater equipment 
Exchanges 
Useful life 
60 
40 
10-20 
11-35 
10-20 
Source: Telecom Eireann annual report and accounts 31 March 1994 
Italy 
Fixed asset categorv 
Non-industrial buildings 
Industrial buildings 
Plant and machinery 
Other tangible fixed assets 
Source: SIP anr.ual report 1992 
Useful life 
33 
25 
5-20 
3-15 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIll 
Luxembourg 
Fixed asset categorv 
Land 
Buildings 
Transmission cable 
Transmission ducts 
Fire safety equipment 
Security equipment 
Replacement transfomers containing PCB 
Special equipment 
Underground network (including 
junctions) 
Overground network 
Technical installations and machines 
Useful life 
not depreciated 
25-50 
10-25 
15 
10 
10 
5 
10 
20 
10 
5-10 
Source: Enterprise des Postes et Telecommunications annual report 1993 
Netherlands 
Fixed asset category 
Land and buildings 
Plant and equipment 
Other property, plant and equipment 
Property, plant and equipment in progress 
Useful life 
0-10 
4-33 
7-25 
not depreciated 
Source: KPN annual report 1993 (includes postal service) 
Portugal 
Fixed asset category 
Buildings and improvements 
Plant, machinery and equipment 
Vehicles, transport and equipment 
Tools 
Office furniture and equipment 
Other fixed assets 
Useful life 
8-50 
3-20 
4-7 
4-10 
3-10 
3-10 
Source: Communicacoes Nacionais consolidated annual report 1993 (consolidated financial 
statements of Portuguese TOs) Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XID 
Spain 
Fixed asset categorv 
Buildings/  structures 
Power equipment 
Switching equipment 
Transmission equipment 
Urban and inter-urban networks 
Subscriber equipment and other 
installations 
Mobile, office equipment and others 
Source: Telefonica annual report, 1993 
United Kingdom 
Fixed asset category 
Freehold buildings 
Leasehold land and buildings 
Transmission duct 
Transmission cable 
Radio and repeater equipment 
Digital telephone exchange equipment 
Computers and office equipment 
Payphones, other network equipment, 
motor vehicles and cableships 
Source: British Telecom annual report 1994 
Useful life 
40 
13-18 
10-20 
5-15 
8-25 
4-8 
5-10 
Useful life 
40 
unexpired portion of lease or 40 years, 
whichever is the shorter 
25 
10-37 
4-25 
11-13 
3-7 
3-40 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
APPENDIX8 
PRELIMINARY LIST OF UNBUNDLED 
SERVICES:  EXTRACf FROM OFrEL 
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE 
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF 
TELECOl\HdUNICATIONS. 
~CONNEcnONAND 
ACCOUNTING SEPARATION: mE 
NEXT STEPS OFrEL, MARCH 1994: 
ANNEXH 
STANDARD LIST OF 
INTERCONNEcnON SERVICES 
(BROKEN DOWN BY 
COMPONENTS) 
1 The Tables that follow provide a list of 
interconnection services technically capable of 
being provided by any operator. OFTEL has 
divided these into 3. 
List A containing interconnection services that 
OFfEL believes BT should provide from 
January 1995 although not all the pricing 
arrangements are yet determined. 
List B contains those services OITEL believes 
need to be considered during 1994 so that they 
can be provided, if  agreed or determined, by 
January 1995. 
List C contains those services or issues which 
OFfEL believes may need more extensive 
debate on a longer time scale. 
2 This annex sets out the contents of the three 
lists. 
A glossary of terms used in the Tables is 
attached to the back of the Tables. The 
numbers referred to are the numbers in the 
Tables. 
List A 
Services with a conveyance element 
1.1  OLE interconnect 
1.2  OMSU-OLE (single tandem) 
1.3  OMSU-OMSU-OLE (double tandem) 
1.4  Outgoing International Direct dialling 
interconnect at DMSU 
1.5  Outgoing International Direct Dialling 
interconnect at ISC 
1.6  Indirect access ingress interconnect at 
DMSU 
1.7  Indirect access ingress interconnect at 
OLE 
1.14  Transit DMSU-DMSU 
1.15  Transit DMSU 
1.16  Access to operator's PRS 
1.17  Access to operator's freefone service 
1.18  Access to operator's local call fee 
services 
1.19  Access via INMARSAT 
1.20  Access via Skyphone 
1.21  Transit access to another operator's PRS 
1.22  Transit access to another operator's 
freephone service 
1.23  Transit access to another operator's local 
call fee services 
1.24  OLE interconnect of ISDN 
1.25  DMSU-DLE interconnect of ISDN 
1.26  DMSU-DMSU-DLE interconnect of 
ISDN 
1.27  Outgoing ISDN IDD at DMSU 
1.28  Outgoing ISDN IDD at ISC 
1.29  Transit DMSU-DMSU interconnect of 
ISDN 
1.30  Transit DMSU interconnect of ISDN 
1.31  Access to operator's emergency services 
1.32  Access to operator's operator assistance 
1.33  Access to operator's operator assistance 
+ onward successful call 
1.34  Access to operator's directory assistance 
1.35  Access to operator's blind and disabled 
directory assistance 
·  1.36  Access to operator's international 
directory assistance 
1.38  Access to BT international operator 
assistance 
1.39  Access to operator's international 
operator assistance + onward successful 
call 
1.40  Inland transfer charge calls to another 
operator's customer 
1.41  Incoming international transfer charge 
calls 
Crown Copyright. Reprinted with the permission of Oftel. T
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Glossary of Terms 
AFN 
C7 
D or DE digits 
DAS 
DDSN 
DJSU 
DLE 
DMSU 
all figure number (eg nnn in 07lnnn 9876) 
CCITI No.7 signalling system 
digit in number string (eg DE in 
0987 D£4321) 
Directory Assistance System 
Digital Derived Services Network 
Digital Junction Switching Unit 
Digital Local Exchange 
Digital Main Switching Unit 
indirect access system to enable BT users to route 
calls via an OLO system by dialling 
a particular access code 
intra-building 
link 
ingress 
INMARSAT 
ISC 
ISDN 
i/x 
KDT 
Mb 
NIS 
NNG 
o/g 
OLO 
PDH 
PRS 
RCU 
SDH 
transit 
the link between interfaces on 
multiplexors and the switches at 
either end of an Interconnect link 
from BT to Operator's network 
International Maritime Satellite 
Organisation 
International Switching Centre 
Integrated Services Digital Network 
interconnect 
Keyboard display terminal 
megabits per second 
Number Information System 
national number group (  eg XXX in 
Oxxx 987654) 
outgoing (from UK) 
Other Licensed Operator 
plesiochronous digital hierarchy 
Premium Rate Services 
Remote Concentrator Unit 
synchronous digitial hierarchy 
call from Operator A to Operator B 
via BT's network 
Crown Cop}rigbt.  RcpriDt.cd with the permission of  Oftel. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIII 
3 The tables show the services and the 
components that make up those services. It is 
proposed that it is the services that would be 
bought, not the components. 
4 For ease of understanding, the components 
and services are described in relation to the 
BT network structure and its elements. 
5 Some services are .provided for interconnect 
now or technically capable of being provided 
now, others may require some technical 
development and still others may require 
fundamental technical development. 
Table 1 Seroices with a conveyance element 
Each service (each row in the table) comprises 
one or more of thirteen components. These 
components are labelled A to M. They are: 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
international network: the network 
from BT's International Switching 
Centre to halfway to the foreign admin 
ISC: switching at the International 
Switching Centre 
trunk transmission: transmission 
between DMSUs and between DMSU 
and ISC 
trunk switching: switching in the 
DMSU layer of BT's network. 
junction bansmission (1): transmission 
between the trunk switching layer and 
digital local exchange (D LE) or digital 
junction switching unit (DJSU) or 
between DJSU and DLE 
local switching setup: setup of 
switched calls at the BT DLE. This 
includes any switching at analogue 
exchanges parented on BT's DLEs.  In 
London this also includes BT's DJSUs. 
Table 28 Number Information Systems 
local switching March 3, 1994 
termination: termination of switched 
calls at the BT DLE. This includes any 
switching at analogue exchanges 
parented on BT's DLEs. In London this 
also includes BT's DJSUs. 
H  junction transmission (ll): transmission 
between the DLE and a remote 
concentrator unit. 
I  concentrator unit may be co  located or 
remote (RCU). This component covers 
the traffic-sensitive costs of the unit. 
DDSN: BT's Digital Derived Services 
·Network, including termination of the 
call. 
K  Operator Centres: BT has centres for 
Directory Assistance, International 
Directory Assistance, Operator 
Assistance, International Operator 
Assistance and Emergency Services. 
This component in the table also 
includes the conveyance from BT's 
DLEs to Operator Handling Centres. 
L 
M 
Payphone Access: Levy on free-to-caller 
calls made from BT public payphones . 
Outpayments: Some services have a 
price component that includes a 
payment to an originating or 
terminating Operator (or foreign 
Admin) or to a Service Provider (e.g. 
transit, access to BT Freefone 0800, 
outgoing international). 
In addition to these components, contributions 
to Access Deficit (ADCs) will be payable, 
subject to Oftel waiver, on all OLO-billed calls 
billed that use BT's exchange lines. 
·  Note that services that offer access to an 
Operator's operators could be by an OLO's 
customer or by that OLO's operators. 
Table 2A Data Management Amendments 
The creation or amendment of number ranges. 
In addition to these services, BT may reserve 
the right to charge for specific network 
management intervention, for example, call 
gapping. 
Table 2B Number Information Systems 
Entry of Operators' customer number 
information on to BT's Number Information 
System (NIS) or into BT's phone books.  Also, 
Crown CopyrighL  Reprinted with the pemu.ssion of Oftel. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XIn 
access to customer number information, either 
using BT's Directory Assistance System (D  AS) 
or through supply of BT Phonebooks. 
Although not shown in the tables, BT would 
also provide, and charge for, service 
development, data amendment work and 
operator training for OLOs to setup Operator 
Centres. 
Table 3 Infrastructure Seroices 
Tables 3A, 3B and 3C cover the 
interconnection services proposed by BT. 
Table 3D shows the price structure of 
dedicated point-to-point transport. 
Table 4 Network Features 
Features in addition to basic services 
identified in Tables 1-3. The table quotes 
examples of such services and is not intended 
to he exhaustive 
A glossary of terms follows the tables. 
Crown Copyright.  Reprinted with the peanission of Oftel. L
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LIST OF SERVICES TECHNICALLY CAPABLE OF BEING PROVIDED BY ANY OPERA  TOR 
TABLE4 
NE1WORK FEATURES 
NB Cost components to be identified. 
SERVICE 
4.1  change of number announcemt 
4.2  call diversion 
4.3  ·  geographic portabititywithin same NNG 
4.4  non-geographic number blocks 
4.5  inter-Oprtr portability of non-geog numbers 
Crown Copyright.  Reprinted with the permission ofOftel. 
... Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
APPENDIX9 
TELEPHONE COMPANY COST STATEMENT BREAKDOWN 
To  achieve  a  meaningful understanding of  service costs  and revenues  requires  detailed 
financial  information.  This  is illustrated below based upon hierarchical  analysis  of an 
operator's reported performed.  We have used as an example an analysis prepared in the 
USA where the practice of service costing is currently more widely applied~  These analyses 
highlight the conflict between maintaining the confidentiality of an operator's commercial 
information and providing the level of detail. which an interconnecting operator might 
consider necessary. 
Illustrative analyses are as follows: 
Total Company Results Report 
Segment Report 
Consumer Segment Report 
Residence Line Contribution Report 
Network Transfer Charges 
Network Transfer Prices Segment Report. 
Central Office Line Terminating Equipment Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xm 
1.  Total Company Results Report 
Income Statement 
Total Operating Turnover 
Operating Expenses 
Plant Specific 
Plant Non-Specific 
Depreciation 
Customer 
Corporate 
Total 
Other Operating Income & Expenses 
Interest & Related Items 
Net Loss 
Net Asset Statement 
Telephone Plant in Service 
Less:  Accumulated depreciation 
Material & Supplies 
Telephone Plant Under Construction 
Less:  Customer deposits 
Total Assets 
Debt Ratio 
Equity Capital ($) 
Return on Equity 
Return on Turnover 
Asset Turnover 
Leverage 
Comment 
s 
(17,281,942) 
(7,258,829) 
(14,201,025) 
(17,678,105) 
(11,542,503) 
For most European companies, this information is publicly available. 
s 
78,385,530 
(67,962,404) 
(3,077,237) 
(8,730,377) 
(1,384,488) 
274,410,698 
(88,064,862) 
3,052,166 
4,904,082 
(893,206) 
193,408,878 
63% 
71,967,444 
-2% 
-2% 
0.41 
2.69 •
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 Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG Xlli 
4.  Residence Line Contribution Report 
Actual  Monthly  Percentage of 
($)  Amount Per  Turnover and 
Residence Line  Transfer 
($)  Charges 
•  ($) 
Turnover and Transfer Charges 
_,  Turnover  7,153,013  7.44  100% 
Transfer changes  0  0.00  0 
Total (A)  7,153,013  7.44  100% 
Direct Costs 
Volume Sensitive Costs 
Network Transfer Charges 
Local Loop  5,704,613  5.93  80% 
Central Office  3,505,313  3.64  49% 
Interoffice Transport  0  0.00  0% 
Other  0  0.00  0% 
Total (B)  9,209,926  9.57  129% 
Business Process Costs 
Sales  0  0.00  0% 
Service Establishment  0  0.00  0% 
Service Maintenance  1,138,125  1.18  16% 
Invoicing & Collection  615,332  0.64  9% 
Other  0  0.00  0% 
Total (C)  1,753,457  1.82  25% 
Total Volume Sensitive Costs  10,963,383  11.40  153% 
(B+C) 
Fixed Costs  41,186  0.04  1% 
Total Direct Costs (D)  11,004,569  11.44  154% 
Service Contribution (D-A)  {3,851,556)  (4.00)  (54%) 
Comment 
Gaining further detailed analysis of the Residence Line contribution, we begin to get some 
idea of what types of costs underlie retail segment results and operator charges, but there is 
no information on utilisation and unit transfer prices. Arthur Andersen Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, DG xni 
S.  Network Transfer Charges 
Facilities provided to:  Consumer Segment - Residence Line 
Quantitv  Description 
80,166  Localloops 
80,166  Central office line 
terminations 
82,161  Local originating interoffice 
busy hour minutes of use 
80,166  Local originating busy hour 
minutes of use 
Subtotal - Central Office 
Total 
Comment 
Monthlv Price  Total Annual 
($)  Charges 
($) 
5.93 
2.93  2,818,637 
0.10  101,854 
0.61  584,822 
5,704,613 
3,505,313 
9,209,926 
These are the kinds of data we believe NRAs will need to make a determination and the cost 
allocation information an operator would find acceptable. We, of course, are not into 
proprietary information from a telephone company's point of view. 
• •
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